Advancing Nuclear Disarmament in the Middle East

 Weekly newsletter for ArabDigest.org, 11 May 2023

Summary: talks need to resume to achieve a Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone in the Middle East, and build on the recent thawing of ties between Saudi Arabia and Iran.

We thank Emad Kiyaei and Paul Cochrane for today’s article. Emad is Director of the Middle East Treaty Organization (METO) and co-author of A Middle East Free of Weapons of Mass Destruction: A New Approach to Nonproliferation, published by Routledge (2020). Paul is an independent journalist covering the Middle East and Africa. He writes regularly for Middle East Eye, Nuclear Energy International, Energy World, and other specialised titles.

The Middle East is at a crossroads, faced with the decision to either advance nuclear disarmament or trigger further nuclear proliferation.

The history of the region is littered with instances of governments building, testing, and using weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) on civilian populations. Egypt deployed chemical weapons in Yemen in the 1960s, and two decades later, Iraq used them on its own citizens and on Iranians during the eight-year war. In the past decade, the Syrian conflict has unleashed dozens of chemical attacks on the civilian population.

However, there is renewed hope to advance the establishment of a decades-old proposal calling for a Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone (WMDFZ) in the Middle East. Such a zone aims to eradicate chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons from all 22 Arab countries in the Middle East and North Africa, as well as Iran and Israel.

Immediate and future proliferation risks are taking shape in a volatile region with ongoing conflicts and geopolitical rivalries. Of particular concern is Israel's opaque nuclear weapons arsenal, and the accelerating of Iran’s nuclear programme following the collapse of the multilateral JCPOA nuclear agreement in 2018.

While international attention has long focused on Iran’s nuclear programme, the UAE and Saudi Arabia’s increasing nuclear capabilities pose an emerging proliferation concern.

Riyadh has moved aggressively to nuclearize, with its near completion of a research reactor and ambitious plans to build civilian nuclear power reactors. Meanwhile the UAE inaugurated the Arab world’s first nuclear power plant in March 2020 after years of delay due to construction faults.

There are of course concerns that such civilian nuclear energy programmes could be weaponised, triggered by regional actors’ belligerence and unwillingness to disarm.

As Prince Turki al-Faisal of Saudi Arabia remarked in 2011, "(if all efforts) fail to convince Israel to shed its WMD and to prevent Iran from obtaining similar weapons, (then) we must, as a duty to our country and people, look into all options we are given, including obtaining these weapons ourselves.”

A better way forward

There is a better way forward: establishing a WMDFZ in the Middle East.

This was first proposed by Egypt in 1990 and supported by Iran. For the zone to be realised, regional countries along with world powers would reach agreement on a treaty text drawn up through inclusive negotiations. It would require setting up a regional organisation to oversee the treaty’s eventual implementation, verification and compliance.

While there is an almost universal support from governments for the initiative, there has been little tangible progress toward its realisation over the past three decades. The traditional track, linked to the indefinite extension of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1995, requires the international community to support the establishment of the zone. Alas, formal efforts within the NPT framework have faltered since then on outlining the treaty text or establishing a regional organisation.

Other avenues to convene the conference outside the NPT process were then explored and the UN General Assembly passed a resolution brought forward by Egypt in December 2018 to convene an annual conference until all parties can reach agreement (based on consensus decision-making procedures) on a treaty text to establish the WMDFZ.

Since Israel is not part of the NPT, it has no obligation to attend the conference on the Zone within the NPT framework. This time around, since the conference is UN mandated, it would be outside of the NPT process, and therefore, Israel might be more inclined to participate.

Further talks

The resolution led to the first WMDFZ conference in November 2019. This conference was a watershed moment as, to the surprise of naysayers, participation was robust.

All 22 member states of the Arab League, Iran, four of the five nuclear-armed, permanent members of the UN Security Council (China, France, Russia, and the United Kingdom), a handful of international organisations, and a number of non-governmental organisations were present. The only countries that declined to attend were Israel and the USA.

Countries of the region participated in good faith with discussions on key issues facing the creation of the zone (both technical and security-related), laying the groundwork for future conferences.

At the conference’s conclusion, participating states adopted a political declaration by consensus, which emphasised their intention to achieve a legally binding treaty to establish the zone in an “open and inclusive manner with all invited States” - leaving the door open for Israel and the US to participate in future conferences.

Subsequent conferences in 2021 and 2022 also ended on a positive note and with each meeting, participating states delve deeper into the eventual treaty text to be negotiated and step closer to the realisation of the Zone.

Meanwhile, the role of civil society in supporting and advancing this process toward the Zone is paramount, as has been the case in realising previous arms control agreements such as the Mine Ban Treaty and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.

An evolving draft treaty

In the same spirit, a network of civil society activists and analysts in 2017 begun crafting an evolving Draft Treaty text that could form the basis for discussion. An organisation was also established, the Middle East Treaty Organization (METO), to advance the establishment of the zone through policy, advocacy, and educational programmes.

METO’s Draft Treaty text reflects the key components needed for an eventual WMDFZ Treaty to be agreed upon by relevant governments. The layout of the Draft Treaty includes: scope (geographic and thematic), declaration of fissile materials and facilities, prohibitions, stockpiling and using WMDs; dismantling, destroying, or converting current WMD stockpiles and materials; entry into force and establishing a regional body for verification, monitoring and building cooperation. Regional governments have incorporated parts of the Draft Treaty in their official negotiations and deliberations.

While METO and the Draft Treaty provide governments with a tangible and realistic path forward, it is only one piece of a bigger puzzle toward achieving the WMDFZ. Other factors that would strengthen the calls for the Zone by civil society actors include: closer collaboration between international civil society organisations working in disarmament and security sectors with those in the region; initiating disarmament campaigns in the region to educate and galvanise civil society in respective regional countries to pressure their governments to prioritise disarmament and human security; and building partnerships between organisations working on the Zone and those focused on broader human security concerns as a way of advancing both areas.

The need for regional collaboration

Establishing a WMDFZ in the Middle East is paramount for a region reeling from decades of instability, insecurity, and WMD proliferation. The scope of the Zone should not be limited to ridding the region of these destructive weapons; it should also include creating a closer political climate in which it can be achieved.

This requires a rare occurrence of collective cooperation in a divided region. The process will require a complete reversal of the current animosity and misunderstanding among regional countries that have decapitated the drive toward improved security, socioeconomic, and political advancement in the region.

That said, in terms of realising a WMDFZ, Iran and Saudi Arabia have renewed ties, which has diffused some regional tensions. Growing normalisation with Syria and the country’s return to the Arab League may also bolster regionally backed initiatives, while the inking of the Abraham Accords has removed some of Israel’s security concerns.

Such diplomatic moves can be built upon, and for the WMDFZ not only to contribute to strengthening nonproliferation efforts but also move towards open discussions on other security-related challenges facing the region.