Arab Media and Society September 2006 - arabmediasociety.com
When Saddam Hussein’s forces rolled across the border into Kuwait in 1990, Riyadh kept the Saudi population in the dark for three days before realizing that most Saudis had tuned into CNN to find out what was going on with their Gulf neighbor. (1) This rude awakening was the beginning of a fundamental turning point in the kingdom’s media strategy which until the early 1990s, had been largely confined to newspaper ownership.
Over the past 17 years the Saudi establishment has used its deep pockets to influence the region’s media and minds, morphing from an approach that paid off and intimidated media that ran negative reports on the kingdom to become one of the Middle East’s most influential media owners. (2)
As a result of the 1991 Gulf War, individuals close to the royal family decided to internationalize the kingdom’s media presence, launching the Middle East Broadcasting Center (MBC) in London, backed by the then Saudi king’s in-law, Walid Ibrahim. (3)
“In the first Saudi era there was more of a tendency to buy individuals,” said As‘ad AbuKhalil, a politics professor at California State University, Stanislaus, and author of The Battle for Saudi Arabia. (4) “Before 1990 there were competing ownerships of Arab media – Libya, Iraq, UAE and Saudi Arabia. These were the major contenders. Ever since that time it is fair to say the media came entirely open for Saudi Arabia and the multiplicity [of media outlets] reflects the multiplicity of princes [that own media outlets].”
The Arab Radio and Television Network (ART) came hot on the heels of MBC, founded by Saudi mogul Saleh Abdullah Kamel in 1993, with a line up of entertainment, music and sport.
ART was followed in 1994 with the then Rome-based Orbit Communications Corporation (the Orbit pay-per view network is now based in Bahrain), a subsidiary of the Saudi Arabian Mawarid Group, which ran a BBC Arabic Television channel from 1994 until 1996 when it was abruptly pulled off air. (5)
In the same year that Orbit pulled the plug on BBC TV Arabic (which is set to restart soon, this time funded by the British taxpayer), ART’s Kamel bought 49% of the Cayman Islands-registered satellite channel Fada’iyya Al Lubnaniyya (the Lebanese Satellite Channel, LBC International), the pan-Arab version of the Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation (LBC) TV channel. (6)
In 2000, Kamel sold his shares to the world’s now thirteenth richest man, Saudi prince Al-Walid Bin Talal, for $100 million. Bin Talal is the Rupert Murdoch of media ownership in the Middle East, with his Kingdom Holding companies owning the region’s largest music label (Rotana Records), six music TV channels (Rotana Clip, Rotana Music, Rotana Gulf, Rotana Cinema, Rotana Tarab, Rotana Zaman), and a stake in Lebanese newspapers An Nahar and Ad Diyar in addition to his stake in LBCI (Bin Talal, incidentally, is the third largest shareholder in Murdoch’s News Corp., with 5.46% of voting shares). (7)
Prince Khalid bin Sultan is also a shareholder in LBC and owner of pan-Arab newspaper Al Hayat. Due to his position as Assistant Minister of Defense for Military Affairs, bin Sultan’s role as a shareholder is significant as he can be considered a state actor, and consequently able to exert certain pressure over LBC to pander to the Saudi establishment.
The only other political outlet in which the Saudi government has a reportedly direct stake, other than newspapers and domestic media outlets which are subjected to draconian laws within Saudi Arabia,(8) is MBC’s all-news satellite channel Al Arabiya, which was established in 2003 to counter Qatar’s Al Jazeera, a channel Riyadh has disliked ever since it went on air in 1996, rankled by investigative reports on corruption in many Arab countries and the airing of Osama bin Laden video statements. The channel was seen as so controversial that at one point Saudi Arabia banned men from watching television at cafes to prevent public discussions of what was on Al Jazeera.
Although Saudi influence over the region’s newspaper business (particularly pan-Arab publications) still remains high, the significance of muzzling print press is not as great as it used to be. Like everywhere else on earth, the Middle East is tuning into TV news rather than picking up a paper.
“Newspapers are only important in so far as what intellectuals, journalists and politicians are reading. If you go to Arab countries and ask about a [newspaper] columnist, they won’t know who they are, but will know TV anchors,” said AbuKhalil.
The Big Issue
Saudi Arabia’s takeover of the region’s media is a reflection of what is occurring globally where a handful of multinational companies increasingly dominate the media. This spills over from entertainment into news coverage.
To Saudi Arabia such control is paramount in an era when the media is increasingly pervasive, because Riyadh’s political and economic clout - and the survival of the Royal family – depends on the kingdom retaining its position as a leading player in the region’s power politics. To retain this balance of power – held in the region by the United States, Israel and Saudi Arabia against an ascendant Iran and non-governmental actors – informative and potentially damning news on the kingdom needs to be squashed.
Saudi Arabia’s approach to media under its control, and the harsh punishments on those that do not portray a rose-tinted view of the royal family and the kingdom, is mirrored in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, which have similarly draconian media laws to retain monarchical power bases. Qatar can be considered somewhat of an exception with Al Jazeera, but when it comes to the channel applying the same exposure to governmental malfeasance and social issues in Doha as it does elsewhere in the region, Al Jazeera comes up short.
Although much of Saudi media ownership revolves around entertainment, as the Managing Editor of Beirut-based Middle East Broadcasters Journal, Habib Battah, pointed out: “MBC, Orbit, Rotana – all these companies have a big Saudi stake and are not really about Saudi Arabia, but about appealing to a pan-Arab audience,” that is perhaps the point, with Saudi shareholders - most linked to the royal family - being able to dictate what is, and what can be, aired to a pan-Arab audience, even if it is only entertainment.
As Marwan Kraidy of the American University noted: “Entertainment television is an active contributor to shaping what Arab publics discuss and do in both the social and political realms.” (9)
The fact that most channels in the region are not running at a profit is also indicative of certain motivations behind acquiring media outlets. “Channels are set up for different reasons, but one thing they’re not set up for is to make money,” said Hugh Miles, author of Al Jazeera: How Arab TV News Challenged the World. “A channel is a very economic way to influence people. Bang for your buck it’s much cheaper than guns. It is about controlling the discourse, and for Saudis about being in charge.”
Saudi Arabia’s strict domestic media laws have kept a lid on any criticism of the Saudi ruling elite in the country, and the kingdom uses its networks of ownership and informal influence to the best of its ability anywhere else. According to Said K. Aburish, author of The Rise, Corruption and Coming Fall of the House of Saud, many Arab and foreign journalists were on the payroll of Riyadh in the 1970s, ‘80s and ‘90s to produce positive articles and commentaries, as well as counter coverage that goes against the agenda of Saudi Arabia.
As noted, that started to change in the 1990s –although the practice still allegedly goes on – with the Saudis’ acquiring whole networks. Such concentrated media ownership, in addition to the Saudis’ deep pockets and widespread economic and political influence, affects Arab journalists and the outlets that do not toe Saudi Arabia’s line.
“It is now a taboo in Arab culture to criticize Saudi. Even [Lebanon’s] Hizbullah media is careful, and in Qatar media criticism has been going down, it has been very sensitive… Whenever the Emir of Qatar meets [Saudi Arabian] King Abdullah, he always gets complaints about Al Jazeera,” AbuKhalil told Arab Media & Society.
Saudi influence is particularly apparent in more media independent Lebanon, which acts as a recruiting pool for many of the region’s journalists, editors and staff, and as such, means journalists will not run stories that could jeopardize their future careers, particularly if they aspire to work for the higher paying Gulf and Saudi networks.
“As a journalist today you cannot criticize Saudi – where would you work?” said AbuKhalil.
Equally, as some 40-70% of the region’s advertising is spent in Saudi Arabia (estimates differ), networks, TV channels and publications are not going to risk jeopardizing their cash flow by upsetting their prime advertising market in the region’s largest economy. Al Jazeera discovered this to their cost.
Al Jazeera was slated to be privatized in 2001, but according to Miles the channel’s attempts to raise enough advertising revenues were scuppered by Saudi pressure on major companies to pull advertisements from Al Jazeera or face advertising problems within the kingdom. “The Saudis have cost the channel dozens of millions in profits,” he said.
Judging by the fact that the channel is still state-funded and the lack of advertising on Al Jazeera today – largely confined to state-run Qatari companies – Riyadh succeeded in its aims, with Al Arabiya shooting ahead in advertising revenues.
No News is Good News
An inkling of how Saudi influence affects news coverage was given in an article by Ian Richardson, who was charged with setting up BBC Arabic TV’s news department during the two-years the channel ran on Orbit:
“During the short life of BBC Arabic Television, there were several angry ‘liaison meetings’ with Orbit and the guarantees of editorial independence proved to be a sour joke, only barely obscured by a thin smokescreen about the BBC's alleged failure to observe “cultural sensitivities” - Saudi code for anything not to the Royal Family's liking. When it became clear to Orbit and Mawarid that it had, in their terms, created a monster not prepared to toe the Saudi line, it was only a matter of time before there would be a final parting of the ways.”(10) As noted earlier, that parting of ways resulted in the channel being completely canned.
Richardson’s article was written a decade ago, but his insight regarding “editorial independence” was readily evident in early June this year when the London-based newspaper The Guardian broke the story of British Aerospace (BAE) and the British Ministry of Defense paying out some $2 billion to Prince Bandar bin Sultan of Saudi Arabia as a sweetener to secure a $40 billion arms deal for BAE Systems back in 1985. The story caused a scandal in Britain and garnered coverage in the international media, but received relatively minimal coverage in the Middle East. The story was not given any airtime by Al Arabiya, with coverage largely confined to non-Saudi influenced outlets Al Jazeera and the London-based Arabic language newspaper, al-Quds al-Arabi. (11)
“It was a huge story and should have got a lot of coverage as it affects the whole region, politically and economically. Minimal coverage seems to be a real injustice to the audience,” said Battah.
A further example of Saudi Arabia setting the media agenda, according to Reuters’ Andrew Hammond, is that “Arab media have largely gone along with a Saudi media campaign against Iran over its growing influence in the Arab world.” (12)
AbuKhalil also sees Saudi media - Al Arabiya in particular - as instrumental in stirring up fitna- – discord – between the Sunnis and Shias, which has been exacerbated by the occupation of Iraq, sectarian divisions in Lebanon, and the need for Saudi Arabia and Western allies to counter Iran’s growing influence in the Middle East and what certain commentators and politicians have called “the Shia crescent” and the "Sushi war."
Ultimately, Saudi influence over the media is having a negative effect on journalistic ethics, investigative reporting, balanced coverage and providing substantial information to the Arab public about issues that are important to the region.
Furthermore, with criticism and insightful stories about Saudi Arabia off limits to most Arab journalists, the problem is compounded by non-Arab journalists not able to take up the slack due to onerous visa regulations and limited access to sources, particularly for stories that relate directly to the state, which is notoriously secretive in handing out information.
As Aburish summarizes in his book The House of Saud: “The ability to influence the Western press comes on top of total control of Saudi internal media and the elimination of opposition within the pan-Arab media. The combined effect produces a false picture which everywhere overlooks, ignores or distorts the House of Saud’s misdeeds. In prospect is a world waking up to a country in flames and wondering why things have gone so far without anybody knowing about them.” (13)
Footnotes
1. Marwan M. Kraidy, “Saudi Arabia, Lebanon and the Changing Arab Information Order,” International Journal of Communication 1 (2007), 139-156, p. 141.
2. See Said K. Aburish, The Rise, Corruption and Coming Fall of the House of Saud (London: Bloomsbury, 1994), p. 216
3. MBC’s shareholder list has never been revealed. It is widely assumed that the Saudi royal family has a stake in the network led by chairman and CEO Sheikh Waleed Bin Ibrahim Al Brahim. In 2002, the network moved operations to Dubai’s Media City and production houses to Beirut, as well as expanding entertainment to MBC 2, MBC 3, MBC 4 and MBC Action MBC also owned United Press International (UPI) from 1994 until it sold the news service in 2000 to Reverend Sun Myung Moon's News World Communications.
4 AbuKhalil also has a popular blog – www.angryarab.blogspot.com
5 Showtime Arabia, the region’s other leading pay-TV network, established in 1996, is not Saudi-owned. Kuwaiti company KIPCO has a 79% stake and the CBS Corporation has the remaining 21%.
6 Marwan M. Kraidy, “Saudi Arabia, Lebanon and the Changing Arab Information Order,” International Journal of Communication 1 (2007), 139-156, p. 143.
7 Bin Talal announced in August that Rotana is to be merged with LBCI, although the two institutions will remain financially independent - LBCI and Rotana to Merge Prior to Listing on Dubai Stock Market - 10 Aug 2007 - http://www.ifpexpo.com/News_show_news.asp?id=2909
8 An investigation by the Committee to Protect Journalists on Saudi Arabia found that: 1) Government officials dismiss editors, suspend or blacklist dissident writers, order news blackouts on controversial topics, and admonish independent columnists over their writings to deter undesirable criticism or to appease religious constituencies 2) The country’s conservative religious establishment acts as a powerful lobbying force against enterprising coverage of social, cultural, and religious matters. The multi-layered religious sector includes official clerics, religious scholars, the religious police, radical revivalist preachers, and their followers 3) Compliant government-approved editors squelch controversial news, acquiesce to official pressures to tone down coverage, and silence critical voices - http://cpj.org/Briefings/2006/saudI_06/saudi_06_printer.html
9 Marwan M. Kraidy, “Saudi Arabia, Lebanon and the Changing Arab Information Order,” International Journal of Communication 1 (2007), 139-156, p. 139.
10 Ian Richardson, The Arabic TV “Monster”, first published in The Independent and Al-Quds Al-Arabi, April 1997. Available at: www.richardsonmedia.co.uk/arabic.html
11 Ian Black. “Latest allegations ignored by a submissive media,” The Guardian June 8, 2007
12 Andrew Hammond. “Saudi media empire tries to counter opposition,” Reuters, 9 August 2007
13 Said K. Aburish, The Rise, Corruption and Coming Fall of the House of Saud (London: Bloomsbury, 1994), p. 240
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Monday, September 24, 2007
The 'Lebanonization' of the Iraqi Media: An Overview of Iraq's Television Landscape
Transnational Broadcasting Studies Issue 16, 2006 - now arabmediasociety.com
The media landscape in Iraq has undergone a radical transformation since state-run Iraqi television abruptly went off air following the US-led invasion in March 2003. With no state television and the ownership of satellite dishes banned by the Baathist regime, Iraqis were, quite literally, starved for information. As a result, satellite dish sales skyrocketed in the months following the invasion, leading to one f the highest penetration rates in the world in just two years. From three national TV stations and 14 officially sanctioned Arb channels (the latter only available to a select few via card subscription in the two years before the war) many Iraqis suddenly found themselves with access to over 300 satellite channels and a handful of new Iraq-oriented networks. "These people had nothing, and now they are overwhelmed with satellite channels. It is a chance to get back to the real world," says Jean-Claude Boulos, head of Iraqi broadcaster Al Sumaria.
Today, the "real world" of the country's splintered political scene is only too well reflected in Iraq's 30-plus terrestrial and satellite channels, the layput of which increasingly mirrors the country's turbulant scene, with stations cropping up to represent every sectarian and political trend.(1)
With Iraq's TV menu growing increasingly sectarian, it is possible to draw a parallel wit Lebanon's highly sectarianized hodgepodge of channels--linked directly or loosely with political parties--which regularly report sect-specific news.(2) It is therefore perhaps fitting to speak of the "Lebanonozation" of Iraq'a media,(3) what with dozens of channels backed by politcal parties, such as the (Shiite) Islamic Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq's Al Furat TV and the (Sunni) Iraqi Islamist Party's Baghdad TV.
However, that said, Iraqi broadcasters have much more to contend with than sectarian rivalries. The current security situation is so bad that channels are spending up to 20 percent of their monthly budgets to protect personnel, employees are regularly unable to show up at work, and filming outside of studios has become hazardous and potentially deadly. Despite the overwhelming post-Saddam boom, the future is far from certain for media in Iraq.
External Influences
Governments led the way in establishing Iraq-orientated TV channels in the post-Saddam Hussein era. One of the first channels to start broadcasting with an Iraqi audience in mind was the Iranian government-backed, Arabic-language satellite TV network Al Alam (The World), which was launched during the invasion. The channel broadcasts throughout the Middle East (bureaus in Tehran, Baghdad and Beirut) but has given special focus to Iraq by hiring anchors and reporters with an Iraqi accent. “The reason for this is very simple actually, Iran is next door to Iraq,” says Faysal Abdel Sater, director of public relations at Al Alam. Indeed, for several months Al Alam was the only foreign TV channel Iraqis without satellite could watch, thanks to the network’s transmitters dotting the Iran-Iraq border.
One of Al Alam’s stated objectives is to “end the long-held monopoly of Western media in broadcasting news.” But alongside Al Alam and Pan-Arab satellite news giants Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya, Western powers were quick to replace one state broadcaster with another in Iraq. As soon as Coalition Forces controlled Baghdad, the US-funded Arabic language station Radio Sawa started broadcasting in March 2003 along with voice of America Kurdish and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty’s Arabic station, known as Radio Free Iraq.
In March 2003, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) created the Iraqi Media Network (IMN), with the aim of establishing a public broadcaster similar to that of the BBC and America’s PBS. The original network contract (eventually totaling some eight contracts worth $108.2 million) was awarded to the San Diego-based Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) by the US Defense Contracting Command to set up 24-hour news channel Al Iraqiya, a sports channel, two FM radio stations and a national newspaper. SAIC was replaced by US-based Harris Communications with a one-year, $96 million contract in January 2004 that was later renewed for six months.(4)
Al Iraqiya initially struggled to gain credibility among Iraqis. It was regarded as the voice of the occupying forces because of its close relations with the CPA and a weekly address by US Administrator Paul Bremer. Iraqi journalists and cameramen also complained that despite the colossal amounts of money provided to contractors, little was trickling down to them. Most were kept on pre-war salaries of $120 a month rather than the $800 a month Western networks offered or a $1,000 a month private stations were reportedly paying reporters.(5)
But after initial teething problems, Al Iraqiya started gaining ground, with 50 percent of Iraqis interviewed in a February 2004 poll by Oxford Research International expressing confidence in the channel, up 11 points from November 2003. Al Sumaria’s Boulos said the now government-run Al Iraqiya (although still financed by the US taxpayer) is the most-viewed terrestrial channel, largely because it is broadcast terrestrially and available to 93 percent of Iraqis. “Al Iraqiya is better now, showing more of what is going on in Iraq,” says Hameed Alaa Hameed, a network engineer from Baghdad.
However, the supposed impartiality of US-linked media has once again come under scrutiny following revelations in December 2005 that the Pentagon was secretly feeding hundreds of positive news stories, written by American military personnel and private contractors, to the Iraqi press. US Army General George W. Casey was reported as saying in March that the US military will continue to pay Iraqi newspapers to publish pro-US articles, adding that an internal review had concluded that no US laws or Pentagon guidelines were being violated by the policy, which aims to counter what Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld called “a campaign of disinformation” by the Iraqi resistance.(6) Whether the US military also is feeding stories to Iraqi TV networks is not known, but with the freedom of print media unabashedly undermined it would seem far from conspiratorial to hypothesize that this is happening at some level in the broadcast media. “I don’t know if they are being given stories, but maybe some channels are getting footage, like Kurdish channels, as they are with the Americans,” says Hameed.
Certainly, state broadcaster Al Iraqiya seems to be given more privileged access by the Coalition forces than other channels . During a joint US and Iraqi military operation on the northern city of Tal Afar in late September 2005, Al Iraqiya was the only non-American camera team allowed to accompany the troops, according to Al Jazeera’s editor-in-chief Ahmed Al Sheikh.
The Iraqi Media Network's Al Iraqiya was not the United States’ only attempt to counteract the popularity of Pan-Arab news channels in Iraq, or in the rest of the region for that matter. In February 2004 Alhurra (The Free One) was established, and shortly after, in April, sister channel Alhurra Iraq began broadcasting. Alhurra has had moderate success around the region, but reached into only 15 percent of Iraqi households in June 2005, according to Ipsos-Stat.
For the UK, Britain’s BBC World Service Trust joined the fray fairly late, launching Al Mirbad TV and radio in August 2005 in southern Iraq. According to Abir Awad, a project developer for the World Service Trust, the channel is to provide independent media in southern Iraq. “The media in Iraq used to be very Baghdad centric so we aimed at a regional audience,” she says. The World Service Trust is an independent charity within the World Service that has developed media in other war-torn countries such as Kosovo and Afghanistan, although Al Mirbad is the Trust’s biggest project to date. The British government’s Department for International Development is providing Al Mirbad with $11.81 million for the next two years, after which the broadcaster will seek funding from international donors and advertisers. The Basra-based channel—“the station with a southern vibe”—is managed by Iraqis and currently produces four hours of original content a day. In addition to helping establish channels, Western governments have also been working to train Iraqi media workers. The BBC and USAID have both been involved in training programs for Iraqi journalists on balance and ethics.
TV Journalism Turns Deadly
The invasion and subsequent occupation of Iraq has resulted in the deadliest conflict for the news media in recent history. At least 67 journalists and 24 media support workers have been killed and 39 journalists kidnapped since the invasion. Five of the kidnapped journalists—four Iraqis and one Italian—were killed, and the others released. Many journalists also have been wounded covering the conflict, as well as harassed and imprisoned by the Coalition and Iraqi authorities. The Iraqi Media Network, which includes national broadcaster Al Iraqiya, has suffered the greatest losses, followed by Dubai-based Al Arabiya, with nine journalists and six support workers killed.(7)
“Everyday when I ask my guys to do a story it is a nightmare for me because I am worried what will happen,” says Nabil Al Khatib, executive editor at Al Arabiya, which has lost 11 staff.(8) (See Al Khatib's interview wih TBS in this issue)
Al Khatib believes the security situation is having a negative impact on news reporting. “If we are talking about serious coverage of an area, a troubled area like Iraq, you need to be able to move freely and go to different areas and pass on your impressions to the public. But to compile a decent, balanced and accurate story is something that most of the time is not doable. It is not impossible to work there but it takes time and a lot of energy that is in contradiction with the nature of news for a news channel.”
Among Al Khatib’s concerns with operating in Iraq is a controversial issue that all news channels in Iraq grapple with—embedding journalists with Coalition forces.
Al Khatib says he has two concerns with embedding correspondents, firstly that the US military request correspondents to be attached to a unit for a lengthy period, often weeks at a time, for security reasons before military operations. Al Khatib says that the channel cannot afford to have correspondents away on assignments for essentially an unknown period. Furthermore, Al Khatib says that with most assignments carried out by Iraqis, locals put themselves at risk if they embed with Coalition forces. “If he is seen with the Americans and comes back, it would be difficult to explain to people that it was just an assignment. People might be aggressive because he was embedded,” he explains.
Al Khatib’s concerns are not to be taken lightly. Of the 91 journalists and media workers killed in Iraq, 80 percent are Iraqi and some 60 percent were targeted for assassination.(9)
“The second concern is that we are afraid of sending someone to be embedded to only cover the American side and then we fail to cover the insurgent side, to be balanced. For CNN or other American networks they don’t care about being balanced or not. We cannot do that and we won’t do that,” he says.
Regulating or Restricting Broadcasters?
As if broadcasting in Iraq is not difficult enough, Iraq’s interim Governing Council set up a Higher Media Commission in the summer of 2003 to regulate and license the burgeoning TV market. In the September of that year the commission barred Pan-Arab news channels Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya from covering the Governing Council’s activities for two weeks, claiming the networks promoted political violence and the killing of members of the council and the Coalition, and broadcast “terrorists terrorizing Iraqis.”
By July 2004, the Iraqi National Communications and Media Commission (INCMC) had been established, laying down rules and editorial standards for program content of television and radio broadcasters.
The commission, closely modeled on the US Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and the UK’s communications’ regulator OfCom, first bared its teeth when it banned Al Arabiya and Al Jazeera for a month in August 2004 for “incitement to hatred” after broadcasting stories on the Iraqi resistance. Al Arabiya was back on air after a month, but Al Jazeera has remained blacklisted ever since. Al Jazeera’s editor in chief, Ahmed Al Sheikh, believes the decision was politically motivated. “It was a joint US-Iraqi decision. If they wanted to have reversed that decision they could have,” he says.
Al Jazeera has experienced such bans in the past in Iran, Jordan, Kuwait and Palestine, but the Iraqi ban has particularly aggravated the channel. “I think the people behind the closure are those who don’t like the truth, no more, no less. They don’t like Al Jazeera,” says Al Jazeera presenter and producer Mohammed Al Bouniry. “By shutting down Al Jazeera they will have no problem to shut others down.”
However, no other channel has been banned in Iraq and other broadcasters do not share the same grievances as Al Jazeera. Al Diyar’s Al Yasiri is supportive of the commission: “We don’t have any form of censorship. At this point in time, Iraq is the freest country in the Arab world for the media.”
But Star TV Network’s Saad Al Saraf believes the commission is not living up to its potential. “It could be bigger and wider, and just revolves around one person (Siyamend Othman). It has not successfully tackled issues in media bias, such as during the elections,” he says. Indeed, there seems to be a sort of "look the other way" approach to enforcing the commission’s rules, such as the ban on "spreading sectarian, racial and religious sedition and strife."
Broadcasting Sectarian Strife?
A cursory glance at the backing and orientation of many channels reveals the extent to which sectarian issues are driving broadcasting, which can only exacerbate sectarian proclivities that are increasingly apparent in Iraq.
Al Salam TV relies on funding from Shiite cleric Muqtada Al Sadr, Ghadeer TV on the Higher Council of the Islamic Revolution, Al Masar TV on the Islamic Da'awa Party, and Ahlul Bayt TV (The House of the Prophet Muhammad) on the patronage of Shiite cleric Ayatollah Hadi Al Moderassi. Baghdadia TV is considered a moderate Sunni channel and Baghdad TV, run by the Iraqi Islamist Party, is known as "Baathist TV" among Shiites who criticize its pro-Sunni agenda. Afaq TV (Horizons) shows video footage in support of the Sunni Iraqi Islamic Party and Muqtada Al Sadr.
Babil TV reportedly offers programming in support of the Sunni Iraqi Front for National Dialogue, and Biladi TV runs programs in support of the United Iraqi Alliance.
Al Furat (The Euphrates) is reportedly backed by the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) and supported the Unified Iraqi Coalition during the elections, which has the backing of Shiite cleric Grand Ayatollah Ali Al Sistani. The channel's director general, Arshad Tawfiq, was a former Iraqi ambassador to Spain and a former Baath Party official, and is now a member of the Supreme Council for National Salvation. The station opposes the presence of the Coalition forces in Iraq, and refers to Iraqis killed by Coalition troops as “martyrs.”
As desired above. the Coalition-created Al Iraqiya channel initially was lambasted as a pro-American mouthpiece, but since it was turned over to the Iraqi government is widely viewed as a sectarian, Shiite channel.
Al Bazzaz’s Al Sharqiya is considered a more toned channel, although overt support was shown for former Prime Minister Iyad Allawi in the recent elections and some view the channel as pro-Sunni. An Iraqi who worked for Al Sharqiyah in Dubai, who did not wish to disclose his name, told TBS that many of the channel’s employees do not like Shiites, a bias that is reflected in the channel’s employment policies. “They kicked me out when they knew I was Shia. It is a pro-Sunni channel,” he says.
The channel was mockingly dubbed “Al Baathiya” upon launch because of Al Bazzaz’s personal history as the head of the Baath regime’s national news agency until 1992. Al Bazzaz is also rumored to have political ambitions and was alleged to have received millions of dollars from the Saudi government to launch the Iraqi Azzaman newspaper in a British high court hearing last year.(10)
Ethnic minorities also have a political media presence. Ashur TV, which represents the Assyrian Democratic Movement, receives 50 percent of its funding from the party and the rest from supporters around the world. The Iraqi Turkoman Front funds Turkomaneli TV. Baghdad’s Shafak TV is backed by the Kurdish authorities, Kurdistan TV by the Kurdistan Democratic Party, and ATB TV is linked to the Kurdistan Communist Party. The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), the party of Iraqi president Jalal Talabani, operates Al Hurriyah TV and PUK TV. KurdSat TV reportedly supports the PUK.
The extent to which sectarianism is affecting Iraq’s media content, particularly news, was evident following the February 22 bombing of a Shiite shrine in Samarra. Sunni-orientated channels such as the Iraqi Islamic Party’s Baghdad TV, which has no correspondents in either of the Shiite holy cities of Najaf and Karbala, focused on Sunnis attacked in retaliation for the bombing, while Shiite-run channels Al Furat and Al Iraqiya devoted coverage to the damage to the shrine and the plight of Shiites under Saddam Hussein’s regime. Al Furat reportedly aired slogans telling Shiites to stand up for their rights.(11)
Even Al Jazeera has come under fire from Iraq’s sectarianism, with Shiites taking to the streets in December 2005 to protest against the channel for broadcasting a remark, made by a guest on a talk show, arguing that religious authority Ayatollah Sistani should stay out of politics. BBC analyst Magdi Abdelhadi believes the demonstrations were a "testimony to the tense relationship between the Shias and the Sunni Arabs. Attacking Al Jazeera becomes a symbolic salvo in the simmering hostility" of Iraq.(12)
These cases do not differ radically from Lebanon’s broadcasting environment. In Lebanon, the TV landscape reflects that of the sectarian political system: Mustaqbal (Future), owned by the Hariri family, is a Sunni channel, LBC is Christian, Al Manar is backed by Shiite political party Hezbollah, and NBN is partially backed by Shiite parliamentary speaker and head of the Amal movement Nabih Berri.(13)
The sectarian nature of Lebanese television was apparent last year when over a million Lebanese thronged to Beirut’s Martyrs’ Square on March 14 to demonstrate against the Syrian occupation. Instead of broadcasting the event Al Manar TV re-broadcast footage of "the Shia" demonstration in downtown that occurred on March 8. Conversely, although LBC and Al Mustaqbal did cover the March 8 demonstration, far more footage was given to ‘their’ demonstration on March 14, repeating the images again and again in the weeks and months that followed.
These three dominant Lebanese channels, along with NBN, are in many senses leftovers from the civil war period, when radio stations were backed by the separate factions before making the leap to television broadcasting.(14) Iraq, on the other hand, has made this transition during a devastating occupation and at a more macro level in line with its population’s own demographics.
At least in Lebanon’s case, such media publicly sustains already deeply rooted sectarian divisions, albeit with greater sensitivity towards other religions than in the past.(15) But in Iraq’s case, where the media is caught up in political turmoil, violence, and a renewed sectarianism that had been kept at bay by Saddam Hussein’s regime, the struggle for viewers—and voters—is perhaps even more acute than in Lebanon, where sectarianism has been the status quo well before the 1860 civil war, and is formerly enshrined in the country’s constitution (1943). After all, the political and social sectarianism of Iraq is, like the multiple political party scene and media landscape, a very new arena that will no doubt change alongside political developments. Channels may fare as their political backers do, sink or swim. But with no effective or impartial national public TV channel—the moribund TeleLiban is hardly watched, and Al Iraqiya favors Iraq’s Shiite government—both Lebanon and Iraq’s media will remain driven by sectarianism.
Although the Iraqi market is likely to see more channels being launched—the INCMC reportedly has 20 applications pending—broadcasting will continue to be a struggle in the absence of stability. And for the foreseeable future, funding for channels is likely to remain primarily in the hands of political and religious groups rather than the commercial or state sectors, much like in Lebanon.
NOTES
1. BBC Monitoring puts the number of Iraqi TV channels at 27, but new channels are being launched. The Iraqi Media Commission did not respond to emails or phone calls to clarify the exact number of channels currently operating and how many TV applications the commission has received. The only exception to the analogy of Lebanonization is the armed resistance, which does not have its own TV channel, though insurgetn groups do prouce their own video and audio materials to post on the Internet or distribute to mainstream media. Also, certain channels that are vocally opposed to the US-led occupation air footage filmed by rebels, such as tapes of kidnap victims and attacks on convoy troops.
2. To get an equitable view of Lebanon’s daily local news you have to tune in to at least three TV channels which, incidentally, are conveniently timed to allow viewers to do exactly that.
3. ‘Lebanonization’ has been used by media commentators to describe the growing sectarian divide between Iraqis, implying an impending civil war on sectarian lines, as occurred in Lebanon between 1976 to 1990. However, although the term fails to take into account the reasons for war in Lebanon, along with other conditions, which vary quite radically from contemporary Iraq, on a political-media level the term seems quite apt.
4. Harris refused to comment on their activities in Iraq. The Harris website reported: ‘The year-ago quarter (2005) benefited from $22 million in revenue from the Iraqi Media Network (IMN) program. Sequentially, revenue increased 3 percent.’
5. Gordon Robinson. ‘Rebuilding Iraqi Television: A Personal Account,’ Iraqi Media Developments Newsletter, Issue 28, December 15 2004 - January 2005 www.standhopecentre.org/imdn/28.htm
6. Mark Mazzetti. ‘Military Will Keep Planting Articles in Iraq,’ Los Angeles Times, March 4, 2006.
7. Committee to Protect Journalists press release, March 17 2006
8. Three Al Arabiya employees, including correspondent Atwar Bahjat, were killed in February, 2006 by a unidentified group outside of Samarra. Regarding the other eight fatalities, five died in a car bomb that targeted Al Arabiya’s bureau in Baghdad, and three were killed by US troops. Reporter Jawad Khathem was the target of an armed kidnap attempt that paralyzed him from the waist down.
9. Committee to Protect Journalists press release, March 17 2006
10. David Pallister, ‘Media mogul accused of running Saudi-funded propaganda campaign,’ The Guardian, January 26, 2005
11. Louise Roug, ‘Unfair, Unbalanced Channels’ Los Angeles Times, March 28, 2006
12. Magdi Abdelhadi. Iraqi Shias Slam Arab TV Channel, December 2005 - www.bbc.co.uk
13. Murr TV (MTV), owned by Greek Orthodox politician Gabriel Murr, was supposed to be re-launched in 2005 after the government shut the station down in 2002. There have also been rumors over the past year of former General Michel Aoun’s Free Patriotic Movement setting up a channel - Orange TV.
14. The Hizbullah backed Al Manar TV channel was launched in 1991 to promote the movement’s role in fighting the Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon, which ended in 2000.
15. For instance LBC now takes Ramadan into consideration for its programming schedule, and hired, for the first time, a Shiite journalist for a documentary series two years ago.
The media landscape in Iraq has undergone a radical transformation since state-run Iraqi television abruptly went off air following the US-led invasion in March 2003. With no state television and the ownership of satellite dishes banned by the Baathist regime, Iraqis were, quite literally, starved for information. As a result, satellite dish sales skyrocketed in the months following the invasion, leading to one f the highest penetration rates in the world in just two years. From three national TV stations and 14 officially sanctioned Arb channels (the latter only available to a select few via card subscription in the two years before the war) many Iraqis suddenly found themselves with access to over 300 satellite channels and a handful of new Iraq-oriented networks. "These people had nothing, and now they are overwhelmed with satellite channels. It is a chance to get back to the real world," says Jean-Claude Boulos, head of Iraqi broadcaster Al Sumaria.
Today, the "real world" of the country's splintered political scene is only too well reflected in Iraq's 30-plus terrestrial and satellite channels, the layput of which increasingly mirrors the country's turbulant scene, with stations cropping up to represent every sectarian and political trend.(1)
With Iraq's TV menu growing increasingly sectarian, it is possible to draw a parallel wit Lebanon's highly sectarianized hodgepodge of channels--linked directly or loosely with political parties--which regularly report sect-specific news.(2) It is therefore perhaps fitting to speak of the "Lebanonozation" of Iraq'a media,(3) what with dozens of channels backed by politcal parties, such as the (Shiite) Islamic Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq's Al Furat TV and the (Sunni) Iraqi Islamist Party's Baghdad TV.
However, that said, Iraqi broadcasters have much more to contend with than sectarian rivalries. The current security situation is so bad that channels are spending up to 20 percent of their monthly budgets to protect personnel, employees are regularly unable to show up at work, and filming outside of studios has become hazardous and potentially deadly. Despite the overwhelming post-Saddam boom, the future is far from certain for media in Iraq.
External Influences
Governments led the way in establishing Iraq-orientated TV channels in the post-Saddam Hussein era. One of the first channels to start broadcasting with an Iraqi audience in mind was the Iranian government-backed, Arabic-language satellite TV network Al Alam (The World), which was launched during the invasion. The channel broadcasts throughout the Middle East (bureaus in Tehran, Baghdad and Beirut) but has given special focus to Iraq by hiring anchors and reporters with an Iraqi accent. “The reason for this is very simple actually, Iran is next door to Iraq,” says Faysal Abdel Sater, director of public relations at Al Alam. Indeed, for several months Al Alam was the only foreign TV channel Iraqis without satellite could watch, thanks to the network’s transmitters dotting the Iran-Iraq border.
One of Al Alam’s stated objectives is to “end the long-held monopoly of Western media in broadcasting news.” But alongside Al Alam and Pan-Arab satellite news giants Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya, Western powers were quick to replace one state broadcaster with another in Iraq. As soon as Coalition Forces controlled Baghdad, the US-funded Arabic language station Radio Sawa started broadcasting in March 2003 along with voice of America Kurdish and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty’s Arabic station, known as Radio Free Iraq.
In March 2003, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) created the Iraqi Media Network (IMN), with the aim of establishing a public broadcaster similar to that of the BBC and America’s PBS. The original network contract (eventually totaling some eight contracts worth $108.2 million) was awarded to the San Diego-based Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) by the US Defense Contracting Command to set up 24-hour news channel Al Iraqiya, a sports channel, two FM radio stations and a national newspaper. SAIC was replaced by US-based Harris Communications with a one-year, $96 million contract in January 2004 that was later renewed for six months.(4)
Al Iraqiya initially struggled to gain credibility among Iraqis. It was regarded as the voice of the occupying forces because of its close relations with the CPA and a weekly address by US Administrator Paul Bremer. Iraqi journalists and cameramen also complained that despite the colossal amounts of money provided to contractors, little was trickling down to them. Most were kept on pre-war salaries of $120 a month rather than the $800 a month Western networks offered or a $1,000 a month private stations were reportedly paying reporters.(5)
But after initial teething problems, Al Iraqiya started gaining ground, with 50 percent of Iraqis interviewed in a February 2004 poll by Oxford Research International expressing confidence in the channel, up 11 points from November 2003. Al Sumaria’s Boulos said the now government-run Al Iraqiya (although still financed by the US taxpayer) is the most-viewed terrestrial channel, largely because it is broadcast terrestrially and available to 93 percent of Iraqis. “Al Iraqiya is better now, showing more of what is going on in Iraq,” says Hameed Alaa Hameed, a network engineer from Baghdad.
However, the supposed impartiality of US-linked media has once again come under scrutiny following revelations in December 2005 that the Pentagon was secretly feeding hundreds of positive news stories, written by American military personnel and private contractors, to the Iraqi press. US Army General George W. Casey was reported as saying in March that the US military will continue to pay Iraqi newspapers to publish pro-US articles, adding that an internal review had concluded that no US laws or Pentagon guidelines were being violated by the policy, which aims to counter what Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld called “a campaign of disinformation” by the Iraqi resistance.(6) Whether the US military also is feeding stories to Iraqi TV networks is not known, but with the freedom of print media unabashedly undermined it would seem far from conspiratorial to hypothesize that this is happening at some level in the broadcast media. “I don’t know if they are being given stories, but maybe some channels are getting footage, like Kurdish channels, as they are with the Americans,” says Hameed.
Certainly, state broadcaster Al Iraqiya seems to be given more privileged access by the Coalition forces than other channels . During a joint US and Iraqi military operation on the northern city of Tal Afar in late September 2005, Al Iraqiya was the only non-American camera team allowed to accompany the troops, according to Al Jazeera’s editor-in-chief Ahmed Al Sheikh.
The Iraqi Media Network's Al Iraqiya was not the United States’ only attempt to counteract the popularity of Pan-Arab news channels in Iraq, or in the rest of the region for that matter. In February 2004 Alhurra (The Free One) was established, and shortly after, in April, sister channel Alhurra Iraq began broadcasting. Alhurra has had moderate success around the region, but reached into only 15 percent of Iraqi households in June 2005, according to Ipsos-Stat.
For the UK, Britain’s BBC World Service Trust joined the fray fairly late, launching Al Mirbad TV and radio in August 2005 in southern Iraq. According to Abir Awad, a project developer for the World Service Trust, the channel is to provide independent media in southern Iraq. “The media in Iraq used to be very Baghdad centric so we aimed at a regional audience,” she says. The World Service Trust is an independent charity within the World Service that has developed media in other war-torn countries such as Kosovo and Afghanistan, although Al Mirbad is the Trust’s biggest project to date. The British government’s Department for International Development is providing Al Mirbad with $11.81 million for the next two years, after which the broadcaster will seek funding from international donors and advertisers. The Basra-based channel—“the station with a southern vibe”—is managed by Iraqis and currently produces four hours of original content a day. In addition to helping establish channels, Western governments have also been working to train Iraqi media workers. The BBC and USAID have both been involved in training programs for Iraqi journalists on balance and ethics.
TV Journalism Turns Deadly
The invasion and subsequent occupation of Iraq has resulted in the deadliest conflict for the news media in recent history. At least 67 journalists and 24 media support workers have been killed and 39 journalists kidnapped since the invasion. Five of the kidnapped journalists—four Iraqis and one Italian—were killed, and the others released. Many journalists also have been wounded covering the conflict, as well as harassed and imprisoned by the Coalition and Iraqi authorities. The Iraqi Media Network, which includes national broadcaster Al Iraqiya, has suffered the greatest losses, followed by Dubai-based Al Arabiya, with nine journalists and six support workers killed.(7)
“Everyday when I ask my guys to do a story it is a nightmare for me because I am worried what will happen,” says Nabil Al Khatib, executive editor at Al Arabiya, which has lost 11 staff.(8) (See Al Khatib's interview wih TBS in this issue)
Al Khatib believes the security situation is having a negative impact on news reporting. “If we are talking about serious coverage of an area, a troubled area like Iraq, you need to be able to move freely and go to different areas and pass on your impressions to the public. But to compile a decent, balanced and accurate story is something that most of the time is not doable. It is not impossible to work there but it takes time and a lot of energy that is in contradiction with the nature of news for a news channel.”
Among Al Khatib’s concerns with operating in Iraq is a controversial issue that all news channels in Iraq grapple with—embedding journalists with Coalition forces.
Al Khatib says he has two concerns with embedding correspondents, firstly that the US military request correspondents to be attached to a unit for a lengthy period, often weeks at a time, for security reasons before military operations. Al Khatib says that the channel cannot afford to have correspondents away on assignments for essentially an unknown period. Furthermore, Al Khatib says that with most assignments carried out by Iraqis, locals put themselves at risk if they embed with Coalition forces. “If he is seen with the Americans and comes back, it would be difficult to explain to people that it was just an assignment. People might be aggressive because he was embedded,” he explains.
Al Khatib’s concerns are not to be taken lightly. Of the 91 journalists and media workers killed in Iraq, 80 percent are Iraqi and some 60 percent were targeted for assassination.(9)
“The second concern is that we are afraid of sending someone to be embedded to only cover the American side and then we fail to cover the insurgent side, to be balanced. For CNN or other American networks they don’t care about being balanced or not. We cannot do that and we won’t do that,” he says.
Regulating or Restricting Broadcasters?
As if broadcasting in Iraq is not difficult enough, Iraq’s interim Governing Council set up a Higher Media Commission in the summer of 2003 to regulate and license the burgeoning TV market. In the September of that year the commission barred Pan-Arab news channels Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya from covering the Governing Council’s activities for two weeks, claiming the networks promoted political violence and the killing of members of the council and the Coalition, and broadcast “terrorists terrorizing Iraqis.”
By July 2004, the Iraqi National Communications and Media Commission (INCMC) had been established, laying down rules and editorial standards for program content of television and radio broadcasters.
The commission, closely modeled on the US Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and the UK’s communications’ regulator OfCom, first bared its teeth when it banned Al Arabiya and Al Jazeera for a month in August 2004 for “incitement to hatred” after broadcasting stories on the Iraqi resistance. Al Arabiya was back on air after a month, but Al Jazeera has remained blacklisted ever since. Al Jazeera’s editor in chief, Ahmed Al Sheikh, believes the decision was politically motivated. “It was a joint US-Iraqi decision. If they wanted to have reversed that decision they could have,” he says.
Al Jazeera has experienced such bans in the past in Iran, Jordan, Kuwait and Palestine, but the Iraqi ban has particularly aggravated the channel. “I think the people behind the closure are those who don’t like the truth, no more, no less. They don’t like Al Jazeera,” says Al Jazeera presenter and producer Mohammed Al Bouniry. “By shutting down Al Jazeera they will have no problem to shut others down.”
However, no other channel has been banned in Iraq and other broadcasters do not share the same grievances as Al Jazeera. Al Diyar’s Al Yasiri is supportive of the commission: “We don’t have any form of censorship. At this point in time, Iraq is the freest country in the Arab world for the media.”
But Star TV Network’s Saad Al Saraf believes the commission is not living up to its potential. “It could be bigger and wider, and just revolves around one person (Siyamend Othman). It has not successfully tackled issues in media bias, such as during the elections,” he says. Indeed, there seems to be a sort of "look the other way" approach to enforcing the commission’s rules, such as the ban on "spreading sectarian, racial and religious sedition and strife."
Broadcasting Sectarian Strife?
A cursory glance at the backing and orientation of many channels reveals the extent to which sectarian issues are driving broadcasting, which can only exacerbate sectarian proclivities that are increasingly apparent in Iraq.
Al Salam TV relies on funding from Shiite cleric Muqtada Al Sadr, Ghadeer TV on the Higher Council of the Islamic Revolution, Al Masar TV on the Islamic Da'awa Party, and Ahlul Bayt TV (The House of the Prophet Muhammad) on the patronage of Shiite cleric Ayatollah Hadi Al Moderassi. Baghdadia TV is considered a moderate Sunni channel and Baghdad TV, run by the Iraqi Islamist Party, is known as "Baathist TV" among Shiites who criticize its pro-Sunni agenda. Afaq TV (Horizons) shows video footage in support of the Sunni Iraqi Islamic Party and Muqtada Al Sadr.
Babil TV reportedly offers programming in support of the Sunni Iraqi Front for National Dialogue, and Biladi TV runs programs in support of the United Iraqi Alliance.
Al Furat (The Euphrates) is reportedly backed by the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) and supported the Unified Iraqi Coalition during the elections, which has the backing of Shiite cleric Grand Ayatollah Ali Al Sistani. The channel's director general, Arshad Tawfiq, was a former Iraqi ambassador to Spain and a former Baath Party official, and is now a member of the Supreme Council for National Salvation. The station opposes the presence of the Coalition forces in Iraq, and refers to Iraqis killed by Coalition troops as “martyrs.”
As desired above. the Coalition-created Al Iraqiya channel initially was lambasted as a pro-American mouthpiece, but since it was turned over to the Iraqi government is widely viewed as a sectarian, Shiite channel.
Al Bazzaz’s Al Sharqiya is considered a more toned channel, although overt support was shown for former Prime Minister Iyad Allawi in the recent elections and some view the channel as pro-Sunni. An Iraqi who worked for Al Sharqiyah in Dubai, who did not wish to disclose his name, told TBS that many of the channel’s employees do not like Shiites, a bias that is reflected in the channel’s employment policies. “They kicked me out when they knew I was Shia. It is a pro-Sunni channel,” he says.
The channel was mockingly dubbed “Al Baathiya” upon launch because of Al Bazzaz’s personal history as the head of the Baath regime’s national news agency until 1992. Al Bazzaz is also rumored to have political ambitions and was alleged to have received millions of dollars from the Saudi government to launch the Iraqi Azzaman newspaper in a British high court hearing last year.(10)
Ethnic minorities also have a political media presence. Ashur TV, which represents the Assyrian Democratic Movement, receives 50 percent of its funding from the party and the rest from supporters around the world. The Iraqi Turkoman Front funds Turkomaneli TV. Baghdad’s Shafak TV is backed by the Kurdish authorities, Kurdistan TV by the Kurdistan Democratic Party, and ATB TV is linked to the Kurdistan Communist Party. The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), the party of Iraqi president Jalal Talabani, operates Al Hurriyah TV and PUK TV. KurdSat TV reportedly supports the PUK.
The extent to which sectarianism is affecting Iraq’s media content, particularly news, was evident following the February 22 bombing of a Shiite shrine in Samarra. Sunni-orientated channels such as the Iraqi Islamic Party’s Baghdad TV, which has no correspondents in either of the Shiite holy cities of Najaf and Karbala, focused on Sunnis attacked in retaliation for the bombing, while Shiite-run channels Al Furat and Al Iraqiya devoted coverage to the damage to the shrine and the plight of Shiites under Saddam Hussein’s regime. Al Furat reportedly aired slogans telling Shiites to stand up for their rights.(11)
Even Al Jazeera has come under fire from Iraq’s sectarianism, with Shiites taking to the streets in December 2005 to protest against the channel for broadcasting a remark, made by a guest on a talk show, arguing that religious authority Ayatollah Sistani should stay out of politics. BBC analyst Magdi Abdelhadi believes the demonstrations were a "testimony to the tense relationship between the Shias and the Sunni Arabs. Attacking Al Jazeera becomes a symbolic salvo in the simmering hostility" of Iraq.(12)
These cases do not differ radically from Lebanon’s broadcasting environment. In Lebanon, the TV landscape reflects that of the sectarian political system: Mustaqbal (Future), owned by the Hariri family, is a Sunni channel, LBC is Christian, Al Manar is backed by Shiite political party Hezbollah, and NBN is partially backed by Shiite parliamentary speaker and head of the Amal movement Nabih Berri.(13)
The sectarian nature of Lebanese television was apparent last year when over a million Lebanese thronged to Beirut’s Martyrs’ Square on March 14 to demonstrate against the Syrian occupation. Instead of broadcasting the event Al Manar TV re-broadcast footage of "the Shia" demonstration in downtown that occurred on March 8. Conversely, although LBC and Al Mustaqbal did cover the March 8 demonstration, far more footage was given to ‘their’ demonstration on March 14, repeating the images again and again in the weeks and months that followed.
These three dominant Lebanese channels, along with NBN, are in many senses leftovers from the civil war period, when radio stations were backed by the separate factions before making the leap to television broadcasting.(14) Iraq, on the other hand, has made this transition during a devastating occupation and at a more macro level in line with its population’s own demographics.
At least in Lebanon’s case, such media publicly sustains already deeply rooted sectarian divisions, albeit with greater sensitivity towards other religions than in the past.(15) But in Iraq’s case, where the media is caught up in political turmoil, violence, and a renewed sectarianism that had been kept at bay by Saddam Hussein’s regime, the struggle for viewers—and voters—is perhaps even more acute than in Lebanon, where sectarianism has been the status quo well before the 1860 civil war, and is formerly enshrined in the country’s constitution (1943). After all, the political and social sectarianism of Iraq is, like the multiple political party scene and media landscape, a very new arena that will no doubt change alongside political developments. Channels may fare as their political backers do, sink or swim. But with no effective or impartial national public TV channel—the moribund TeleLiban is hardly watched, and Al Iraqiya favors Iraq’s Shiite government—both Lebanon and Iraq’s media will remain driven by sectarianism.
Although the Iraqi market is likely to see more channels being launched—the INCMC reportedly has 20 applications pending—broadcasting will continue to be a struggle in the absence of stability. And for the foreseeable future, funding for channels is likely to remain primarily in the hands of political and religious groups rather than the commercial or state sectors, much like in Lebanon.
NOTES
1. BBC Monitoring puts the number of Iraqi TV channels at 27, but new channels are being launched. The Iraqi Media Commission did not respond to emails or phone calls to clarify the exact number of channels currently operating and how many TV applications the commission has received. The only exception to the analogy of Lebanonization is the armed resistance, which does not have its own TV channel, though insurgetn groups do prouce their own video and audio materials to post on the Internet or distribute to mainstream media. Also, certain channels that are vocally opposed to the US-led occupation air footage filmed by rebels, such as tapes of kidnap victims and attacks on convoy troops.
2. To get an equitable view of Lebanon’s daily local news you have to tune in to at least three TV channels which, incidentally, are conveniently timed to allow viewers to do exactly that.
3. ‘Lebanonization’ has been used by media commentators to describe the growing sectarian divide between Iraqis, implying an impending civil war on sectarian lines, as occurred in Lebanon between 1976 to 1990. However, although the term fails to take into account the reasons for war in Lebanon, along with other conditions, which vary quite radically from contemporary Iraq, on a political-media level the term seems quite apt.
4. Harris refused to comment on their activities in Iraq. The Harris website reported: ‘The year-ago quarter (2005) benefited from $22 million in revenue from the Iraqi Media Network (IMN) program. Sequentially, revenue increased 3 percent.’
5. Gordon Robinson. ‘Rebuilding Iraqi Television: A Personal Account,’ Iraqi Media Developments Newsletter, Issue 28, December 15 2004 - January 2005 www.standhopecentre.org/imdn/28.htm
6. Mark Mazzetti. ‘Military Will Keep Planting Articles in Iraq,’ Los Angeles Times, March 4, 2006.
7. Committee to Protect Journalists press release, March 17 2006
8. Three Al Arabiya employees, including correspondent Atwar Bahjat, were killed in February, 2006 by a unidentified group outside of Samarra. Regarding the other eight fatalities, five died in a car bomb that targeted Al Arabiya’s bureau in Baghdad, and three were killed by US troops. Reporter Jawad Khathem was the target of an armed kidnap attempt that paralyzed him from the waist down.
9. Committee to Protect Journalists press release, March 17 2006
10. David Pallister, ‘Media mogul accused of running Saudi-funded propaganda campaign,’ The Guardian, January 26, 2005
11. Louise Roug, ‘Unfair, Unbalanced Channels’ Los Angeles Times, March 28, 2006
12. Magdi Abdelhadi. Iraqi Shias Slam Arab TV Channel, December 2005 - www.bbc.co.uk
13. Murr TV (MTV), owned by Greek Orthodox politician Gabriel Murr, was supposed to be re-launched in 2005 after the government shut the station down in 2002. There have also been rumors over the past year of former General Michel Aoun’s Free Patriotic Movement setting up a channel - Orange TV.
14. The Hizbullah backed Al Manar TV channel was launched in 1991 to promote the movement’s role in fighting the Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon, which ended in 2000.
15. For instance LBC now takes Ramadan into consideration for its programming schedule, and hired, for the first time, a Shiite journalist for a documentary series two years ago.
Tuesday, September 04, 2007
The need for transparency in the Gulf oil markets
Commentary – Executive magazine August 2007
While the Middle East makes baby steps towards implementing greater financial transparency, accountability and the rule of law, the region’s best-known commodity – oil – lacks transparency in the way tenders are allocated and, more disturbingly, in actual reserve estimates.
Information on oil, the lynchpin of the Gulf economies and the catalyst for numerous conflicts, coups and much other skulduggery in the Middle East, is being held back from not only the people of the region, but also the very markets that rely on that energy.
The most glaring examples are Iraq and Saudi Arabia.
In Iraq the issue is over the proposed oil law, which would give multinational oil companies such as Conoco, ExxonMobil and Chevron first dibs on developing the country’s oil fields under contracts of up to 30 years.
Iraqi politicians have complained that they don’t know what is going on with oil resources as the formulation of the law is being stage managed by a US consultancy firm. Furthermore, in a recent poll carried out by Custom Strategic Research in Iraq, only 4% of poll respondents felt they have been given “totally adequate” information about the oil law while a further 20% describe information provision as “somewhat adequate,” and 76% as “inadequate”. The poll also indicates that Iraqis are not happy with the sector being developed by foreign companies, with 63% replying they would prefer Iraq’s oil to be developed and produced by Iraqi public sector companies.
The need for greater transparency in allocating oil tenders and the drawing up of the new oil law – the bedrock for future development of the country – is essential for Iraqis to decide on how their oil wealth is to be used.
Of greater concern to the global markets are the oil reserves of Saudi Arabia, the world’s top oil producer and exporter. Future supply projections are largely based on the fact that Saudi Arabia will be producing as much as 20 to 25 million barrels of oil per day (bpd) within the next two to three decades. Yet current production capacity is 11.3 million bpd, around half of that estimate.
Although Saudi Arabia is carrying out several multi-billion dollar projects to raise capacity to 12.5 million bpd by 2009, such an increase is not enough, certainly to prove to the world that the kingdom has the reported 261 billion barrels of proven oil reserves. That information, on how much each field contributes to total oil reserves, is treated as a state secret. The problem is compounded by Riyadh not allowing third-party verification of their ability to deliver. Additionally, there is speculation that the kingdom’s three most important fields, which have been producing at high rates for over 50 years and require a staggering 12 million barrels per day of water to be injected to create pressure for extraction, are reaching the end of their shelf life.
Saudi Arabia assures us that it can meet projected targets – which, to its credit, it has always done – but unless national oil company (NOC) Aramco provides more information on reserves, it will be hard to know how long they can effectively meet demand.
Such secrecy among NOCs is somewhat understandable, but not helpful in making future projections in a time of rapid global economic growth or holding NOCs– the dominant energy firms in the region – more accountable to their citizens.
Equally, a lack of transparency is also limiting NOCs’ access to external capital that could help raise capacity and resultantly meet surging world demand. And with the International Energy Agency (IEA) projecting that over the next 30 years some $2.2 trillion in new investments will be needed in the global oil sector to meet surging demand, much of this cash will be destined for the Middle East - but into whose pockets and for what ends?
There is an exception however to the secrecy so predominant in the Gulf: Bahrain. In 2005, Bahrain streamlined its oil operations from three authorities into one, the National Oil and Gas Authority (NOGA), with the head of NOGA, Abdul-Hussain Ali-Mizra, a technocrat, also the Minister of Oil and Gas Affairs. Such an approach has given NOGA greater flexibility in meeting both domestic and international demand, attracting capital, and helping to remove bureaucratic obstacles that hampered growth. All tenders are now put online for companies to bid for.
“Oil and gas has been very secretive in the past but we want to change that as there is nothing to hide,” Ali-Mizra told me earlier this year. “Countries should be transparent and responsible, so we are setting the benchmark.”
With Bahrain relatively low on the global energy supply rankings, Manama has perhaps the least to lose in being transparent (we all know its supplies are running out), but Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf countries would do well to take a leaf out of Bahrain’s book to be more forthcoming in information on tenders and reserve estimates. The markets demand it, and the people deserve it.
While the Middle East makes baby steps towards implementing greater financial transparency, accountability and the rule of law, the region’s best-known commodity – oil – lacks transparency in the way tenders are allocated and, more disturbingly, in actual reserve estimates.
Information on oil, the lynchpin of the Gulf economies and the catalyst for numerous conflicts, coups and much other skulduggery in the Middle East, is being held back from not only the people of the region, but also the very markets that rely on that energy.
The most glaring examples are Iraq and Saudi Arabia.
In Iraq the issue is over the proposed oil law, which would give multinational oil companies such as Conoco, ExxonMobil and Chevron first dibs on developing the country’s oil fields under contracts of up to 30 years.
Iraqi politicians have complained that they don’t know what is going on with oil resources as the formulation of the law is being stage managed by a US consultancy firm. Furthermore, in a recent poll carried out by Custom Strategic Research in Iraq, only 4% of poll respondents felt they have been given “totally adequate” information about the oil law while a further 20% describe information provision as “somewhat adequate,” and 76% as “inadequate”. The poll also indicates that Iraqis are not happy with the sector being developed by foreign companies, with 63% replying they would prefer Iraq’s oil to be developed and produced by Iraqi public sector companies.
The need for greater transparency in allocating oil tenders and the drawing up of the new oil law – the bedrock for future development of the country – is essential for Iraqis to decide on how their oil wealth is to be used.
Of greater concern to the global markets are the oil reserves of Saudi Arabia, the world’s top oil producer and exporter. Future supply projections are largely based on the fact that Saudi Arabia will be producing as much as 20 to 25 million barrels of oil per day (bpd) within the next two to three decades. Yet current production capacity is 11.3 million bpd, around half of that estimate.
Although Saudi Arabia is carrying out several multi-billion dollar projects to raise capacity to 12.5 million bpd by 2009, such an increase is not enough, certainly to prove to the world that the kingdom has the reported 261 billion barrels of proven oil reserves. That information, on how much each field contributes to total oil reserves, is treated as a state secret. The problem is compounded by Riyadh not allowing third-party verification of their ability to deliver. Additionally, there is speculation that the kingdom’s three most important fields, which have been producing at high rates for over 50 years and require a staggering 12 million barrels per day of water to be injected to create pressure for extraction, are reaching the end of their shelf life.
Saudi Arabia assures us that it can meet projected targets – which, to its credit, it has always done – but unless national oil company (NOC) Aramco provides more information on reserves, it will be hard to know how long they can effectively meet demand.
Such secrecy among NOCs is somewhat understandable, but not helpful in making future projections in a time of rapid global economic growth or holding NOCs– the dominant energy firms in the region – more accountable to their citizens.
Equally, a lack of transparency is also limiting NOCs’ access to external capital that could help raise capacity and resultantly meet surging world demand. And with the International Energy Agency (IEA) projecting that over the next 30 years some $2.2 trillion in new investments will be needed in the global oil sector to meet surging demand, much of this cash will be destined for the Middle East - but into whose pockets and for what ends?
There is an exception however to the secrecy so predominant in the Gulf: Bahrain. In 2005, Bahrain streamlined its oil operations from three authorities into one, the National Oil and Gas Authority (NOGA), with the head of NOGA, Abdul-Hussain Ali-Mizra, a technocrat, also the Minister of Oil and Gas Affairs. Such an approach has given NOGA greater flexibility in meeting both domestic and international demand, attracting capital, and helping to remove bureaucratic obstacles that hampered growth. All tenders are now put online for companies to bid for.
“Oil and gas has been very secretive in the past but we want to change that as there is nothing to hide,” Ali-Mizra told me earlier this year. “Countries should be transparent and responsible, so we are setting the benchmark.”
With Bahrain relatively low on the global energy supply rankings, Manama has perhaps the least to lose in being transparent (we all know its supplies are running out), but Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf countries would do well to take a leaf out of Bahrain’s book to be more forthcoming in information on tenders and reserve estimates. The markets demand it, and the people deserve it.
Is it all about Iran’s energy?
Commentary – Executive magazine July 2007
As the rumors of a strike on Iran continue, with US sabre rattling an almost weekly occurrence – lately over Hizbullah agents in Iraq, and Al-Qaeda allegedly using Iran as a staging ground – a question begs to be asked, is this as much about energy as Tehran’s nuclear ambitions?
Iran is sitting on huge oil and gas reserves that have not been utilized to their full potential. The country’s gas reserves are of major importance to the development of the global economy, particularly liquefied natural gas (LNG), with global consumption surging by over 30% in the five years to 2005.
Qatar’s North field and Iran’s South Pars field is the largest known gas field in the world, with estimated gas reserves of 1,300 trillion cubic feet (TCF) or 221 billion barrels of oil and gas equivalent (boe).
Major energy companies are champing at the bit to access this veritable gold mine, but the US sanctions on the Islamic Republic - which threaten to punish foreign firms that do business in Iran under the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 - has prevented the development of the South Par’s estimated 500 TCF (85 billion boe) of natural gas.
The majors have resultantly concentrated on Qatar, which overtook Indonesia last year as the biggest exporter of LNG, exporting 31.09 billion cubic meters (bcm) or 15% of global LNG exports. But with global demand for LNG rising - demand is expected to nearly double in the next three to four years - Iran remains the untapped diamond.
“The fact is we will need Iranian energy sooner or later, perhaps sooner,” said Ian Moncrieff, Vice President, Oil and Gas Practice, at American consultancy firm Kline & Company.
So the question is, will the global thirst for Iranian gas necessitate war by the US or rapprochement?
A thaw in relations could –and arguably should - occur, spurred on by the majors, as occurred in Central Asia in the 1990s. Furthermore, the world has become increasingly dependent on the energy flowing out of the Gulf.
Last year, Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE produced about 28% of the world's oil, while holding 55% (728 billion barrels) of the world's crude oil reserves and 41% of total proven gas reserves (2,509 TCF). OECD gross oil imports from the Gulf countries averaged about 10.4 million barrels per day (bpd) during 2006, accounting for 31% of the OECD's total net oil imports.
A strike on Iran would cause a serious upset in accessing this energy, as in such a scenario the Straits of Hormuz could be closed or partially blocked. With some 17 million bpd exported via the Straits, roughly one-fifth of the world’s oil supplies, even a slight disruption to the flow of energy would have a serious impact on energy prices – the price of a barrel of oil would not just spike, it would rocket into the triple digits.
The Gulf countries are very aware of the dangers that the reliance on the Straits presents, with two pipelines on the drawing board that could pump as much as 6.5 million bpd, around 40% of the daily exports through the Straits. These pipelines will not be finished for several years however, and the possibility of pumping oil and gas by pipeline to the Mediterranean is equally years off, due to the billions of dollars needed to overhaul as well as build pipelines across Iraq and through Syria, another geopolitical wild card.
The global need to access the Gulf’s energy resources could conceivably prevent a strike on Iran. Then again, US Energy Secretary Sam Bodman said last year that the United States would be in “good shape” if Gulf exports were affected due to America's emergency stockpile of almost 700 million barrels of crude oil. It would be the rest of the world that would not be in such good shape however, and with Washington increasingly isolated over its adventurism in Iraq, an attack on Iran and the knock-on consequences on energy supplies could leave the US without many friends. These factors are no doubt being given due consideration on Capitol Hill and at the Pentagon.
What will equally be considered is that Qatar will supply the US and UK with some 40% of their LNG needs, but only by 2010, and that LNG projects in Iran are only likely to swing into action by 2013 – plenty of time to tackle the Islamic Republic and still come out trumps, unless Iraqi resistance style developments occur in Iran of course.
Just as the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq were about securing energy resources as well as waging the “war on terror” and nipping the supposed threat of WMDs in the bud, America’s posturing over Iran is as much about accessing energy as countering the threat of Iran’s nuclear aspirations.
How Washington handles this crisis is of grave importance not only to the region but to the rest of the world, who desperately rely on the Gulf’s oil and gas to keep their economies ticking along.
PAUL COCHRANE is a freelance journalist based in Beirut. His work has appeared in Britain’s Petroleum Review.
As the rumors of a strike on Iran continue, with US sabre rattling an almost weekly occurrence – lately over Hizbullah agents in Iraq, and Al-Qaeda allegedly using Iran as a staging ground – a question begs to be asked, is this as much about energy as Tehran’s nuclear ambitions?
Iran is sitting on huge oil and gas reserves that have not been utilized to their full potential. The country’s gas reserves are of major importance to the development of the global economy, particularly liquefied natural gas (LNG), with global consumption surging by over 30% in the five years to 2005.
Qatar’s North field and Iran’s South Pars field is the largest known gas field in the world, with estimated gas reserves of 1,300 trillion cubic feet (TCF) or 221 billion barrels of oil and gas equivalent (boe).
Major energy companies are champing at the bit to access this veritable gold mine, but the US sanctions on the Islamic Republic - which threaten to punish foreign firms that do business in Iran under the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 - has prevented the development of the South Par’s estimated 500 TCF (85 billion boe) of natural gas.
The majors have resultantly concentrated on Qatar, which overtook Indonesia last year as the biggest exporter of LNG, exporting 31.09 billion cubic meters (bcm) or 15% of global LNG exports. But with global demand for LNG rising - demand is expected to nearly double in the next three to four years - Iran remains the untapped diamond.
“The fact is we will need Iranian energy sooner or later, perhaps sooner,” said Ian Moncrieff, Vice President, Oil and Gas Practice, at American consultancy firm Kline & Company.
So the question is, will the global thirst for Iranian gas necessitate war by the US or rapprochement?
A thaw in relations could –and arguably should - occur, spurred on by the majors, as occurred in Central Asia in the 1990s. Furthermore, the world has become increasingly dependent on the energy flowing out of the Gulf.
Last year, Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE produced about 28% of the world's oil, while holding 55% (728 billion barrels) of the world's crude oil reserves and 41% of total proven gas reserves (2,509 TCF). OECD gross oil imports from the Gulf countries averaged about 10.4 million barrels per day (bpd) during 2006, accounting for 31% of the OECD's total net oil imports.
A strike on Iran would cause a serious upset in accessing this energy, as in such a scenario the Straits of Hormuz could be closed or partially blocked. With some 17 million bpd exported via the Straits, roughly one-fifth of the world’s oil supplies, even a slight disruption to the flow of energy would have a serious impact on energy prices – the price of a barrel of oil would not just spike, it would rocket into the triple digits.
The Gulf countries are very aware of the dangers that the reliance on the Straits presents, with two pipelines on the drawing board that could pump as much as 6.5 million bpd, around 40% of the daily exports through the Straits. These pipelines will not be finished for several years however, and the possibility of pumping oil and gas by pipeline to the Mediterranean is equally years off, due to the billions of dollars needed to overhaul as well as build pipelines across Iraq and through Syria, another geopolitical wild card.
The global need to access the Gulf’s energy resources could conceivably prevent a strike on Iran. Then again, US Energy Secretary Sam Bodman said last year that the United States would be in “good shape” if Gulf exports were affected due to America's emergency stockpile of almost 700 million barrels of crude oil. It would be the rest of the world that would not be in such good shape however, and with Washington increasingly isolated over its adventurism in Iraq, an attack on Iran and the knock-on consequences on energy supplies could leave the US without many friends. These factors are no doubt being given due consideration on Capitol Hill and at the Pentagon.
What will equally be considered is that Qatar will supply the US and UK with some 40% of their LNG needs, but only by 2010, and that LNG projects in Iran are only likely to swing into action by 2013 – plenty of time to tackle the Islamic Republic and still come out trumps, unless Iraqi resistance style developments occur in Iran of course.
Just as the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq were about securing energy resources as well as waging the “war on terror” and nipping the supposed threat of WMDs in the bud, America’s posturing over Iran is as much about accessing energy as countering the threat of Iran’s nuclear aspirations.
How Washington handles this crisis is of grave importance not only to the region but to the rest of the world, who desperately rely on the Gulf’s oil and gas to keep their economies ticking along.
PAUL COCHRANE is a freelance journalist based in Beirut. His work has appeared in Britain’s Petroleum Review.
Iraqi Refugee Catastrophe
Commentary – Executive magazine June 2007
One of the world’s largest refugee crises is underway in the Middle East. It has been going on for the last four years, but judging by the scant attention the issue gets from the media and the international community, you wouldn’t think so. I’m referring to the Iraqi refugee crisis.
There are an estimated 1.6 million Iraqis internally displaced, one million in neighboring Jordan, 1.5 million plus in Syria, 80,000 in Egypt, and 30,000 in Lebanon. If the exodus continues, there could be more Iraqis outside of the country than in it, and those that will have stayed on will not be the moderates Washington is desperately trying to win over. It will be the ‘insurgents,’ the Iraqi resistance, whatever nomenclature you might want to give to the Iraqis opposing the US-led Coalition.
In all fairness to the media, the Iraqi refugee crisis in Jordan has garnered token attention, but the equally pressing situation in Syria has not.
As for Jordan, the influx of Iraqis to Syria has been a double-edged sword. Initially the Iraqis that fled were middle to upper class, bringing with them life savings that were duly invested in property, setting up businesses and making a home away from home. But as the situation in Iraq has deteriorated to resemble one of Dante’s cycles of hell, the Iraqis flooding into Jordan and Syria (Saudi Arabia has kept its doors firmly shut, building a $7 billion fence along the border to keep Iraqis out) are increasingly cash strapped.
This has brought with it misery, desperation and a growing xenophobia towards the Iraqi refugees in Syria due to rents doubling in price and food costs rising by an estimated 10 percent in just two years.
As a Syrian man remarked, even Syrian prostitutes are complaining about the influx as there are so many Iraqi women selling themselves on the streets - for as a little as 150 Syrian Pounds ($3).
The refugee crisis is compounding Syria’s internal problems, what with 11.4 percent of the population living in poverty, 20% unemployed, and a population that is expected to surge from the current 18 million to 30 million by 2025. On top of all that, the Syrian government announced in April that the refugees were costing the state an estimated $1 billion a year.
Compared to the coverage immigration and refugees get in the European press it is mind blowing to think of the stink the media would cause if, say, Britain’s population had grown by about 8% - the equivalent number of Iraqis now in Syria – in under four years due to a massive influx of refugees. It would rightly be deemed a major international crisis.
But the countries primarily responsible for the real crisis in the Middle East, the US and Britain, have kept passing the buck and taken in a paltry number of Iraqi refugees.
The Bush administration, recently caving in after a great deal of pressure, said the US would accept 7,000 this year - a step in the right direction considering the US let in under 500 Iraqis since the war began, but a drop in the ocean in comparison to Syria and Jordan.
Britain is no better, approving just 12% of Iraqi asylum claims, according to Amnesty International, whereas Sweden has a 91% approval rate, letting in 60,000 Iraqis and suspending the forcible return of refugees.
The West cannot of course take in millions of Iraqi refugees, but what it can do is aid humanitarian organizations and the UNHCR in Jordan and Syria until Iraqis can return home. But just as Britain and the US inadequately planned for the aftermath of the invasion, the White House and Downing Street have not allocated adequate funds for refugees. The funds that the international community has pigeon-holed for the Iraqi crisis are for use in Iraq, not for the neighboring countries grappling with the spill over from the occupation.
The UN has repeatedly called for extra funding, but such appeals have fallen on deaf ears.
Syria has now been forced to tighten entry regulations and reduced visas from a month to two weeks, forcing displaced Iraqis into a Catch-22 situation: stay illegally in Syria risking deportation or make the potentially lethal return trip to Iraq. Border crossings to Jordan or Lebanon are no easier, taking up to 8 hours and with a high likelihood of refused entry.
“People are complaining that Iraqis are raising the price of rents and oil, but if Syria doesn’t take them who will?” questioned Dr Nabil Sukkar, Managing Director of the Syrian Consulting Bureau for Development and Investment.
The refugee crisis is going to be with us for some time to come, and it is about time the US and Britain pulled their weight in trying to rectify what the International Refugee Committee has called ‘a humanitarian crisis of historic proportions.’
One of the world’s largest refugee crises is underway in the Middle East. It has been going on for the last four years, but judging by the scant attention the issue gets from the media and the international community, you wouldn’t think so. I’m referring to the Iraqi refugee crisis.
There are an estimated 1.6 million Iraqis internally displaced, one million in neighboring Jordan, 1.5 million plus in Syria, 80,000 in Egypt, and 30,000 in Lebanon. If the exodus continues, there could be more Iraqis outside of the country than in it, and those that will have stayed on will not be the moderates Washington is desperately trying to win over. It will be the ‘insurgents,’ the Iraqi resistance, whatever nomenclature you might want to give to the Iraqis opposing the US-led Coalition.
In all fairness to the media, the Iraqi refugee crisis in Jordan has garnered token attention, but the equally pressing situation in Syria has not.
As for Jordan, the influx of Iraqis to Syria has been a double-edged sword. Initially the Iraqis that fled were middle to upper class, bringing with them life savings that were duly invested in property, setting up businesses and making a home away from home. But as the situation in Iraq has deteriorated to resemble one of Dante’s cycles of hell, the Iraqis flooding into Jordan and Syria (Saudi Arabia has kept its doors firmly shut, building a $7 billion fence along the border to keep Iraqis out) are increasingly cash strapped.
This has brought with it misery, desperation and a growing xenophobia towards the Iraqi refugees in Syria due to rents doubling in price and food costs rising by an estimated 10 percent in just two years.
As a Syrian man remarked, even Syrian prostitutes are complaining about the influx as there are so many Iraqi women selling themselves on the streets - for as a little as 150 Syrian Pounds ($3).
The refugee crisis is compounding Syria’s internal problems, what with 11.4 percent of the population living in poverty, 20% unemployed, and a population that is expected to surge from the current 18 million to 30 million by 2025. On top of all that, the Syrian government announced in April that the refugees were costing the state an estimated $1 billion a year.
Compared to the coverage immigration and refugees get in the European press it is mind blowing to think of the stink the media would cause if, say, Britain’s population had grown by about 8% - the equivalent number of Iraqis now in Syria – in under four years due to a massive influx of refugees. It would rightly be deemed a major international crisis.
But the countries primarily responsible for the real crisis in the Middle East, the US and Britain, have kept passing the buck and taken in a paltry number of Iraqi refugees.
The Bush administration, recently caving in after a great deal of pressure, said the US would accept 7,000 this year - a step in the right direction considering the US let in under 500 Iraqis since the war began, but a drop in the ocean in comparison to Syria and Jordan.
Britain is no better, approving just 12% of Iraqi asylum claims, according to Amnesty International, whereas Sweden has a 91% approval rate, letting in 60,000 Iraqis and suspending the forcible return of refugees.
The West cannot of course take in millions of Iraqi refugees, but what it can do is aid humanitarian organizations and the UNHCR in Jordan and Syria until Iraqis can return home. But just as Britain and the US inadequately planned for the aftermath of the invasion, the White House and Downing Street have not allocated adequate funds for refugees. The funds that the international community has pigeon-holed for the Iraqi crisis are for use in Iraq, not for the neighboring countries grappling with the spill over from the occupation.
The UN has repeatedly called for extra funding, but such appeals have fallen on deaf ears.
Syria has now been forced to tighten entry regulations and reduced visas from a month to two weeks, forcing displaced Iraqis into a Catch-22 situation: stay illegally in Syria risking deportation or make the potentially lethal return trip to Iraq. Border crossings to Jordan or Lebanon are no easier, taking up to 8 hours and with a high likelihood of refused entry.
“People are complaining that Iraqis are raising the price of rents and oil, but if Syria doesn’t take them who will?” questioned Dr Nabil Sukkar, Managing Director of the Syrian Consulting Bureau for Development and Investment.
The refugee crisis is going to be with us for some time to come, and it is about time the US and Britain pulled their weight in trying to rectify what the International Refugee Committee has called ‘a humanitarian crisis of historic proportions.’
Wednesday, June 13, 2007
Syria facing Iraqi refugee crisis
By Paul Cochrane in Damascus
The Independent On Sunday 10 June 2007
A major and growing refugee crisis is developing in Syria. More than 1.4 million Iraqis have fled there since the 2003 invasion, with about 30,000 more arriving every month.
The influx is putting a massive strain on Syrian society, triggering inflation and overburdening social services. Relief agencies are struggling to handle the crisis.
With only a quarter of the £30m allocated for Iraqi refugees by the United Nations used in Syria, UN relief agencies are now appealing for further funds and assistance.
"We are looking for more funding," said Laurens Jolles, a UNHCR representative. "We encourage other agencies to come, and bilateral funding for Syrian governmental departments most affected."
The problem is particularly acute as Syria is a poor country that faces US economic sanctions and is under international pressure to cooperate over Iraq and Lebanon. There are also some 400,000 Palestinian refugees who have lived in Syria since the creation of Israel in 1948.
Around 80 per cent of the Iraqis in Syria are believed to live in Damascus, according to the UNHCR, adding to the capital's water and housing shortages. Schools and hospitals are struggling with the influx, with some schools reporting more than 60 students per class instead of the usual 30.
With the Iraqi refugees costing the state £500m over the past four years, according to a recent government statement, Damascus tried to tighten entry regulations a few months ago. The decision sparked protests in the capital and the government eventually capitulated, realising the issue could cause significant problems domestically.
"The government is now insisting that Iraqis register themselves to give details about accommodation, as Syria likes to have more control over the people here. However it is still very permissive, especially compared to Jordan and Lebanon," said Mr Jolles.
The UNHCR has so far registered 82,000 refugees, with some 450 registered per day and up to 2,000 Iraqis seeking appointments every week. In the past year the refugee crisis has become even more pronounced.
Initially, wealthier Iraqis left for Jordan or Syria. But as Iraq descended into chaos, poorer Iraqis crossed the Syrian border in increasing numbers, contributing to societal and economic strains in a country that has 25 per cent unemployment. "It's a big problem. We don't want Iraqis here as many are bad people - thieves and roughnecks - and are driving up the price of everything," said shopkeeper Yassir Habash, 31.
The influx of refugees, equivalent to roughly 8 per cent of Syria's 19 million population, has resulted in inflationary pressure, doubling the price of accommodation and raising food costs by an estimated 10 percent in under two years. Petty crime and prostitution has also increased, with Iraqi women selling themselves on the streets for as little as £1.50.
The influx has generated a degree of xenophobia towards the new immigrants. "I worked as a mechanic but locals started threatening me and I was forced to leave," said Tariki Zaide, 23, who now supports his parents and four siblings by working, illegally, as a cleaner at a guesthouse in Damascus. Earning £1.50-£2 a day he said his family is struggling to pay the £60 monthly rent.
"People are complaining that Iraqis are raising the price of rents and oil, but if Syria doesn't take them who will?" asked Dr Nabil Sukkar, managing director of the Syrian Consulting Bureau for Development and Investment.
Neighbouring Jordan is reeling from an estimated 750,000 Iraqi refugees, tightening entry requirements and imposing certain conditions on Iraqis that wish to stay in the country of 5.9 million people. Saudi Arabia is keeping its doors firmly shut, planning to build a US-Mexico style border fence, at the cost of a £3.5bn, to keep Iraqis out.
"At least 50 per cent will never go back, especially if they stay another year," said Dr. Sukkar. "Many have settled down here, getting jobs or creating 'Little Baghdads' in certain areas, but I see more trouble before Iraq settles down," he said.
The Independent On Sunday 10 June 2007
A major and growing refugee crisis is developing in Syria. More than 1.4 million Iraqis have fled there since the 2003 invasion, with about 30,000 more arriving every month.
The influx is putting a massive strain on Syrian society, triggering inflation and overburdening social services. Relief agencies are struggling to handle the crisis.
With only a quarter of the £30m allocated for Iraqi refugees by the United Nations used in Syria, UN relief agencies are now appealing for further funds and assistance.
"We are looking for more funding," said Laurens Jolles, a UNHCR representative. "We encourage other agencies to come, and bilateral funding for Syrian governmental departments most affected."
The problem is particularly acute as Syria is a poor country that faces US economic sanctions and is under international pressure to cooperate over Iraq and Lebanon. There are also some 400,000 Palestinian refugees who have lived in Syria since the creation of Israel in 1948.
Around 80 per cent of the Iraqis in Syria are believed to live in Damascus, according to the UNHCR, adding to the capital's water and housing shortages. Schools and hospitals are struggling with the influx, with some schools reporting more than 60 students per class instead of the usual 30.
With the Iraqi refugees costing the state £500m over the past four years, according to a recent government statement, Damascus tried to tighten entry regulations a few months ago. The decision sparked protests in the capital and the government eventually capitulated, realising the issue could cause significant problems domestically.
"The government is now insisting that Iraqis register themselves to give details about accommodation, as Syria likes to have more control over the people here. However it is still very permissive, especially compared to Jordan and Lebanon," said Mr Jolles.
The UNHCR has so far registered 82,000 refugees, with some 450 registered per day and up to 2,000 Iraqis seeking appointments every week. In the past year the refugee crisis has become even more pronounced.
Initially, wealthier Iraqis left for Jordan or Syria. But as Iraq descended into chaos, poorer Iraqis crossed the Syrian border in increasing numbers, contributing to societal and economic strains in a country that has 25 per cent unemployment. "It's a big problem. We don't want Iraqis here as many are bad people - thieves and roughnecks - and are driving up the price of everything," said shopkeeper Yassir Habash, 31.
The influx of refugees, equivalent to roughly 8 per cent of Syria's 19 million population, has resulted in inflationary pressure, doubling the price of accommodation and raising food costs by an estimated 10 percent in under two years. Petty crime and prostitution has also increased, with Iraqi women selling themselves on the streets for as little as £1.50.
The influx has generated a degree of xenophobia towards the new immigrants. "I worked as a mechanic but locals started threatening me and I was forced to leave," said Tariki Zaide, 23, who now supports his parents and four siblings by working, illegally, as a cleaner at a guesthouse in Damascus. Earning £1.50-£2 a day he said his family is struggling to pay the £60 monthly rent.
"People are complaining that Iraqis are raising the price of rents and oil, but if Syria doesn't take them who will?" asked Dr Nabil Sukkar, managing director of the Syrian Consulting Bureau for Development and Investment.
Neighbouring Jordan is reeling from an estimated 750,000 Iraqi refugees, tightening entry requirements and imposing certain conditions on Iraqis that wish to stay in the country of 5.9 million people. Saudi Arabia is keeping its doors firmly shut, planning to build a US-Mexico style border fence, at the cost of a £3.5bn, to keep Iraqis out.
"At least 50 per cent will never go back, especially if they stay another year," said Dr. Sukkar. "Many have settled down here, getting jobs or creating 'Little Baghdads' in certain areas, but I see more trouble before Iraq settles down," he said.
Hizbollah knick-knacks selling well in Lebanon
May 14 2007
BY PAUL COCHRANE FOR THE STRAITS TIMES in Beirut
AS LEBANON is slowly rebuilt following last year's war, the militant Shi'ite group Hizbullah is raising millions of dollars in funds from charitable donations and deriving support from companies touting Hizbullah paraphernalia.
In a supermarket in the bustling southern suburbs of Beirut - an area predominantly inhabited by Shi'ites and badly ravaged by Israeli bombardments during the war last summer - a particular brand of tea stands out from the other products on the shelves.
Attached to US$3 plastic wrapped boxes of Riches tea bags are white mugs emblazoned with a portrait of Hizbullah leader Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah. Next to them are packets of loose tea with a small glass bearing Mr Nasrallah’s portrait for US$1.
“We felt obliged to show appreciation for Sayyed Nasrallah,” said Mr Ahmed Moussaoui, general manager of Somas Establishment, distributor of Riches tea.
“We would not exist in this country and be able to sell tea without what Nasrallah and the resistance did last summer.”
He added that Hizbullah would not financially benefit from sales.
A supermarket spokesman said the store had seen high sales of the Riches brand since the mugs were introduced.
“But I don’t think people are buying them for the tea,” he added.
Mugs adorned with an image of Hizbullah's Secretary General Sayeed Hassan Nasrallah line the shelves at Super Market Ramal in Mreyjeh, Southern Beirut.Other Hizbullah paraphernalia is on sale in the southern suburbs, including posters, clocks, key chains, t-shirts, and cigarette lighters featuring a light that beams a portrait of Nasrallah .
One of the biggest sellers has been a rose water Resistance Perfume, packaged with a picture and a political message from Mr Nasrallah.
But it’s more of a Hizbullah marketing tool than a way to raise funds.
“The lighters, the clocks – its all chump change at the end of the day, a small piece of the pie,” said Nicholas Noe, author of the forthcoming Voice Of Hizbullah: The Statements Of Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah.
Academic experts estimate Hizbullah’s annual budget for social welfare, construction and health care programmes to be US$1 billion a year.
“Hizbullah have a lot of money-generating resources. It’s not just a liberation group, it’s also a corporation – there is not only a construction arm, but other revenue generators like hospitals and import-export companies. Charitable donations are the key though,” said Mr Noe.
Some analysts suggest that the majority of Hizbullah’s funding comes from charitable contributions – a religious obligation for Muslims – by wealthy Shi’ites in the Arab Gulf, West Africa and North America.
The money is most likely transported via couriers, said Mr Noe.
“In a recent aeroplane crash in Africa, a Hizbullah courier was found to have been carrying US$5 million in diamonds donated by Lebanese businessmen,” he said.
Mr Noe added that the war had substantially increased financial contributions to Hizbullah.
A recently released Israeli government-appointed inquiry commission report has in fact criticised Israel’s performance in last year’s war. And in the Arab world, it has been seen as confirmation of Hizbullah’s victory.
The group counts allies like Iran among donors. The Islamic republic’s leaders are looking to Hizbullah, not only for military strategy but also for economic purposes – for how to structure an economic system in a globalised world – said Mr Noe.
But “no matter what Iran’s role is with Hizbullah, Iran is cash strapped: there is high unemployment, the country has to import oil, and there are huge domestic problems,” said Mr Noe.
“The paraphernalia market probably outstrips Iran’s contribution.”
- ALL PHOTOS BY PAUL COCHRANE
Sunday, March 04, 2007
Investors on the road to Damascus: Syria is hot despite the sanctions
The Independent On Sunday
BEIRUT: Billions of pounds of foreign investment is flooding into Syria, even though the Middle East country remains under American sanctions and faces growing international pressure to co-operate over Iraq and Lebanon.
Following the death of former president Hafez al-Assad in 2000, Syria started an economic reform drive and moved away from socialism towards a market economy under Assad's son, President Bashar al-Assad. Foreign investment was allowed for the first time in 2003, and it has caused the face of Damascus to change radically. Benetton and other well-known foreign clothing outlets are now seen throughout the capital, while billboards line the streets touting wares that would have been unknown under Hafez al-Assad.
Indeed, over the past five years advertising has surged 50 per cent as branding becomes as much a part of Syrians' everyday lives as any- where else on the planet. Satellite television, estimated to beam into 85 per cent of Syrian homes, despite being officially banned, is also playing its part.
"For years it was a closed system, and now Syrians are motivated to buy Western brands," said Karim Saidah, general manager of France's Bel Groupe, owner of The Laughing Cow cheese brand in Syria.
The car market, meanwhile, has surged by a staggering 60 per cent since vehicle taxes were slashed in 2005.
The Joud Company, a local conglomerate, has collared 50 per cent of the £51m soft drinks market after striking a deal with Pepsi when the US giant was taken off a Syrian blacklist. And Bel Groupe's share of the processed cheese market rocketed from 5 per cent to 65 per cent in the 18 months since opening a £8.7m factory.
One of the most attractive sectors for investors, however, is retail and tourism. One project is a £256m joint venture between Dubai's Emaar Properties, IGO, an offshore investment, and a development company called the Eighth Gate. Located just outside Damascus's city centre, the project is expected to be the largest mall in the Levant.
Although economic reforms and investment are being officially encouraged, decades of bureaucratic inertia, cronyism and political ideology are hindering retail developments.
"Such projects are all plans on paper... they may be viable within 10 years," said Dr Nabil Sukkar, managing director of the Syrian Consulting Bureau for Development and Investment.
"What takes six months in Qatar takes six years in Syria. There are a lot of hurdles for permits," he added.
Nor are Western companies immune to the risks. Many, for example, may be attracted by Syria's 18 million potential consumers, but not all are comfortable pouring money into a region that remains unstable. Nor do they want to risk the wrath of the US over economic sanctions. It means the biggest players tend to be Lebanese and Gulf investors, who are flush with cash from the recent spike in oil prices and remain nervous, post 9/11, of investing in the West.
Yet the reforms continue. Earlier this month, the government pushed through a law allowing the export of profits. Officials hope it will help attract some £19bn, which will be needed in the coming five years to achieve a target growth rate of 7 per cent, to diversify the economy away from dwindling oil revenues, and to reduce unemployment.
The launch of a security exchange commission later this year may also give Syria's reforms a boost. "The stock exchange will inspire holding companies and corporations, as well as improving money transactions in the market," said Laila al-Samman, general manager at the Bank of Syria and Overseas. "There is a big chance to make money as Syria is a new market."
BEIRUT: Billions of pounds of foreign investment is flooding into Syria, even though the Middle East country remains under American sanctions and faces growing international pressure to co-operate over Iraq and Lebanon.
Following the death of former president Hafez al-Assad in 2000, Syria started an economic reform drive and moved away from socialism towards a market economy under Assad's son, President Bashar al-Assad. Foreign investment was allowed for the first time in 2003, and it has caused the face of Damascus to change radically. Benetton and other well-known foreign clothing outlets are now seen throughout the capital, while billboards line the streets touting wares that would have been unknown under Hafez al-Assad.
Indeed, over the past five years advertising has surged 50 per cent as branding becomes as much a part of Syrians' everyday lives as any- where else on the planet. Satellite television, estimated to beam into 85 per cent of Syrian homes, despite being officially banned, is also playing its part.
"For years it was a closed system, and now Syrians are motivated to buy Western brands," said Karim Saidah, general manager of France's Bel Groupe, owner of The Laughing Cow cheese brand in Syria.
The car market, meanwhile, has surged by a staggering 60 per cent since vehicle taxes were slashed in 2005.
The Joud Company, a local conglomerate, has collared 50 per cent of the £51m soft drinks market after striking a deal with Pepsi when the US giant was taken off a Syrian blacklist. And Bel Groupe's share of the processed cheese market rocketed from 5 per cent to 65 per cent in the 18 months since opening a £8.7m factory.
One of the most attractive sectors for investors, however, is retail and tourism. One project is a £256m joint venture between Dubai's Emaar Properties, IGO, an offshore investment, and a development company called the Eighth Gate. Located just outside Damascus's city centre, the project is expected to be the largest mall in the Levant.
Although economic reforms and investment are being officially encouraged, decades of bureaucratic inertia, cronyism and political ideology are hindering retail developments.
"Such projects are all plans on paper... they may be viable within 10 years," said Dr Nabil Sukkar, managing director of the Syrian Consulting Bureau for Development and Investment.
"What takes six months in Qatar takes six years in Syria. There are a lot of hurdles for permits," he added.
Nor are Western companies immune to the risks. Many, for example, may be attracted by Syria's 18 million potential consumers, but not all are comfortable pouring money into a region that remains unstable. Nor do they want to risk the wrath of the US over economic sanctions. It means the biggest players tend to be Lebanese and Gulf investors, who are flush with cash from the recent spike in oil prices and remain nervous, post 9/11, of investing in the West.
Yet the reforms continue. Earlier this month, the government pushed through a law allowing the export of profits. Officials hope it will help attract some £19bn, which will be needed in the coming five years to achieve a target growth rate of 7 per cent, to diversify the economy away from dwindling oil revenues, and to reduce unemployment.
The launch of a security exchange commission later this year may also give Syria's reforms a boost. "The stock exchange will inspire holding companies and corporations, as well as improving money transactions in the market," said Laila al-Samman, general manager at the Bank of Syria and Overseas. "There is a big chance to make money as Syria is a new market."
Tuesday, February 27, 2007
Fight against funding for terrorists founders on eighth-century system
As Arab banks try to stop illicit money transfers, the ancient 'hawala' network keeps the criminal channels open
By Paul Cochrane in Beirut
The Independent on Sunday 11 February 2007
Hi-tech attempts to stop the flow of finance to terrorist organisations in the Middle East have been stymied by a system of money transfer that dates back to the eighth century.
In the wake of the attacks on 11 September 2001, Washington pushed Arab financial institutions to crack down on illicit money transfers and implement regulations stipulated by the OECD's Financial Action Task Force (FATF) - an international body overseeing initiatives to combat money laundering and terrorism.
Arab central banks and financial institutions were quick to adopt FATF recommendations so that they could continue dealing with Western banks and compete on the global market.
The Middle East North Africa-FATF (MENA-FATF), established two years ago, claims illicit activity has declined by 90 per cent.
But with tighter regulations on banks, criminals are returning to the use of the hawala system of moving money from country to country.
Money is transferred through a network of hawala brokers, or hawaladars. A customer approaches a broker in one city and provides a sum of money to be transferred to a recipient in another, usually foreign, city. The broker who has received the money calls his counterpart in the recipient's city, providing instructions on the disposal of the funds and promising to settle the debt at a later date.
The method relies entirely on the honour of the brokers and no records are produced of individual transactions.
"What happens now does not go through financial institutions or banks; it's smuggled or goes via the hawala system," said Masood Safar Abdulla, the compliance manager at the Commercial Bank of Dubai.
The ancient hawala system is popular with the Gulf's massive expatriate Asian labour force as a cheap way of sending money home, estimated to run to billions of dollars a year.
Although much of the money transferred is legitimate, a drug bust by the Italian police late last year connected several Pakistanis with a Dubai-based Indian who received money through his informal bank to channel funds to drug cartels and arms dealers.
The incident is a single example of how dirty money could be laundered via the hawala system, and has put pressure on countries to improve regulation of alternative remittance systems. "The fact that MENA-FATF is organising a conference on hawala shows it is more serious about the issue," said Michel Nassif of World-Check, a British company that runs an intelligence database on financial risk.
But even if central banks can bring the hawala system under control, large sums of ready cash are being transported around the Middle East, eased by the region's lack of transparency.
"The most troubling spot is Dubai," said a source at a regional central bank. "There is a lot of cash coming in and out. If you look at the construction boom, it doesn't make sense: are these new skyscrapers really economically viable? That is a big indicator of money laundering."
Some money invested in UAE real estate is allegedly from Russian and Indian individuals. But how much is being laundered is anyone's guess. "Who can measure it? We know it is going on and we are not doing enough. UAE says it is, but it is a convenient system for everyone," the source said.
Another banking executive in the region said: "MENA-FATF is not very effective and governments are paranoid about financial transparency."
Iraq is considered a particular problem for regulators, with cash flowing in and out of the country to be laundered or to fund insurgents. "A lot of terrorist financing is going on in Iraq; how else are they being funded?" the central bank source said.
Incidents of money laundering connected to Iraq abound, with one source giving the example of an Iraqi-Lebanese businessman "cleaning" Kuwaiti money in Azerbaijan for an Iranian client to fund Muqtada al-Sadr's Mahdi army in Baghdad.
Mr Nassif said the Middle East needed peace and stability before illicit funding could be curbed. "The more turmoil in the region, the more regulations will not be implemented."
By Paul Cochrane in Beirut
The Independent on Sunday 11 February 2007
Hi-tech attempts to stop the flow of finance to terrorist organisations in the Middle East have been stymied by a system of money transfer that dates back to the eighth century.
In the wake of the attacks on 11 September 2001, Washington pushed Arab financial institutions to crack down on illicit money transfers and implement regulations stipulated by the OECD's Financial Action Task Force (FATF) - an international body overseeing initiatives to combat money laundering and terrorism.
Arab central banks and financial institutions were quick to adopt FATF recommendations so that they could continue dealing with Western banks and compete on the global market.
The Middle East North Africa-FATF (MENA-FATF), established two years ago, claims illicit activity has declined by 90 per cent.
But with tighter regulations on banks, criminals are returning to the use of the hawala system of moving money from country to country.
Money is transferred through a network of hawala brokers, or hawaladars. A customer approaches a broker in one city and provides a sum of money to be transferred to a recipient in another, usually foreign, city. The broker who has received the money calls his counterpart in the recipient's city, providing instructions on the disposal of the funds and promising to settle the debt at a later date.
The method relies entirely on the honour of the brokers and no records are produced of individual transactions.
"What happens now does not go through financial institutions or banks; it's smuggled or goes via the hawala system," said Masood Safar Abdulla, the compliance manager at the Commercial Bank of Dubai.
The ancient hawala system is popular with the Gulf's massive expatriate Asian labour force as a cheap way of sending money home, estimated to run to billions of dollars a year.
Although much of the money transferred is legitimate, a drug bust by the Italian police late last year connected several Pakistanis with a Dubai-based Indian who received money through his informal bank to channel funds to drug cartels and arms dealers.
The incident is a single example of how dirty money could be laundered via the hawala system, and has put pressure on countries to improve regulation of alternative remittance systems. "The fact that MENA-FATF is organising a conference on hawala shows it is more serious about the issue," said Michel Nassif of World-Check, a British company that runs an intelligence database on financial risk.
But even if central banks can bring the hawala system under control, large sums of ready cash are being transported around the Middle East, eased by the region's lack of transparency.
"The most troubling spot is Dubai," said a source at a regional central bank. "There is a lot of cash coming in and out. If you look at the construction boom, it doesn't make sense: are these new skyscrapers really economically viable? That is a big indicator of money laundering."
Some money invested in UAE real estate is allegedly from Russian and Indian individuals. But how much is being laundered is anyone's guess. "Who can measure it? We know it is going on and we are not doing enough. UAE says it is, but it is a convenient system for everyone," the source said.
Another banking executive in the region said: "MENA-FATF is not very effective and governments are paranoid about financial transparency."
Iraq is considered a particular problem for regulators, with cash flowing in and out of the country to be laundered or to fund insurgents. "A lot of terrorist financing is going on in Iraq; how else are they being funded?" the central bank source said.
Incidents of money laundering connected to Iraq abound, with one source giving the example of an Iraqi-Lebanese businessman "cleaning" Kuwaiti money in Azerbaijan for an Iranian client to fund Muqtada al-Sadr's Mahdi army in Baghdad.
Mr Nassif said the Middle East needed peace and stability before illicit funding could be curbed. "The more turmoil in the region, the more regulations will not be implemented."
A Day in the Dahiye: an account of a trip to Beirut's southern suburbs
Jan 27, 2007
Just after the Barbir junction, on the road heading from Bachar Khouri to Beirut's southern suburbs – the dahiye – and the airport, the van is directed to the side of the road at a Lebanese army checkpoint. A soldier goes up to the driver's window, cheeks are kissed, and then the side door is slid open by another soldier and all the chebab – the men – are asked to step out. Identity cards are presented, inspected and each man frisked from shoulders to ankles by the M16 wielding soldiers.
"What's this? No ID?" the soldier asked when I presented my passport. "It's a passport, I'm a tourist," I was forced to lie, not having a residency permit. The soldier looked a little incredulously at me – what would a tourist be doing going to the southern suburbs, what the Western media during the July war last year called a "Hizbullah stronghold"? He gave me a nod, and we piled back in the bus – young, clean shaven men, middle age men with stubble and moustaches, and the bearded, heading home after a morning's work.
The talk in the bus was about the checkpoint and the army, but the mood seemed decisive – everyone was pleased the army were checking vehicles. But why vehicles going to the dahiye and not solely the other way around, towards downtown where the opposition has been protesting since December 1, and a probable trigger point for any violence? Needed security said one man.
The roads were unusually quiet for a Saturday afternoon, but Beirut has been quiet since the student riots on Thursday that left three dead, 160 plus wounded, and resulted in a late night curfew. People have been staying at home, and discussion amongst people is what could happen next, with violence at the nationwide opposition-led strike last Tuesday and on Thursday at the Beirut Arab University.
The van drove over the temporary airport bridge erected after the Israelis destroyed it in July last year, the wooden beams creaking and clapping as the vehicles pile across. Men got off at points along the road, and others clambered aboard.
Before the airport the van turned into the dahiye, driving through the densely populated Bourj Al Barajneh, passing two-level houses, 10 storey buildings, the occasional plot of landed planted with vegetables, butcher's shops, internet 'cafes,' corner shops, and fruit and veg. sellers.
At a petrol station I indicated I wanted to get out, paid the young driver – dressed in a woolly hat and body warmer – 750LL (50c) and walk over to Mreyjeh. A new building is going up where the rather wittily named 'Guantanamo,' fenced-in astro turf football pitch used to be. Other buildings are also under construction in the area, presumably to house Lebanese dispossessed during the July war and the continuous stream of people moving to Beirut from the South and the Bekaa valley, where the majority of Shia live.
On arriving at my friend Hassan's building, one over from where I lived for two years, he asked me over the intercom to get some snoobar – pine nuts – before clambering up the seven flights of stairs to his apartment – yet another power cut (outages range from 6 to 10 hours a day).
On walking over to a shop, I meet Mohamed Baydoun, who runs a computer games shop where youths play on four Playstations. The usual exchanges were made – how are you? How is your health? Your family? Work? And then the inevitable, what do you think of what is going on? Mohammed is not too optimistic, but changed the topic when his 8-year old sound Abboude ran over to us.
On returning to Hassan's, we decide to go for a walk. The sun, after all, was shining and the sky blue. First off, we messed around with Hassan's car battery, lost a screw, and I had to push Hassan's car along with some young lads until the ignition kicked in.
With Hassan chugging off in his car, I had entered the road and bumped into Mohamed, a cameraman for NBN TV, outside a butcher's shop cuddling his one year old son.
We talked for a while, and then I saw Hassan, a 25 year old computer programmer, hanging out on the streets with other chebab – young men. His face lit up as we greeted each other. "Where are you living now," he asked. "In Achrafieh, same place as before." "Ah, with the enemy," he joked.
"I think there will be trouble this Tuesday," he added. "Will you be there if something happens?" "Yeah, for sure man" (Hassan's English is punctured with Americanisms picked up from TV and hip-hop music.) I cannot tell if Hassan is serious or not, he is a bit of a joker and very concerned, as many young Lebanese are, about his appearance - slicked back hair under a designer white woollen hat, a leather motorcycle jacket and the requisite stylish jeans. But unlike usual chebab talk – of sex and women – this time it was politics, and the guys were determined there should be change in Lebanon's political make up. But before the convo. got any further, Hassan picked me up in his brother's 1980s Mercedes to park it outside his other brother's apartment block. There we met his brother Joe, wife Nisreen and 2-year old son Yahya.
"Are you with us?" Nisreen asked, wearing a brown, stylish headscarf – a recent addition to her appearance.
"I am for Lebanon, and the Lebanese people," I replied, rather diplomatically.
"You are with us then," she said.
Joe joined us and told me that the March 14 movement – predominantly Sunni and the rightwing Christian parties of the Phalange and the Lebanese Forces – want to make Amal and Hizbullah fight them and lead the country to civil war. Hizbullah has discipline, the others don't he said. If Hizbullah wanted it could take over the country in a day, but it doesn't want to, it wants a part of the government.
Did you hear about the snipers on Thursday he asked me? "They were Sunnis, crooks and criminals who care nothing about people hired by (Sunni politician) Hariri. They want to stir up strife."
I told him that a friend told me that at the strike on Tuesday at Nahr el Kelb, by Jounieh, 700 Lebanese Forces supporters armed with metal bars and chains, to the shout of "charge," attacked the opposition supporting Christians - Michel Aoun's party - tearing orange scarves off men and women's necks, beating up bystanders and causing mayhem. Joe didn't seem surprised.
Hassan was keen to start our walk however, and we wander ed around the neighbourhood for a while, talking of this and that. We passed by a church near Mreyjeh's municipality. I noticed that it is being renovated, long overdue as the turn of the century building was destroyed in the civil war.
"It's a beautiful church," Hassan said as we looked through the fence.
"Yes, but will anyone use it?"
"No," Hassan laughed. "There are no Christians here anymore."
Then why rebuild it? In the early 1970s the dahiye predominantly consisted of Christian villages on the outskirts of Beirut. Industrialization and the migration of Shia from the Bekaa and the South – attributed to work seekers and Israeli invasions - led to the urbanization of what became known as the dahiye. With the onset of civil war in 1975, Christians started to leave the area as the country divided along sectarian lines. However, due to Lebanon's archaic electoral voting system, Lebanese vote in their villages or towns, meaning for the municipality of Mreyjeh, with some 60,000 people, only 5,165 are registered as living there. From the pre-1976 days, 85 percent of voters were Christian and 15 percent were Shiite, but the area is nearly 100 percent Shia today.
The bizarreness of this system is that only 15 Christian families live in Mreyjeh, meaning about 50 votes. Not unexpectedly, the municipality administration along with the other 5000 odd voters live elsewhere.
The original Shiite inhabitants of the area only have 600 votes.
Hassan said this doesn't encourage the cleaning of the streets.
I asked him why Hizbullah doesn't clean up the streets, as a bit of a 'brighten up the neighbourhood' kind of programme.
Hassan replied that this could be seen to be undercutting the municipality, in addition to the fact that the municipality is run by Christians.
But along with the political-sectarian angle, part of the real problem for municipalities in the dahiye is that they do not collect much tax from locals – about 10% in Mreyjeh's case – and secondly, the government has slashed municipality budgets.
Nonetheless Mreyjeh's second church quietly goes up, funded by – I'm not sure yet, but plan to find out.
The end of the 10 day Shia religious ritual of Ashoura is on Tuesday, and make-shift Husseiniyya tents, decked out in black cloth and full of plastic chairs, were to be seen in various places. Few seemed to be very full, with one three-quarters empty.
I asked Hassan - decked fully in black himself, as Ashoura requires the pious – whether Ashoura was a bit quieter this year.
"Yes, due to the situation and politics," he said. The end ritual, which usually involves around 100,000 plus gathering in the dahiye, and in other cities, notoriously Nabatiyeh where a few thousand self-flagellate themselves. (Hizbullah and Amal do not condone this, requesting that if you have to shed blood for Ashouta, donate it).
There seemed to be other reasons why the Shia were avoiding gathering en masse for Ashoura. Hassan said he was worried about a Sunni suicide bomber entering a crowd of Shia. (The day passed without event in Lebanon).
On returning to Hassan's we had dinner with his wife Najwa (a converted Sunni), and 2-year old daughter Fatima. Half way through the dinner of kibbe (raw meat), stuffed courgettes, rice with meat, and spaghetti, Rou-rou visited, Najwa's 15-year old niece. Unlike the last time I saw her, about five months ago, she wore all black, bar her face, hands and feet. Her father died of a heart attack recently. A retired soldier in his 40s, he weighed around 400 pounds.
After dinner we watched Al Manar TV, affiliated to Hizbullah. There was a curious video montage where a clock, with images, ticks backwards from 2007 to 1975. "Let's not go back to then," it read. The image from 2007 was of a Sunni sniper at the Beirut Arab University riots on Thursday.
On the news there was slowed down footage of the bodyguard of Saad Hariri (pro-govt. Sunni, head of the Future movement, and son of assassinated former PM Rafik Hariri) running down to a bunch of guys, walkie talkie in hand, telling Sunni men to rally. There was also footage of a young Shia man that was killed walking home from work on the day of the riots, with an interview with his Sunni wife and two young children. Other reports included the wounded from the fights.
After leaving Hassan's I went for a shave at the local barber, run by a 20 year old called Ali.
'Studio Style' is painted an orangey-brown, and on the mirrors are stuck pictures of pop band Westlife and Brad Pitt. On a wall above a black, fake leather couch is a large, garish photograph of Ali. With the help of his 16-year old assistant Ahmed, Ali gave me a requested "Hizbullah beard". That means closely cut just under the jawbone and high on the cheek, although Ali insisted it meant further under the chin.
The "Hizbullah beard" has long been a joke in some of the chebab barbershops. The former occupant of Studio Style, it was called something equally interesting, like Studio Smile, would always tell the other lads hanging out in the barbershop what I wanted. Once, on asking whether I wanted a shave, he steered me to a free chair. Hassan (yes, another) then whispered Hizbullah? I said yes, and he then indicated to the man sat in the only other barber's chair and said cheekily, Hizbullah.
After asserting my interpretation of the Hizbullah beard, I just missed a van to Martyrs' square. After waiting about ten minutes, a slick silver BMW passed by then reversed. The window rolled down and a young man asked me where I was going. He agreed to take me, and then asked the same of the man standing next to me at the junction. He wasn't heading that way, so I had a ride back, and all the driver could ask was how much would it cost, and where, could he learn English.
Just after the Barbir junction, on the road heading from Bachar Khouri to Beirut's southern suburbs – the dahiye – and the airport, the van is directed to the side of the road at a Lebanese army checkpoint. A soldier goes up to the driver's window, cheeks are kissed, and then the side door is slid open by another soldier and all the chebab – the men – are asked to step out. Identity cards are presented, inspected and each man frisked from shoulders to ankles by the M16 wielding soldiers.
"What's this? No ID?" the soldier asked when I presented my passport. "It's a passport, I'm a tourist," I was forced to lie, not having a residency permit. The soldier looked a little incredulously at me – what would a tourist be doing going to the southern suburbs, what the Western media during the July war last year called a "Hizbullah stronghold"? He gave me a nod, and we piled back in the bus – young, clean shaven men, middle age men with stubble and moustaches, and the bearded, heading home after a morning's work.
The talk in the bus was about the checkpoint and the army, but the mood seemed decisive – everyone was pleased the army were checking vehicles. But why vehicles going to the dahiye and not solely the other way around, towards downtown where the opposition has been protesting since December 1, and a probable trigger point for any violence? Needed security said one man.
The roads were unusually quiet for a Saturday afternoon, but Beirut has been quiet since the student riots on Thursday that left three dead, 160 plus wounded, and resulted in a late night curfew. People have been staying at home, and discussion amongst people is what could happen next, with violence at the nationwide opposition-led strike last Tuesday and on Thursday at the Beirut Arab University.
The van drove over the temporary airport bridge erected after the Israelis destroyed it in July last year, the wooden beams creaking and clapping as the vehicles pile across. Men got off at points along the road, and others clambered aboard.
Before the airport the van turned into the dahiye, driving through the densely populated Bourj Al Barajneh, passing two-level houses, 10 storey buildings, the occasional plot of landed planted with vegetables, butcher's shops, internet 'cafes,' corner shops, and fruit and veg. sellers.
At a petrol station I indicated I wanted to get out, paid the young driver – dressed in a woolly hat and body warmer – 750LL (50c) and walk over to Mreyjeh. A new building is going up where the rather wittily named 'Guantanamo,' fenced-in astro turf football pitch used to be. Other buildings are also under construction in the area, presumably to house Lebanese dispossessed during the July war and the continuous stream of people moving to Beirut from the South and the Bekaa valley, where the majority of Shia live.
On arriving at my friend Hassan's building, one over from where I lived for two years, he asked me over the intercom to get some snoobar – pine nuts – before clambering up the seven flights of stairs to his apartment – yet another power cut (outages range from 6 to 10 hours a day).
On walking over to a shop, I meet Mohamed Baydoun, who runs a computer games shop where youths play on four Playstations. The usual exchanges were made – how are you? How is your health? Your family? Work? And then the inevitable, what do you think of what is going on? Mohammed is not too optimistic, but changed the topic when his 8-year old sound Abboude ran over to us.
On returning to Hassan's, we decide to go for a walk. The sun, after all, was shining and the sky blue. First off, we messed around with Hassan's car battery, lost a screw, and I had to push Hassan's car along with some young lads until the ignition kicked in.
With Hassan chugging off in his car, I had entered the road and bumped into Mohamed, a cameraman for NBN TV, outside a butcher's shop cuddling his one year old son.
We talked for a while, and then I saw Hassan, a 25 year old computer programmer, hanging out on the streets with other chebab – young men. His face lit up as we greeted each other. "Where are you living now," he asked. "In Achrafieh, same place as before." "Ah, with the enemy," he joked.
"I think there will be trouble this Tuesday," he added. "Will you be there if something happens?" "Yeah, for sure man" (Hassan's English is punctured with Americanisms picked up from TV and hip-hop music.) I cannot tell if Hassan is serious or not, he is a bit of a joker and very concerned, as many young Lebanese are, about his appearance - slicked back hair under a designer white woollen hat, a leather motorcycle jacket and the requisite stylish jeans. But unlike usual chebab talk – of sex and women – this time it was politics, and the guys were determined there should be change in Lebanon's political make up. But before the convo. got any further, Hassan picked me up in his brother's 1980s Mercedes to park it outside his other brother's apartment block. There we met his brother Joe, wife Nisreen and 2-year old son Yahya.
"Are you with us?" Nisreen asked, wearing a brown, stylish headscarf – a recent addition to her appearance.
"I am for Lebanon, and the Lebanese people," I replied, rather diplomatically.
"You are with us then," she said.
Joe joined us and told me that the March 14 movement – predominantly Sunni and the rightwing Christian parties of the Phalange and the Lebanese Forces – want to make Amal and Hizbullah fight them and lead the country to civil war. Hizbullah has discipline, the others don't he said. If Hizbullah wanted it could take over the country in a day, but it doesn't want to, it wants a part of the government.
Did you hear about the snipers on Thursday he asked me? "They were Sunnis, crooks and criminals who care nothing about people hired by (Sunni politician) Hariri. They want to stir up strife."
I told him that a friend told me that at the strike on Tuesday at Nahr el Kelb, by Jounieh, 700 Lebanese Forces supporters armed with metal bars and chains, to the shout of "charge," attacked the opposition supporting Christians - Michel Aoun's party - tearing orange scarves off men and women's necks, beating up bystanders and causing mayhem. Joe didn't seem surprised.
Hassan was keen to start our walk however, and we wander ed around the neighbourhood for a while, talking of this and that. We passed by a church near Mreyjeh's municipality. I noticed that it is being renovated, long overdue as the turn of the century building was destroyed in the civil war.
"It's a beautiful church," Hassan said as we looked through the fence.
"Yes, but will anyone use it?"
"No," Hassan laughed. "There are no Christians here anymore."
Then why rebuild it? In the early 1970s the dahiye predominantly consisted of Christian villages on the outskirts of Beirut. Industrialization and the migration of Shia from the Bekaa and the South – attributed to work seekers and Israeli invasions - led to the urbanization of what became known as the dahiye. With the onset of civil war in 1975, Christians started to leave the area as the country divided along sectarian lines. However, due to Lebanon's archaic electoral voting system, Lebanese vote in their villages or towns, meaning for the municipality of Mreyjeh, with some 60,000 people, only 5,165 are registered as living there. From the pre-1976 days, 85 percent of voters were Christian and 15 percent were Shiite, but the area is nearly 100 percent Shia today.
The bizarreness of this system is that only 15 Christian families live in Mreyjeh, meaning about 50 votes. Not unexpectedly, the municipality administration along with the other 5000 odd voters live elsewhere.
The original Shiite inhabitants of the area only have 600 votes.
Hassan said this doesn't encourage the cleaning of the streets.
I asked him why Hizbullah doesn't clean up the streets, as a bit of a 'brighten up the neighbourhood' kind of programme.
Hassan replied that this could be seen to be undercutting the municipality, in addition to the fact that the municipality is run by Christians.
But along with the political-sectarian angle, part of the real problem for municipalities in the dahiye is that they do not collect much tax from locals – about 10% in Mreyjeh's case – and secondly, the government has slashed municipality budgets.
Nonetheless Mreyjeh's second church quietly goes up, funded by – I'm not sure yet, but plan to find out.
The end of the 10 day Shia religious ritual of Ashoura is on Tuesday, and make-shift Husseiniyya tents, decked out in black cloth and full of plastic chairs, were to be seen in various places. Few seemed to be very full, with one three-quarters empty.
I asked Hassan - decked fully in black himself, as Ashoura requires the pious – whether Ashoura was a bit quieter this year.
"Yes, due to the situation and politics," he said. The end ritual, which usually involves around 100,000 plus gathering in the dahiye, and in other cities, notoriously Nabatiyeh where a few thousand self-flagellate themselves. (Hizbullah and Amal do not condone this, requesting that if you have to shed blood for Ashouta, donate it).
There seemed to be other reasons why the Shia were avoiding gathering en masse for Ashoura. Hassan said he was worried about a Sunni suicide bomber entering a crowd of Shia. (The day passed without event in Lebanon).
On returning to Hassan's we had dinner with his wife Najwa (a converted Sunni), and 2-year old daughter Fatima. Half way through the dinner of kibbe (raw meat), stuffed courgettes, rice with meat, and spaghetti, Rou-rou visited, Najwa's 15-year old niece. Unlike the last time I saw her, about five months ago, she wore all black, bar her face, hands and feet. Her father died of a heart attack recently. A retired soldier in his 40s, he weighed around 400 pounds.
After dinner we watched Al Manar TV, affiliated to Hizbullah. There was a curious video montage where a clock, with images, ticks backwards from 2007 to 1975. "Let's not go back to then," it read. The image from 2007 was of a Sunni sniper at the Beirut Arab University riots on Thursday.
On the news there was slowed down footage of the bodyguard of Saad Hariri (pro-govt. Sunni, head of the Future movement, and son of assassinated former PM Rafik Hariri) running down to a bunch of guys, walkie talkie in hand, telling Sunni men to rally. There was also footage of a young Shia man that was killed walking home from work on the day of the riots, with an interview with his Sunni wife and two young children. Other reports included the wounded from the fights.
After leaving Hassan's I went for a shave at the local barber, run by a 20 year old called Ali.
'Studio Style' is painted an orangey-brown, and on the mirrors are stuck pictures of pop band Westlife and Brad Pitt. On a wall above a black, fake leather couch is a large, garish photograph of Ali. With the help of his 16-year old assistant Ahmed, Ali gave me a requested "Hizbullah beard". That means closely cut just under the jawbone and high on the cheek, although Ali insisted it meant further under the chin.
The "Hizbullah beard" has long been a joke in some of the chebab barbershops. The former occupant of Studio Style, it was called something equally interesting, like Studio Smile, would always tell the other lads hanging out in the barbershop what I wanted. Once, on asking whether I wanted a shave, he steered me to a free chair. Hassan (yes, another) then whispered Hizbullah? I said yes, and he then indicated to the man sat in the only other barber's chair and said cheekily, Hizbullah.
After asserting my interpretation of the Hizbullah beard, I just missed a van to Martyrs' square. After waiting about ten minutes, a slick silver BMW passed by then reversed. The window rolled down and a young man asked me where I was going. He agreed to take me, and then asked the same of the man standing next to me at the junction. He wasn't heading that way, so I had a ride back, and all the driver could ask was how much would it cost, and where, could he learn English.
Friday, September 01, 2006
Journalism in Lebanon
(Originally published as Journalisten im Libanon in the Frankfurter Allegemeine Zeitung, 7 August 2006)
BEIRUT: Israel provides foreign journalists upon arrival with a ‘welcome’ pack that includes useful contact numbers, maps, political speeches, and background information on UN resolutions and the conflict with Hizbullah. Journalists also have the possibility of embedding with Israeli troops and the dubious advantage of air raid sirens warning of incoming Hizbullah rockets.
None of this is the case for journalists on the other side of the border.
Journalists that were not already based in Lebanon when the conflict kicked off had to take a circuitous route via Syria after Lebanon’s one and only international airport was put out of action when Israeli warplanes destroyed the runway.
At the Syrian border, journalists are met with indifference by Lebanese border officials. Other than the mandatory entry form to fill in and a passport stamp, journalists are on their own; no maps, telephone directories or bundles of paper of useful information.
What kind of environment journalists were entering was evident before even crossing the border.
In the first week, tens of thousands of Lebanese fled to Syria, and the borders were inundated with people and vehicles clogging the roads. And with the main highway to the border destroyed by Israeli warplanes, vehicles had to take alternative routes through the mountains and hope they were not targeted like the smouldering wrecks of trucks, buses and cars to be seen on the drive to Beirut.
The capital is a city marred by war; the usually bustling streets empty and incessant traffic jams a distant memory.
But food and drink is available, and the odd restaurant and bar are open for business. Refugees are to be seen housed in schools, hotels and university dormitories, and veiled Muslim women walk the streets of the Christian areas that have taken in the displaced.
Although the war is being fought in the south, bombs have been dropped on the north of Beirut, the city itself and heavily in the now desolated southern suburbs, where Hizbullah’s headquarters were based.
Hizbullah organized a tour for journalists to visit the destroyed area of Haret Hreik the day after the bombings.
“They guided us through parts of the destroyed areas, calling us to retreat when jets were heard overhead,” said American journalist Jackson Allers.
Trying to get into the southern suburbs without authorization proved to be harder, with Hizbullah members patrolling the area on motorbikes.
“In Baalbek it was easy, in the southern suburbs it wasn’t,” recalled Dutch journalist Peter Speetjens. “It took an hour to try and get past the guards and we still weren’t let in.”
Other than the political, business and refugee stories to be done in Beirut, journalists have flocked to the areas that have been hit the worst by Israeli attacks, the areas around the Bekaa Valley town of Baalbek and the southern port city of Tyre.
Speetjens took the opportunity of the 48-hour Israeli ceasefire last week to visit Baalbek.
“The Israelis said there would be no bombings in Lebanon, but we didn’t want to take the chance. Just in case we put TV on the car with tape, as PRESS is too long to spell out.”
He said he was allowed to enter the destroyed sections of Baalbek, accompanied by a Hizbullah member dressed in a “shirt, trousers and pair of house slippers.”
But with Israeli drones flying overhead throughout the day, Speetjens said he started getting concerned for his safety as the minutes ticked away for the end of the ceasefire.
“Every time we passed a truck on the way back I felt edgy, as they had been hitting trucks and bridges,” he said.
Speetjens fears were not allayed upon return to Beirut however.
“I am a bit concerned about working at my office, as it is next to a big bridge. Some people refused to come, but I lowered the metal window shutters, just in case.”
To the south lies the front line, the route beset with bombed-out bridges and craters taking people up to six hours instead of the pre-war hour and a half journey.
“Driving past Sidon to Tyre with the road empty and destruction everywhere I started to tense up,” said US radio journalist Ben Gilbert, who spent 10 months off and on in Iraq.
“As a BMW passed I wondered if the driver was a suicide bomber. Then I realized the stress factor was linked to Iraq. It’s a Pavlov-ian response, my body reacting to a danger I was used to.”
Other than the danger of air and artillery strikes, Gilbert said reporting in Lebanon was not comparable with Iraq, where over 100 journalists have been killed in the past three years.
“It’s great to be able to walk around and not worry about the possibility of your head being cut-off. In Iraq you can’t do random interviews and the level of US hatred is so high it’s dangerous to be a foreigner. Here you can walk out of the hotel, meet someone and immediately do an interview,” he said.
Journalists are also not hampered by censorship restrictions, as the Israelis and Americans impose on journalists when embedded with military forces in Northern Israel and Iraq.
“You can go and drive anywhere you want in the south, soldiers won’t stop you, but it is risky. I think it would be great to meet Hizbullah fighters and embed with them,” said Gilbert.
Journalists have met Hizbullah fighters while out in the field however. “We managed to talk to a few Hizbullah fighters and saw how well trained they were,” said Hugh McLeod, a journalist for Scottish newspaper The Sunday Herald. “They took our names, telephone numbers and publication details. They were very professional and clearly followed a drill.”
Without the option of embedding with Hizbullah, journalists are confined to the beleaguered city of Tyre and excursions to neighbouring villages to see the aftermath of Israeli military strikes.
“You can hear the war but you don’t see it directly. It’s very strange,” McLeod said.
Due to the danger of visiting the frontlines, and communications hampered by power cuts and drones affecting telephone coverage, McLeod said staying up to date was problematic.
Equally, food, water and fuel supplies are running low in Tyre, and the Israelis had carried out a commando raid on a building on the outskirts of the city.
“The main problem is that there is no guarantee you will be safe,” McLeod added. “Even today two guys were killed on a scooter near a chicken rotisserie we used to eat at. It was a shock for everybody.”
Former journalist and English teacher Mohamed Ajami, from the southern town of Nabatiyeh, joined the growing ranks of fixers and translators now working with foreign journalists when the conflict started.
He said the accommodation media personnel are staying at in the old part of Tyre, all clustered around a specific hotel, had weak foundations and lacked defences.
“We are sitting ducks. Just because we are with the media it doesn’t mean we are immune from attack,” he said.
Out on the road it is the same story, with no guarantees that media vehicles will not be targeted, as has occurred to dozens of cars, vans, and ambulances, and even UN positions.
“There is no way you can ring the Israeli Defence Force (IDF) and say we want to go to Bint Jbeil,” said McLeod.
Visiting outlying towns and villages during the aerial ceasefire, Gilbert said the roads were eerily quiet.
“It is scary because no one is on the streets as you pass through towns that should have 5,000 people. You can see for miles, hear the drones, and know that someone in Israel can see you and could press a button. Hopefully they can see TV emblazoned on the car,” he said.
For freelance journalists such as Gilbert the risks of leaving Tyre are even higher than for the major media outlets, which have GPS systems to pinpoint their exact location in relation to Israeli bombardments and scout cars to go ahead and check the safety of certain routes.
“If your car breaks down and you are all alone, what happens? I don’t know the south very well and you are in a battle zone, so you try to attach yourself to a convoy of journalists or civilian vehicles. There is definitely safety in numbers,” said Gilbert.
Miraculously only one journalist has been killed so far, a young Lebanese photojournalist killed in a missile strike while travelling by taxi to the south.
But Ajami thinks it is only a matter of time before more journalist lose their lives.
“If the conflict goes on journalists will be killed, there are a lot down here, and the chances of casualties are high,” he said.
With journalists largely confined to the relative safety of Tyre, McLeod said reporting involved visits to refugees, hospitals and schools or “ambulance chasing.”
“But a week ago two ambulances were hit, so we are more wary now,” he said.
Ajami said the other danger journalists faced was the possibility of being cut off from the rest of Lebanon, as there is now only one road out of Tyre.
Indeed, with the Masnaa border closed following an air strike last week, there is only one route out of Lebanon, the northern border with Syria. If any more transport links to the north are destroyed, the country could be completely isolated from the world, and journalists would be stranded alongside the Lebanese.
“We are in the same boat as the Lebanese, there is no possibility of being evacuated,” said Gilbert.
BEIRUT: Israel provides foreign journalists upon arrival with a ‘welcome’ pack that includes useful contact numbers, maps, political speeches, and background information on UN resolutions and the conflict with Hizbullah. Journalists also have the possibility of embedding with Israeli troops and the dubious advantage of air raid sirens warning of incoming Hizbullah rockets.
None of this is the case for journalists on the other side of the border.
Journalists that were not already based in Lebanon when the conflict kicked off had to take a circuitous route via Syria after Lebanon’s one and only international airport was put out of action when Israeli warplanes destroyed the runway.
At the Syrian border, journalists are met with indifference by Lebanese border officials. Other than the mandatory entry form to fill in and a passport stamp, journalists are on their own; no maps, telephone directories or bundles of paper of useful information.
What kind of environment journalists were entering was evident before even crossing the border.
In the first week, tens of thousands of Lebanese fled to Syria, and the borders were inundated with people and vehicles clogging the roads. And with the main highway to the border destroyed by Israeli warplanes, vehicles had to take alternative routes through the mountains and hope they were not targeted like the smouldering wrecks of trucks, buses and cars to be seen on the drive to Beirut.
The capital is a city marred by war; the usually bustling streets empty and incessant traffic jams a distant memory.
But food and drink is available, and the odd restaurant and bar are open for business. Refugees are to be seen housed in schools, hotels and university dormitories, and veiled Muslim women walk the streets of the Christian areas that have taken in the displaced.
Although the war is being fought in the south, bombs have been dropped on the north of Beirut, the city itself and heavily in the now desolated southern suburbs, where Hizbullah’s headquarters were based.
Hizbullah organized a tour for journalists to visit the destroyed area of Haret Hreik the day after the bombings.
“They guided us through parts of the destroyed areas, calling us to retreat when jets were heard overhead,” said American journalist Jackson Allers.
Trying to get into the southern suburbs without authorization proved to be harder, with Hizbullah members patrolling the area on motorbikes.
“In Baalbek it was easy, in the southern suburbs it wasn’t,” recalled Dutch journalist Peter Speetjens. “It took an hour to try and get past the guards and we still weren’t let in.”
Other than the political, business and refugee stories to be done in Beirut, journalists have flocked to the areas that have been hit the worst by Israeli attacks, the areas around the Bekaa Valley town of Baalbek and the southern port city of Tyre.
Speetjens took the opportunity of the 48-hour Israeli ceasefire last week to visit Baalbek.
“The Israelis said there would be no bombings in Lebanon, but we didn’t want to take the chance. Just in case we put TV on the car with tape, as PRESS is too long to spell out.”
He said he was allowed to enter the destroyed sections of Baalbek, accompanied by a Hizbullah member dressed in a “shirt, trousers and pair of house slippers.”
But with Israeli drones flying overhead throughout the day, Speetjens said he started getting concerned for his safety as the minutes ticked away for the end of the ceasefire.
“Every time we passed a truck on the way back I felt edgy, as they had been hitting trucks and bridges,” he said.
Speetjens fears were not allayed upon return to Beirut however.
“I am a bit concerned about working at my office, as it is next to a big bridge. Some people refused to come, but I lowered the metal window shutters, just in case.”
To the south lies the front line, the route beset with bombed-out bridges and craters taking people up to six hours instead of the pre-war hour and a half journey.
“Driving past Sidon to Tyre with the road empty and destruction everywhere I started to tense up,” said US radio journalist Ben Gilbert, who spent 10 months off and on in Iraq.
“As a BMW passed I wondered if the driver was a suicide bomber. Then I realized the stress factor was linked to Iraq. It’s a Pavlov-ian response, my body reacting to a danger I was used to.”
Other than the danger of air and artillery strikes, Gilbert said reporting in Lebanon was not comparable with Iraq, where over 100 journalists have been killed in the past three years.
“It’s great to be able to walk around and not worry about the possibility of your head being cut-off. In Iraq you can’t do random interviews and the level of US hatred is so high it’s dangerous to be a foreigner. Here you can walk out of the hotel, meet someone and immediately do an interview,” he said.
Journalists are also not hampered by censorship restrictions, as the Israelis and Americans impose on journalists when embedded with military forces in Northern Israel and Iraq.
“You can go and drive anywhere you want in the south, soldiers won’t stop you, but it is risky. I think it would be great to meet Hizbullah fighters and embed with them,” said Gilbert.
Journalists have met Hizbullah fighters while out in the field however. “We managed to talk to a few Hizbullah fighters and saw how well trained they were,” said Hugh McLeod, a journalist for Scottish newspaper The Sunday Herald. “They took our names, telephone numbers and publication details. They were very professional and clearly followed a drill.”
Without the option of embedding with Hizbullah, journalists are confined to the beleaguered city of Tyre and excursions to neighbouring villages to see the aftermath of Israeli military strikes.
“You can hear the war but you don’t see it directly. It’s very strange,” McLeod said.
Due to the danger of visiting the frontlines, and communications hampered by power cuts and drones affecting telephone coverage, McLeod said staying up to date was problematic.
Equally, food, water and fuel supplies are running low in Tyre, and the Israelis had carried out a commando raid on a building on the outskirts of the city.
“The main problem is that there is no guarantee you will be safe,” McLeod added. “Even today two guys were killed on a scooter near a chicken rotisserie we used to eat at. It was a shock for everybody.”
Former journalist and English teacher Mohamed Ajami, from the southern town of Nabatiyeh, joined the growing ranks of fixers and translators now working with foreign journalists when the conflict started.
He said the accommodation media personnel are staying at in the old part of Tyre, all clustered around a specific hotel, had weak foundations and lacked defences.
“We are sitting ducks. Just because we are with the media it doesn’t mean we are immune from attack,” he said.
Out on the road it is the same story, with no guarantees that media vehicles will not be targeted, as has occurred to dozens of cars, vans, and ambulances, and even UN positions.
“There is no way you can ring the Israeli Defence Force (IDF) and say we want to go to Bint Jbeil,” said McLeod.
Visiting outlying towns and villages during the aerial ceasefire, Gilbert said the roads were eerily quiet.
“It is scary because no one is on the streets as you pass through towns that should have 5,000 people. You can see for miles, hear the drones, and know that someone in Israel can see you and could press a button. Hopefully they can see TV emblazoned on the car,” he said.
For freelance journalists such as Gilbert the risks of leaving Tyre are even higher than for the major media outlets, which have GPS systems to pinpoint their exact location in relation to Israeli bombardments and scout cars to go ahead and check the safety of certain routes.
“If your car breaks down and you are all alone, what happens? I don’t know the south very well and you are in a battle zone, so you try to attach yourself to a convoy of journalists or civilian vehicles. There is definitely safety in numbers,” said Gilbert.
Miraculously only one journalist has been killed so far, a young Lebanese photojournalist killed in a missile strike while travelling by taxi to the south.
But Ajami thinks it is only a matter of time before more journalist lose their lives.
“If the conflict goes on journalists will be killed, there are a lot down here, and the chances of casualties are high,” he said.
With journalists largely confined to the relative safety of Tyre, McLeod said reporting involved visits to refugees, hospitals and schools or “ambulance chasing.”
“But a week ago two ambulances were hit, so we are more wary now,” he said.
Ajami said the other danger journalists faced was the possibility of being cut off from the rest of Lebanon, as there is now only one road out of Tyre.
Indeed, with the Masnaa border closed following an air strike last week, there is only one route out of Lebanon, the northern border with Syria. If any more transport links to the north are destroyed, the country could be completely isolated from the world, and journalists would be stranded alongside the Lebanese.
“We are in the same boat as the Lebanese, there is no possibility of being evacuated,” said Gilbert.
Legends of the Lebanon War
(Originally published in the Frankfurter Allegemeine Zeitung as Legenden im Libanon-Krieg, 14 August, 2006)
BEIRUT: The old adage ‘the first casualty of war is the truth’ is as applicable to the Israel-Hizbullah conflict as any other war.
Disinformation has abounded from the get-go, with spurious statements made by officials, photographs doctored by the media, and web blogs full of claims and counter claims.
Israel’s justification for the war, and bombardment of civilian areas, has also rested on what now appear to be dubious claims.
The first claim is that the action that sparked the conflict, the seizure of two Israeli soldiers by Hizbullah on July 12, was carried out on Israeli territory. But according to Amin Hoteit, the retired Lebanese army Brigadier-General responsible for demarcating the Blue Line between Lebanon and Israel in conjunction with the United Nations in 2000, the Israeli soldiers were attacked and captured on Lebanese territory.
“They were taken on a road 120 meters inside Lebanon near Aitaa el Chaab,” Hoteit said on Friday. “There is no fence, no sign, and they [Hizbullah] did not cross any demarcation of Israeli territory. It is an uninhabited forest area only used by the resistance [Hizbullah]. We blocked the road after demarcation.”
Hoteit’s claim tallies with statements issued by Hizbullah and the Lebanese police following the incident that were not picked up by the mainstream media.
“Implementing our promise to free Arab prisoners in Israeli jails, our strugglers have captured two Israeli soldiers in southern Lebanon,” Hizbullah stated on July 12. Hizbullah had warned the Israelis several times in the past that the group would capture and detain Israeli soldiers if they entered Lebanon and would use them in an exchange of prisoners.
The Lebanese police said the two soldiers were captured as they “infiltrated” the town of Aitaa al-Chaab inside Lebanon.
Israel’s second claim involves the targeting of civilian areas in Lebanon, which Israel justifies by claiming Hizbullah fighters are hiding among civilians and using residential areas to store arms. But the evidence on the ground seems to point the other way, according to analysts, NGOs, villagers and the party itself.
Israel claims its bombardments are aimed at destroying Hizbullah facilities and incapacitating infrastructure used to transport armaments and supplies to the guerrilla force. However, the attacks have not prevented Hizbullah from firing thousands of rockets into Northern Israel but have left over 1,000 Lebanese civilians dead, a million displaced and caused an estimated $2.5 billion in infrastructure damage.
“Hiding behind civilians is the only reason the Israelis can come up with, even if they are hitting a kindergarten or a school. In general 90% of their targets are against civilian targets, and in some cases hit the residences of Hizbullah leaders,” said Abass Awali, who has worked with the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) for over 20 years.
Little is known about Hizbullah’s military tactics but as analysts point out, the group does not engage in conventional warfare and uses guerrilla tactics.
Fighters are known to operate from their hometown regions, with locals not knowing whether a neighbour is a Hizbullah fighter or not.
“Hizbullah operates clandestinely as the area is strewn with informers,” said Amal Saad-Ghorayeb, a professor at the Lebanese American University and expert on Hizbullah.
She said fighters carry their own supplies to avoid detection or interaction with villagers, and use a simple but effective way of communicating by telephone or walkie-talkie. “‘Meet me by my uncle’s shop’, or ‘next to my girlfriend’s house’.” No names, and no addresses.”
Villagers that had fled the village of Safaa, 20 kilometers south-east of Tyre near the Israeli border, a week ago said they saw no sign of Hizbullah fighters in the area.
“My neighbours may be Hizbullah, but I never saw any weapons. They are invisible warriors, we know nothing about them,” said Abass Ayoub, now living in a school in the Christian village of Safra, north of Beirut, where he has taken refuge with his family.
Ayoub said his only encounter with a Hizbullah fighter was when he was trapped for two days along with 20 others in a kitchen when the building was bombed.
“The fighter called to us that he had brought food and water, and left the supplies under a tree. He told us to come and get it, then left, but we were stuck,” said Ayoub.
Ghorayeb conceded there was “no way to be sure” that Hizbullah were not operating in and around villages. “But from sound reasoning, would they operate that openly? There are too many collaborators [with Israel].”
Awali said Hizbullah had altered its strategy from the 1982-2000 fight against Israel in the South.
“Their strategy is completely different from the last occupation. They would bring the rockets to a position and fire it from there, but this is not the story at all now. They have their own bases in the valleys and not in the villages,” he said. “This also explains how they are able to keep firing rockets at Israel.”
Hizbullah adamantly denies that it uses civilian areas to launch rockets and store heavy weapons.
“Military experts have said Katuysha rockets cannot be fired from buildings, it should be done from an open field,” said Ibrahim Moussawi, political spokesman for the Hizbullah-backed TV channel Al Manar. “The Israelis have also not given us any evidence of hitting arms caches. There would be sizeable explosions if they did.”
However, in the battle for the southern town of Bint Jbeil, Israeli Defence Force Captain Doron Spielman claimed residents were “trapped” inside the town by Hizbullah fighters, BBC News Online reported.
“Hezbollah blockaded the city before the battle began, and we now know at gunpoint forced the Lebanese residents to stay inside the city,” Spielman said.
Saad-Ghorayeb said the claim was “ridiculous,” as Hizbullah would not alienate members of its support base and logically would not need to threaten residents to stay in Bint Jbeil.
“How could villagers leave anyway? Vehicles could not leave the area and there is a curfew, why would they need to be held at gunpoint?”
The greatest condemnation of Israel’s military tactics have centred around the bombing on July 30 of a four-story residential building in the southern town of Qana that killed 28 civilians, mainly women and children.
Reporters at the scene said they had not seen any Hizbullah fighters in the area at the time, none of the bodies recovered from the rubble were those of militants, and rescue workers had found no weapons in the building that was targeted.
In a Human Rights Watch (HRW) report on the attack, the group said, “Israel has not presented any evidence to show that Hezbollah was present in or around the building that was struck at the time of the attack.”
Kenneth Roth, HRW’s executive director, has blamed Israel for targeting civilians in Lebanon. “The pattern of attacks shows the Israeli military’s disturbing disregard for the lives of Lebanese civilians. Our research shows that Israel’s claim that Hezbollah fighters are hiding among civilians does not explain, let along justify, Israel’s indiscriminate warfare…In the many cases of civilian deaths examined by HRW, the location of Hezbollah troops and arms had nothing to do with the deaths because there was no Hezbollah around.”
However, with journalists, NGOs and independent observers not able to access villages in the south due to the conflict, and both sides providing disinformation, there is no definite proof Hizbullah has not resorted to using ‘human shields.’
Former General Hoteit’s claim, on the other hand, needs to be further investigated by the international community.
BEIRUT: The old adage ‘the first casualty of war is the truth’ is as applicable to the Israel-Hizbullah conflict as any other war.
Disinformation has abounded from the get-go, with spurious statements made by officials, photographs doctored by the media, and web blogs full of claims and counter claims.
Israel’s justification for the war, and bombardment of civilian areas, has also rested on what now appear to be dubious claims.
The first claim is that the action that sparked the conflict, the seizure of two Israeli soldiers by Hizbullah on July 12, was carried out on Israeli territory. But according to Amin Hoteit, the retired Lebanese army Brigadier-General responsible for demarcating the Blue Line between Lebanon and Israel in conjunction with the United Nations in 2000, the Israeli soldiers were attacked and captured on Lebanese territory.
“They were taken on a road 120 meters inside Lebanon near Aitaa el Chaab,” Hoteit said on Friday. “There is no fence, no sign, and they [Hizbullah] did not cross any demarcation of Israeli territory. It is an uninhabited forest area only used by the resistance [Hizbullah]. We blocked the road after demarcation.”
Hoteit’s claim tallies with statements issued by Hizbullah and the Lebanese police following the incident that were not picked up by the mainstream media.
“Implementing our promise to free Arab prisoners in Israeli jails, our strugglers have captured two Israeli soldiers in southern Lebanon,” Hizbullah stated on July 12. Hizbullah had warned the Israelis several times in the past that the group would capture and detain Israeli soldiers if they entered Lebanon and would use them in an exchange of prisoners.
The Lebanese police said the two soldiers were captured as they “infiltrated” the town of Aitaa al-Chaab inside Lebanon.
Israel’s second claim involves the targeting of civilian areas in Lebanon, which Israel justifies by claiming Hizbullah fighters are hiding among civilians and using residential areas to store arms. But the evidence on the ground seems to point the other way, according to analysts, NGOs, villagers and the party itself.
Israel claims its bombardments are aimed at destroying Hizbullah facilities and incapacitating infrastructure used to transport armaments and supplies to the guerrilla force. However, the attacks have not prevented Hizbullah from firing thousands of rockets into Northern Israel but have left over 1,000 Lebanese civilians dead, a million displaced and caused an estimated $2.5 billion in infrastructure damage.
“Hiding behind civilians is the only reason the Israelis can come up with, even if they are hitting a kindergarten or a school. In general 90% of their targets are against civilian targets, and in some cases hit the residences of Hizbullah leaders,” said Abass Awali, who has worked with the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) for over 20 years.
Little is known about Hizbullah’s military tactics but as analysts point out, the group does not engage in conventional warfare and uses guerrilla tactics.
Fighters are known to operate from their hometown regions, with locals not knowing whether a neighbour is a Hizbullah fighter or not.
“Hizbullah operates clandestinely as the area is strewn with informers,” said Amal Saad-Ghorayeb, a professor at the Lebanese American University and expert on Hizbullah.
She said fighters carry their own supplies to avoid detection or interaction with villagers, and use a simple but effective way of communicating by telephone or walkie-talkie. “‘Meet me by my uncle’s shop’, or ‘next to my girlfriend’s house’.” No names, and no addresses.”
Villagers that had fled the village of Safaa, 20 kilometers south-east of Tyre near the Israeli border, a week ago said they saw no sign of Hizbullah fighters in the area.
“My neighbours may be Hizbullah, but I never saw any weapons. They are invisible warriors, we know nothing about them,” said Abass Ayoub, now living in a school in the Christian village of Safra, north of Beirut, where he has taken refuge with his family.
Ayoub said his only encounter with a Hizbullah fighter was when he was trapped for two days along with 20 others in a kitchen when the building was bombed.
“The fighter called to us that he had brought food and water, and left the supplies under a tree. He told us to come and get it, then left, but we were stuck,” said Ayoub.
Ghorayeb conceded there was “no way to be sure” that Hizbullah were not operating in and around villages. “But from sound reasoning, would they operate that openly? There are too many collaborators [with Israel].”
Awali said Hizbullah had altered its strategy from the 1982-2000 fight against Israel in the South.
“Their strategy is completely different from the last occupation. They would bring the rockets to a position and fire it from there, but this is not the story at all now. They have their own bases in the valleys and not in the villages,” he said. “This also explains how they are able to keep firing rockets at Israel.”
Hizbullah adamantly denies that it uses civilian areas to launch rockets and store heavy weapons.
“Military experts have said Katuysha rockets cannot be fired from buildings, it should be done from an open field,” said Ibrahim Moussawi, political spokesman for the Hizbullah-backed TV channel Al Manar. “The Israelis have also not given us any evidence of hitting arms caches. There would be sizeable explosions if they did.”
However, in the battle for the southern town of Bint Jbeil, Israeli Defence Force Captain Doron Spielman claimed residents were “trapped” inside the town by Hizbullah fighters, BBC News Online reported.
“Hezbollah blockaded the city before the battle began, and we now know at gunpoint forced the Lebanese residents to stay inside the city,” Spielman said.
Saad-Ghorayeb said the claim was “ridiculous,” as Hizbullah would not alienate members of its support base and logically would not need to threaten residents to stay in Bint Jbeil.
“How could villagers leave anyway? Vehicles could not leave the area and there is a curfew, why would they need to be held at gunpoint?”
The greatest condemnation of Israel’s military tactics have centred around the bombing on July 30 of a four-story residential building in the southern town of Qana that killed 28 civilians, mainly women and children.
Reporters at the scene said they had not seen any Hizbullah fighters in the area at the time, none of the bodies recovered from the rubble were those of militants, and rescue workers had found no weapons in the building that was targeted.
In a Human Rights Watch (HRW) report on the attack, the group said, “Israel has not presented any evidence to show that Hezbollah was present in or around the building that was struck at the time of the attack.”
Kenneth Roth, HRW’s executive director, has blamed Israel for targeting civilians in Lebanon. “The pattern of attacks shows the Israeli military’s disturbing disregard for the lives of Lebanese civilians. Our research shows that Israel’s claim that Hezbollah fighters are hiding among civilians does not explain, let along justify, Israel’s indiscriminate warfare…In the many cases of civilian deaths examined by HRW, the location of Hezbollah troops and arms had nothing to do with the deaths because there was no Hezbollah around.”
However, with journalists, NGOs and independent observers not able to access villages in the south due to the conflict, and both sides providing disinformation, there is no definite proof Hizbullah has not resorted to using ‘human shields.’
Former General Hoteit’s claim, on the other hand, needs to be further investigated by the international community.
Bar Journalism
(Originally published, in translation, in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung entitled Im Krieg hinter der Bar, 26/08/06)
During the media frenzy that the situation in Lebanon warranted over the past month, numerous news outlets ran the rather staid story of Lebanese bars open for business and people partying with abandon, seemingly callous to the destruction inflicted on the country.
The story was popular for numerous reasons, but high on the list has to be the ease of such a report. The journalist could go out for a drink after a day in the field, whip out a notebook, and get a story at the same time as enjoying the spectacle.
In some cases the story only involved visiting one of the few open bars in Beirut or venturing into the mountains to the restaurants and clubs transplanted from the capital in Broumana and Faraya.
The Lebanese nightlife story has been a popular one for the past several years for visiting journalists and pundits alike, remarking on the cosmopolitan clientele, the fancy interiors, designer music, and broad array of cocktails. A nightlife scene not rivalled anywhere in the Arab Middle East.
It is also a story that people in Europe and America could easily relate to, and perhaps even more so in a complex conflict where southern Lebanon is so different from Westernized Beirut.
In the Beirut and Broumana bars you can find cosmopolitan, multi-lingual youth willing to talk, whereas in the south a translator is needed and you cannot have such an easy exchange of views.
Some bar and restaurant owners were keen to talk to journalists, but the owner of Torino, one of the few bars to stay open in Beirut in the first weeks of the conflict, shied away from the exposure.
German-Lebanese Andreas Boulos said his small café-bar was a “journalist hub” before reporters travelled to the south to report from the frontline. “Many had in mind the southern stories of destruction and this side, Lebanon still partying, but I really didn’t see it that way. I said come for a drink and take a break.”
For many Lebanese going to a bar was exactly that, a simple form of escapism away from the conflict, power cuts, and the confines of home to enter a world they were familiar with.
The Lebanese also have the unenviable experience of knowing how to survive during a war and maintain some semblance of a normal life.
Indeed, in 1982 during the civil war, the US Marines reportedly thought they had landed in the wrong country on seeing Lebanese tanning themselves on the beach in Jounieh, a Christian city north of Beirut that was the main nightspot during the war years.
What many of the nightlife articles failed to point out, however, was that Lebanon has always had such extraordinary disparities. The wealthy have always been able to party, dropping $8 for a drink, while the majority of the country earns just over $10 a day and are limited in their entertainment options
In the recent war this disparity was not as evident, many of the wealthy having left the country or hunkered down in the mountains, and nearly all bars and restaurants closed. Everyone else was sitting out the conflict at home, glued to a TV screen watching history unfold.
With people making minimal money, if at all, during the conflict, it was equally only the better off and the employed, journalists included, that could afford to go out for a meal or a drink.
“It was like journalistic tourism,” said Boulos, referring to the number of foreign journalists that descended on Beirut in the first week of the war. “But it was fun to see them also, journalists from all over the world: Australians, Polish, Japanese, Italian, South African, Spanish and, of course, Americans. It became a nice place for people to let out their stress.”
But also a place for journalists to mix work and pleasure, make connections and in a couple of cases, hire bar-goers as fixers and translators.
Boulos said he was repeatedly asked by journalists to be interviewed for television, newspapers, magazines, and radio.
“I didn’t feel harassed but the amount of journalists in the first four or five days was a shock. I was firm about not being filmed and interviewed, but couldn’t deny them interviewing customers if they were ok with it. They have always written on nightlife in Lebanon, how great and so on.”
Boulos was also asked to be in a documentary and write a five-day diary on his life that would be counterbalanced with a diary from Israel.
But aside from the diary suggestion, minimal attention was paid to the story behind the scenes, the trials of running a bar during a war and an economic siege, with the standard story revolving around why customers are there, what they think of the war, and the bar owner’s opinion of the customers.
Boulos himself encountered numerous logistical problems, power cuts, rising costs and emotional scenes.
“I had higher expenses during the last month [than usual], beside the stress factor. There was minimal electricity, which was a big problem as I had to pay for a generator, and prices went up on fresh goods. But there was no shortage of alcohol.”
Boulos was lucky however to have had staff live in the area and willing to work.
“We didn’t stay open for business’ sake, but to be morally independent and productive in any form. And when we worked we forgot what was really happening; it was better than sitting at home.”
But with stress levels high and emotions often running even higher, Boulos said his bar was the scene of a lot of drama, where lovers spent their last hours together before being separated by evacuation and heated alcohol-induced arguments resounded into the early hours.
With a tenuous peace now in place Lebanese nightlife will gradually drift down from the mountains and back to the capital, although with many bars and restaurants likely to have gone bankrupt and the city centre dependent on non-existent tourists, it may be a while before journalists report again on Lebanon’s once notorious nightlife.
During the media frenzy that the situation in Lebanon warranted over the past month, numerous news outlets ran the rather staid story of Lebanese bars open for business and people partying with abandon, seemingly callous to the destruction inflicted on the country.
The story was popular for numerous reasons, but high on the list has to be the ease of such a report. The journalist could go out for a drink after a day in the field, whip out a notebook, and get a story at the same time as enjoying the spectacle.
In some cases the story only involved visiting one of the few open bars in Beirut or venturing into the mountains to the restaurants and clubs transplanted from the capital in Broumana and Faraya.
The Lebanese nightlife story has been a popular one for the past several years for visiting journalists and pundits alike, remarking on the cosmopolitan clientele, the fancy interiors, designer music, and broad array of cocktails. A nightlife scene not rivalled anywhere in the Arab Middle East.
It is also a story that people in Europe and America could easily relate to, and perhaps even more so in a complex conflict where southern Lebanon is so different from Westernized Beirut.
In the Beirut and Broumana bars you can find cosmopolitan, multi-lingual youth willing to talk, whereas in the south a translator is needed and you cannot have such an easy exchange of views.
Some bar and restaurant owners were keen to talk to journalists, but the owner of Torino, one of the few bars to stay open in Beirut in the first weeks of the conflict, shied away from the exposure.
German-Lebanese Andreas Boulos said his small café-bar was a “journalist hub” before reporters travelled to the south to report from the frontline. “Many had in mind the southern stories of destruction and this side, Lebanon still partying, but I really didn’t see it that way. I said come for a drink and take a break.”
For many Lebanese going to a bar was exactly that, a simple form of escapism away from the conflict, power cuts, and the confines of home to enter a world they were familiar with.
The Lebanese also have the unenviable experience of knowing how to survive during a war and maintain some semblance of a normal life.
Indeed, in 1982 during the civil war, the US Marines reportedly thought they had landed in the wrong country on seeing Lebanese tanning themselves on the beach in Jounieh, a Christian city north of Beirut that was the main nightspot during the war years.
What many of the nightlife articles failed to point out, however, was that Lebanon has always had such extraordinary disparities. The wealthy have always been able to party, dropping $8 for a drink, while the majority of the country earns just over $10 a day and are limited in their entertainment options
In the recent war this disparity was not as evident, many of the wealthy having left the country or hunkered down in the mountains, and nearly all bars and restaurants closed. Everyone else was sitting out the conflict at home, glued to a TV screen watching history unfold.
With people making minimal money, if at all, during the conflict, it was equally only the better off and the employed, journalists included, that could afford to go out for a meal or a drink.
“It was like journalistic tourism,” said Boulos, referring to the number of foreign journalists that descended on Beirut in the first week of the war. “But it was fun to see them also, journalists from all over the world: Australians, Polish, Japanese, Italian, South African, Spanish and, of course, Americans. It became a nice place for people to let out their stress.”
But also a place for journalists to mix work and pleasure, make connections and in a couple of cases, hire bar-goers as fixers and translators.
Boulos said he was repeatedly asked by journalists to be interviewed for television, newspapers, magazines, and radio.
“I didn’t feel harassed but the amount of journalists in the first four or five days was a shock. I was firm about not being filmed and interviewed, but couldn’t deny them interviewing customers if they were ok with it. They have always written on nightlife in Lebanon, how great and so on.”
Boulos was also asked to be in a documentary and write a five-day diary on his life that would be counterbalanced with a diary from Israel.
But aside from the diary suggestion, minimal attention was paid to the story behind the scenes, the trials of running a bar during a war and an economic siege, with the standard story revolving around why customers are there, what they think of the war, and the bar owner’s opinion of the customers.
Boulos himself encountered numerous logistical problems, power cuts, rising costs and emotional scenes.
“I had higher expenses during the last month [than usual], beside the stress factor. There was minimal electricity, which was a big problem as I had to pay for a generator, and prices went up on fresh goods. But there was no shortage of alcohol.”
Boulos was lucky however to have had staff live in the area and willing to work.
“We didn’t stay open for business’ sake, but to be morally independent and productive in any form. And when we worked we forgot what was really happening; it was better than sitting at home.”
But with stress levels high and emotions often running even higher, Boulos said his bar was the scene of a lot of drama, where lovers spent their last hours together before being separated by evacuation and heated alcohol-induced arguments resounded into the early hours.
With a tenuous peace now in place Lebanese nightlife will gradually drift down from the mountains and back to the capital, although with many bars and restaurants likely to have gone bankrupt and the city centre dependent on non-existent tourists, it may be a while before journalists report again on Lebanon’s once notorious nightlife.
135,000 bombs dropped on Lebanon
The Israeli Armed Forces (IDF) launched 5,000 missiles, five-ton bunker-buster bombs and cluster bombs as well as anti-personnel phosphorus bombs each day into Lebanon for 27 days -- totaling over 135,000 missiles, bombs and artillery shells. During the last seven days of the war Israel launched 6,000 bombs and shells per day -- over 42,000, for a grand total of 177,000 over a heavily populated territory the size of the smallest state in the US. In contrast, the Lebanese national resistance launched 4,000 rockets during the entire 34-day period, an average of 118 per day. The ratio was 44 to 1 -- without mentioning the size differentials, the long-term killing effects of the thousands of un-exploded cluster bombs (nearly 50 killed or maimed since the end of hostilities) and Israel’s scorched earth military incursion.
The proportion of civilian deaths to soldiers was 41 to 116 or 26% of the total Israeli dead (but if we only consider Jewish Israelis and IDF members the proportion 23 to 116 or 16% of the Jewish dead were civilian.) Clearly the Lebanese resistance was aiming most of its fire at the invading IDF. In contrast, in Lebanon, of the 1,181 so far known to have been killed, 1088 were civilians and only 93 were fighters. In other words 92% of the Lebanese dead were civilians -- over three times the rate of civilians killed by the Lebanese resistance and almost six times the rate of Jewish civilians killed (the only ones who count in the Lobby’s propaganda machine). To put it more bluntly: over 47 Lebanese civilians were slaughtered for each Jewish Israeli civilian death.
(From The Lobby and the Israeli Invasion of Lebanon: Their Facts and Ours
by James Petras)
The proportion of civilian deaths to soldiers was 41 to 116 or 26% of the total Israeli dead (but if we only consider Jewish Israelis and IDF members the proportion 23 to 116 or 16% of the Jewish dead were civilian.) Clearly the Lebanese resistance was aiming most of its fire at the invading IDF. In contrast, in Lebanon, of the 1,181 so far known to have been killed, 1088 were civilians and only 93 were fighters. In other words 92% of the Lebanese dead were civilians -- over three times the rate of civilians killed by the Lebanese resistance and almost six times the rate of Jewish civilians killed (the only ones who count in the Lobby’s propaganda machine). To put it more bluntly: over 47 Lebanese civilians were slaughtered for each Jewish Israeli civilian death.
(From The Lobby and the Israeli Invasion of Lebanon: Their Facts and Ours
by James Petras)
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