On the Media Battle for Lebanon, May 2008

Arab Media & Society

On May 7, what was supposed to be a day of strikes to demand higher wages metamorphosed into eight days of fighting between the Hizbullah-led opposition, “March 8”, and the pro-government, “March 14” forces. (1) At the forefront of Lebanon’s bloodiest infighting since the civil war were the media, relaying the heated words of politicians that stoked the conflict while beaming out propaganda thick and fast. Lebanon’s media divisions became further entrenched in their sectarian and political camps, pan-Arab media did the same, and media outlets came under direct attack. (2) The Lebanese public, meanwhile, holed themselves up inside and watched events play out on TV.


After Ghassan Ghosn, the head of the General Confederation of Lebanese Workers, announced that the strike was cancelled, Hizbullah and its supporters shut down Beirut by blocking roads with piles of rubble, burning tyres and overturned rubbish bins. The following day, Hizbullah military units moved into the west of the city and started taking over, engaging in street battles with members of Sunni politician Saad Hariri’s Future movement and affiliated parties.
What changed a day of socio-economic concerns into political violence were demands Prime Minister Fouad Siniora’s government made in the days prior to the clashes. Walid Jumblatt, the pro-government Druze leader and head of the Progressive Socialist Party (PSP), had called for Hizbullah’s private phone network to be shut down, the removal of surveillance cameras Hizbullah had installed by runways at the airport, and for the head of airport security (a Shia by the name of Wafik Shoukair), to be replaced as he was alleged to be working for Hizbullah.
On May 8, Hizbullah’s Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah responded in a press conference, saying the decisions of the government were “tantamount to a declaration of war and the start of a war...on behalf of the United States and Israel.” He also went on to say that the phone network was used in “defending the country against Israel,” and that Jumblatt’s dream “is Sunni-Shia strife. We will not fulfil his dream.” (3)
That evening, as reported by only a few media outlets and relayed in a firsthand account from an employee of the Hariri-owned, pro-government Future TV (FTV) channel, the Future movement brought in thousands of men from Akkar and Tripoli to the Kantari area of West Beirut. “There were two six-wheeler trucks full of mattresses for the guys to sleep on in preparation for a fight. When we saw them we felt more comfortable, then the next day they all disappeared. Maybe they ran away or the Future movement changed its mind and didn’t want a clash. The men were paid to be there, and not armed, just with batons,” he said.
The next group to disappear from around the FTV offices in Kantari were the Lebanese Army, including three armoured personnel carriers that had been stationed in the channel’s parking lot. Then the SecurePlus security guards hired to protect FTV fled, bar one blubbering 18-year old security guard that had to be slapped around by the news editor to “act like a man.” (4)
On the morning of May 9, the FTV employee said an army officer entered the Kantari offices. “He said armed men were outside and if you don’t leave the building, they will come in or burn the building down. The news editor asked for re-assurances: for employees to be allowed to leave and the station to not be harmed, as well as for one technician to stay behind. After everyone left - according to the technician - the Colonel came back with Hizbullah technicians to be taken to the master control room. Cables, uplinks and satellite links were cut – they were professional and knew what they were doing. They needed to find the server, so made the technician call the head technician to find out, and on the phone [Hizbullah] said they knew where he lived.”
Future TV’s terrestrial, satellite and news channel, Future 24, were off the air. New TV, a pro-opposition TV channel, was later given exclusive access to film the seized offices. Meanwhile, Future’s radio station Al Sharq, the Future-owned Armenian radio station Sevan, and the Mustaqbal (Future) newspaper had their offices raided and ceased operations.
Later that Friday afternoon, Syrian Socialist Nationalist Party (SSNP) members, in an act of revenge for the burning of SSNP offices by Mustaqbal supporters during clashes in February 2007, set the FTV offices in Raouche on fire. The FTV employee said an estimated 20-30% of the channel’s archives were lost during the fire, including footage of Harb Tamouz (the July 2006 war between Hizbullah and Israel). “Fortunately, the week before a big part of the archives had been copied, and all the footage relating to Hariri was in a different location,” he said.
New TV's footage of the seized Future TV offices

Propaganda a go-go

Prior to the shutdown of FTV, violence had escalated on the streets of West Beirut and in other parts of the country. Lebanese TV channels were constantly streaming live news of the events, with reports, statements, claims and counter claims forcing viewers to keep an eye on all channels to get an idea of what was going on. (5)
Even pan-Arab channels were showing their true colours, with Saudi-owned Al Arabiya TV clearly on the side of the Siniora government and against Hizbullah, while the Qatar-owned Al Jazeera gave sympathetic coverage to Hizbullah.
Members of the government came out and decried Hizbullah’s actions as a “coup d’etat,” which was quickly picked up on by March 14 affiliated media outlets, on Al Arabiya TV, as well as by the Western media. March 14 also denied that Future had a militia, reiterating that the only militia in Lebanon was Hizbullah, and that, in the words of Hani Hammoud, senior adviser to Hariri, “the end result is that Iran has taken over the country.” (6)
Al Manar and NBN, on the other hand, spoke of the “government’s militia”, and that March 14 was receiving orders from Washington and Israel, making Lebanon a pawn in the US-Zionist agenda for the Middle East, thus a legitimate target.
Hizbullah played the take over of Beirut as a move in a “correction-ist direction, bringing a new identity to Beirut, of being against Israel,” said Dr Ibrahim Mousawi, a Lebanese political analyst allied with the March 8 movement.
The night of May 9 was an exception to all the news that had filled up the airtime of Lebanon’s television channels. The Christian channel LBC, lacking any competition from FTV, which had the rights to air Superstar (the US’ Pop Idol), broadcast live reality show Star Academy at peak time. (7) The show featured a choreographed sequence of women in leather dancing amid chains at the start, and a full audience in attendance. (8) Al Manar broadcast a Syrian soap opera.

LBC's Star Academy aired live while the clashes continued in Beirut...

...Al Manar aired a Syrian soap opera

The next day, May 10, propaganda went into overdrive, with Al Manar showing video montages of March 14’s connections with the United States via slowed-down, key-hole style images of Jumblatt meeting with US Assistant Secretary of State David Welch, and Siniora meeting with US Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice (but notably avoided showing footage of Rice and Welch meeting with Parliamentary Speaker and Amal leader (March 8), Nabih Berri). (9) Al Manar also showed footage of a hand grenade with Hebrew writing on it that was allegedly found in pro-government offices, implying March 14 was receiving military aid from the Israelis.

Al Manar footage of an Israeli hand grenade allegedly found at a Future Movement office

But with Future TV off the air, March 14 was left with only one sympathetic Lebanese TV station, LBC, which aired footage of a demonstration outside the FTV offices to protest the channel being taken off air.
"The shutting down of FTV showed the increasing importance of the media as a target on the battlefield,” said Habib Battah, an independent media analyst on the Middle East. “Keeping FTV off the airwaves was a psychological attack on Future's political supporters. It also gave the other side a monopoly over propaganda messages, with no channel to rebut the damaging allegations that were made against it.”
Among the opposition there was a great deal of schadenfreude over FTV being silenced. The fact that Al Manar and Hizbullah had made so much noise over the destruction of Al Manar’s studios in Beirut’s southern suburbs by Israeli fighter jets in Harb Tamouz (the July, 2006 war) aggravated many people when it came to the shutting down of FTV, with condemnations coming in from around the world. And unlike Future TV, which re-started broadcasting on May 14, Al Manar had contingency plans for an attack on its facilities and was only off air for two minutes. (10)
“It is ironic that Al Manar protested Israel's attack on its headquarters as a violation of the free press while Al Manar supporters helped shut down a Lebanese-owned media outlet less than two years later," said Battah.
The decision to not merely gag by totally silence FTV even angered some March 8 supporters, with Mousawi saying he didn’t agree with FTV being shut down and that it “backfired” on Hizbullah.
According to Ramez Maalouf, Professor of Journalism at the Lebanese American University, Hizbullah’s rationale behind taking FTV out of the media equation was to calm down the situation in the country.
“People in Hizbullah said [if FTV stayed on air] it would make the war more violent and dangerous, and was a way of keeping things quiet,” he said. “To me it was dangerous, as it further underlines the idea that people have that Hizbullah can do anything as it is on a mission from God.” (11)
Later on May 9, however, Hizbullah issued an apology for the closure of FTV and the treatment of journalists while covering events, but laid the blame squarely on the government’s shoulders. (12)
"We are sorry about everything that has happened to the press corps, but the government is to blame for letting things get this far. We hold the government fully responsible for everything that has happened to the media. We hope these media will be operating again soon under the control of the Lebanese Army,” Hizbullah MP Hassan Fadlallah said in a statement issued to the Lebanese National News Agency. (13)
Somewhat ironically, on the final day of the conflict, on May 14, when fighting had shifted from Beirut to the Chouf and Tripoli, Al Manar released a statement citing “violations of press freedom” when viewers in northern Lebanon complained that Future movement supporters had pressured local cable providers to stop broadcasting Al Manar, NBN and OTV.

Media war

“Truth was the victim of this war, and there was a lot of misleading propaganda,” said Mousawi. “Of course there were variations between one outlet and another, and I believe the media that followed the March 14 camp made the largest distortion – FTV became just like any media outlet of a gang, and didn’t hold to basic principles of journalism, inciting hatred and creating news about things that didn’t exist. At the same time, the March 8 media was not impeccable either - all made mistakes.”
Mousawi added that March 8 media was keen not to fall into the trap of provoking fitna – discord – between the Sunni and Shia, which Nasrallah claimed Jumblatt and the government were trying to do, and what Hizbullah claims is an American project in the region (this Shia-Sunni divide is referred to in some Washington DC circles as the “Sushi war”).
To Maalouf, blame lay less with the media than with Lebanon’s sectarian political system.
“It’s a case of politicians bringing things to a boil, but the media needed to use words more carefully,” he said. “I think the fault lies with the politicians as it’s about the choices the political system gives people, not the media.”
Maalouf said LBC was seen as the least biased of all the channels.
“But all in all, LBC is like An Nahar (newspaper), centre-right,” he added. Notably, he said OTV, allied to opposition leader Michel Aoun’s Free Patriotic Movement, increased its viewership during the clashes.
“The more divided the audience became, the more people navigated to the channels that reflected their views. For instance, the tenser it became, the more Christians watched OTV, which they didn’t watch much usually,” Maalouf said.
To Battah, the conflict showed that most Lebanese television stations have become an intrinsic part of the infrastructure of the political establishment.
“Lebanese TV is no longer just biased, it is one of the most important weapons in the hands of political groups,” he said.
“This has led some Lebanese politicians to justify attacks on the media, and unfortunately this is now accepted by many of their constituents. It’s a very dangerous development because even now average citizens are engaging in attacks on journalists just because they don't agree with the broadcaster's politics. This is definitely a low point for Lebanese journalism. The polarization of society has increased sectarianism in the press and stoked hatred toward the press as a whole.”

The Aftermath

While viewing habits had changed during the clashes, the media environment started to get even more virulent once the fighting died down and FTV was back on air.
With the fighting ongoing, FTV had re-located to Beirut Hall to prepare for getting back on air. “We waited for the political green light as Future faced a lot of threats that the Kantari offices would be burned down [if FTV went on air],” said the Future TV employee.
When FTV re-launched, channels like Al Arabiya showed solidarity by re-broadcasting footage, while LBC aired a statement by the Mufti of Beirut on Marcel Ghanem’s show saying FTV was back.
“It’s a different story how coverage changed after re-broadcasting,” said the FTV employee. “FTV went from being biased to being extremely biased. It started calling it an Alam Harb (“media war”), people were asked not to say certain things and to cut a statement to change the meaning. For instance, they transcribe a speech and then the editor underlines the words you can use, five words here and 20 words there, and this changes it all, it becomes a different speech. The management and the news directors also started saying they [March 8 media] are lying in news bulletins and creating this story, so it’s ok for us to do whatever. I think this is the worst effect of what happened,” he added.
Al Manar meanwhile started portraying the end of the conflict as a victory for Hizbullah, which had not capitulated to any of Jumblatt’s demands and, by force, driven March 14 into an agreement in Qatar that ended a political crisis that had lasted 18 months. In December 2006, Hizbullah and co. pulled out of the government and established a tent city that closed off downtown Beirut. Once President Emile Lahoud stood down from office in November last year, the political standoff stalled the election of a new head of state some twenty times. By June 21, with a compromise reached on a new president, General Michel Sleiman, the tents were taken down and Beirut appeared to be back to normal.
On the TV, programming returned to its usual content, including politically partisan points of view and journalism that skirts the line between news and propaganda.

Footnotes

1) The March dates refer to demonstrations in downtown Beirut in the wake of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri’s assassination on February 14, 2005. March 8 consisted of Hizbullah and Amal, while March 14 (the date of the so-called ‘Cedar Revolution’) consisted of Hariri’s Future movement, the Progressive Socialist Party, the Lebanese Forces, the Phalange Party and Aoun’s Free Patriotic Movement (FPM). The predominantly Christian FPM later joined March 8, diving the Christian community.
2) Lebanese TV channels are split into two camps: The pro-opposition channels are Hizbullah-backed Al Manar TV, the National Broadcasting Network (NBN), which is partially backed by Shiite parliamentary speaker and head of the Amal movement Nabih Berri, New TV, and the Free Patriotic Movement-run Orange TV or OTV. Pro-government channels are Mustaqbal (Future) TV, owned by the Hariri family, and the Lebanese Broadcasting Company (LBC). See Paul Cochrane, ‘Are Lebanon’s Media fanning the flames of sectarianism?’ in AMS - www.arabmediasociety.org/?article=206
3) A transcript of Nasrallah’s speech is available at http://yalibnan.com/site/archives/2008/05/nasrallah_justi.php
4) Members of the opposition, and opposition media, claim the Hariri-owned security company SecurePlus is the Future movement’s militia.
5) Both Al Manar and Future TV did not reply to official requests for interviews with the management.
6) Nick Blandford, ‘Uncertainty deepens in Lebanon as Hezbollah seizes control of west Beirut’, Christian Science Monitor, May 9, 2008 - www.csmonitor.com/2008/0509/p25s23-wome.htm
7) Saudi prince and billionaire Walid Bin Talal increased his stake in LBC-Sat and the Production and Acquisition Company to 85% in July this year.
8) Beirut Report – www.beirutreport.blogspot.com/2008_05_01_archive.html
9) For screen shots and descriptions of media coverage during May see Lebanese-American journalist Habib Battah’s blog, Beirut Report – www.beirutreport.blogspot.com/2008_05_01_archive.html
10) See Paul Cochrane, “Bombs and broadcasts: Al Manar's battle to stay on air” in AMS - www.arabmediasociety.org/?article=19
11) Maalouf was making a reference to the slogan Hizbullah adopted after Harb Tamouz – “Nasr min Allah,” Victory from God.
12) Many journalists, foreign and Lebanese alike, were threatened by Hizbullah and Amal gunmen when trying to cover events. Two Al Jazeera TV staff were also wounded during clashes in a Beirut neighbourhood. An Al-Arabiya TV crew were briefly taken prisoner in a Beirut suburb on May 8, released after half an hour by Hizbullah.
13) www.menassat.com/?q=en/news-articles/3673-hezbollah-takes-over-west-beirut-1

ALL PHOTOS COURTESY OF HABIB BATTAH - www.beirutreport.blogspot.com

Syria’s Water Shortages: Agriculture, Subsidies and Hydropolitics

With flour subsidised, crop failure this year has eaten into the government's four to five millions tons of reserves

By Paul Cochrane in Damascus, Executive magazine

SYRIA IS IN THE MIDST of its third year of drought. Some 90% of the barley has been lost due to crop failure, the wheat harvest is down by over 50%, and ground water reserves are running low.
In the face of such a crisis, Syria has had to resort to the international wheat market for the first time in 15 years, no longer self-sufficient or able to export from what was, since antiquity, one of the region’s bread baskets.
This hydrological crisis couldn’t have come at a worst time for Syria, with the country attempting to implement widespread economic reforms and reduce subsidies while food, energy and living costs continue to spiral upwards. Furthermore, the international price of wheat has risen 83% over the past year, putting strain on Syria’s budget deficit and wheat reserves.
Such hard realities couldn’t be further from the rosy picture presented by the media and investors in the wake of Syria’s economic reforms, who cite surging investments, the financial sector’s exponential growth, a stock market in the offing, and rising tourism figures.
“People are bullish on Syria, but there are problems we are facing,” said Dr Nabil Sukkar, managing director of the Syrian Consulting Bureau for Development and Investment. “Agriculture is not fashionable, people instead talk of industry and ICT, but it should be given the priority it deserves in Syria,” he added.
The scale of Syria’s hydrological woes is forcing the government to rethink its agricultural policies as wheat and barley reserves dwindle. Last year, Syria produced 4.1 million tons of wheat, more than enough to meet demand for the 4 million tons consumed domestically. But the government estimates this year the harvest could be as low as 2 million tons, a drop of over 50%, if not lower. Barley, which accounts for 10% of Syria’s grain production, has declined 90%, having an immediate knock-on effect on the livestock sector, which used 60% of all barley as animal feed. Many small-scale farms have been forced to close as a result.
The decline in production is attributed to low rainfall, the land freezing over at the beginning of the year, and the over-usage of groundwater resources.
“Everywhere received only 50% of rain, and in agricultural areas this is a major problem,” said Dr Abdullah Droubi, Director of Water Resources at the Arab League’s Arab Center for the Studies of Arid Zones and Dry Lands (ACSAD) in Damascus. Other areas received only 15-30% of normal precipitation levels, with the exception of the coastal regions, resulting in an average of 2 inches or less between September 2007 and April 2008, according to the United States Department of Agriculture’s Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS).
The water shortage is most severe in the northern governorates of Al Raqqah, Al Hasakah and Aleppo, which account for 75% of the country’s wheat production. The problem is further compounded by Syria obtaining an estimated 85% of its renewable water from the Euphrates, Tigris and Orontes rivers, but with poor rainfall in neighboring Turkey, where the rivers originate, Syria is struggling to meet its water needs.
“They are trying to irrigate some places with supplementary water and from ground water, but as ground water is not recharged, it is a closed cycle - no precipitation means groundwater will decrease,” said Droubi. Utilizing ground water also means less water flows into lakes and rivers, as well as increasing the salinity of ground water reserves.
Pollution, inefficient usage of water and above all a surging population, growing at 2.11% a year, is putting further strain on resources. Additionally, demand for domestic potable water is growing at 4.5% a year and consumption is expected to increase by 40% a year over the next 15 years, according to research by Makram Shakhshir at the University of Damascus.
The problem is particularly acute in urban areas such as Damascus, home to six million people, a third of the country’s population.
The growth of Damascus has impacted directly on the city’s water table as the capital expanded from 1,900 hectares in 1945 to 8,500 today. The nearby Ghuta Oasis, a prime source of water and arable land, has also shrunk, from 25,000 hectares to 10,000 hectares, and continues to lose some 200 hectares per annum as the city expands outwards.
The Barada water basin, located under Greater Damascus, has also retreated in the past 20 years, from 50 meters below ground to 200 meters. Some experts suggest this could this could drop to 400 meters in the next 20 years, exacerbated by some 87% of the 25,000 wells around Damascus being illegal, according to Francesca de Chatel, author of Water Sheikhs and Dam Builders. Furthermore, with Damascus’ ground water table shrinking, sewage is reportedly seeping in and contaminating the water below.
With greater demand and a rising population, Syria’s water problems are only likely to get worse, said Droubi. “Drought is a very big issue in the region and related to climate change, but no one knows to what extent. As for the future, the region will suffer from more drought and lowering precipitation - a 20% reduction in 50 years is one scenario,” he said.


Walking a fine line

To offset the crop reduction, Syria received 190,000 tons of wheat in aid from Abu Dhabi, and canceled a deal with Egypt to exchange 176,000 tons of wheat for rice. The government is also dipping into its estimated 4 to 5 million tons of wheat reserves to keep bread affordable as other food prices have risen by an average of 20% in the last six months, according to the World Food Programme.
“Rice went from 20 SYP ($0.40) to 120 SYP ($2.25) a kilo; olive oil has also risen in price, which we have for breakfast, lunch and dinner. People are hurting,” said Yassir Hamod, a storeowner in Damascus.
To counter rising prices, the government raised public salaries by 25% earlier this year, but with accommodation and energy costs also surging, it may be only a matter of time before people take to the streets to protest, as has occurred in 30 countries around the world over rising food costs.
“We have not seen real repercussions from the rise in prices,” said a political analyst with close ties to the Syrian government. “Maybe in February or March 2009 when people feel the repercussions of winter fuel costs coupled with food expenses, here is a test, so we may witness some disturbances but the crisis is not yet mature.”
Nevertheless, with so many issues converging at once, Syria is struggling to find the right balance between keeping the populace placated through cheap food and fuel - spending an estimated 15% of GDP on fuel subsidies alone - and implementing reforms that will phase out subsidies that have been a mainstay of the Baathist socialist system. Finance Minister Muhammad al-Hussein was quoted in April as saying removing bread subsidies is a “red line,” particularly as consumption of bread has increased as other staples have risen in price. But with the wheat crop half the level of domestic demand, Syria could use up much of its wheat reserves this year alone, forcing the country to buy on the international market, where prices have risen 83% over the past year. Such an outcome would have an immediate impact on Syria’s budget deficit, which was 10% of GDP last year. Furthermore, with Syria now a net importer of oil but with demand for oil rising as well as for electricity, up 5% in the first half of 2008, the budget deficit is expected to soar this year.
“It is a mounting crisis and measures are minimal compared to the extent of the crisis,” the analyst said. “The government doesn’t have a clear view on how to manipulate price rises and salaries, it is still very ad hoc and experimental. The government will support employees, but leave to the rule of the market the others,” he added.

Agricultural solutions

It is in agriculture that the biggest changes need to be made however, the biggest net user of water with some 45% of the sector irrigated, a figure hydrologists consider an inefficient usage of water. And with the state the sole buyer of wheat, barely, sugar beet, millet and cotton, the onus is on the government to reform.
“The debate in Syria is what priority agriculture should take,” said the analyst. “In principle, what is needed is a revision of the state plan for agriculture regarding the distribution of crops and harvests.”
The government has already embarked on a scheme to reduce cotton production to solely cater for local needs, particularly as cotton is highly water-intensive as well as accounting for nearly 25% of the total global insecticide market, a further cause of land and water degradation. However, Sukkar said agriculture is still operating along traditional lines as land reform has not been implemented.
“We are faced with constraints, such as land reform laws which put a ceiling on ownership and prevents mechanization of agriculture,” he said. “Law 10 of 1986 allowed joint public-private projects in agriculture, the government allocating 25% in land allocation and 75% private. It was meant to encourage commercial agriculture but it didn’t work, it was a failure,” Sukkar added.
In reforming other areas, such as reducing production of certain crops like tobacco and cotton, it will be a case of losing export dollars but at the same time helping to ensure water sources, said Droubi.
“I say that water policy should be more important than politics, as water decides economic development in the country, but this is lost in bureaucracy and the public sector is not at the right level,” Droubi said. “We need a technical revolution and support from developed countries, especially as the trouble in the region will impact on the Europe and the USA,” he added.
One solution put forward is for Syria to build desalinization plants. “It was discussed during the peace process and has good potential,” said the analyst. But with prices tags of $1.5 billion upwards for a facility, as well as the time needed for construction, the suggested solution for the short term is improved water usage, stopping leakages, and public awareness campaigns.
“One of the key issues is people are wasting water as there is not a culture of saving resources,” said Poul Gadegaard, Team Leader of the Syrian Enterprise Business Centre. “The government is more focused on petrol and diesel than water, but it should be the other way around. Water prices should rise as people need to learn to economize; I think this is a big, big problem.”


Hydropolitics

Syria’s water woes go beyond crops and potential social unrest to geopolitics. Hydropolitics is the proverbial 1000lb gorilla in the room that somehow gets overlooked amid the region’s ongoing political problems.
“Water should be a top priority now, we are not in the 1960s or ‘70s. We can see that the situation is dropping very fast, and there is no time to even think of a solution,” said Droubi. “Cooperation is needed on a regional level.”
Some progress has been made, with Syria, Turkey and Iraq earlier this year agreeing to establish an institute to find solutions to water and environmental issues between the three water-linked countries.
“Where political relations have had an impact on the water crisis is Turkey allowing more water through its dams to Syria,” said the analyst. But in rain starved southern Syria the issue is still a political one. The Israeli-occupied Golan Heights provide an estimated 30% of the Jewish state’s water, while the water basin connects to Syria, Western Jordan and Northern Israel. Access to the water of the Golan region will be pivotal in any peace discussions between Damascus and Israel, but Syria should not bank on gaining much water the analyst said, despite the Golan’s proximity to Damascus.
“Syria cannot expect big amounts of water to come from this area. I don’t think the Golan will add much political speaking – Syria should look for a solution elsewhere,” said the analyst.
Ultimately, unless a multi-pronged solution to Syria’s water woes is enacted – politically, socially and economically - the country could face rising socio-economic problems just as Syria is opening up to the world.

Graphs, charts and satellite images courtesy of the United States Department of Agriculture’s Foreign Agricultural Service. Photographs by Paul Cochrane.

Lebanon vs. Syria: The battle to be the region’s playground

Commentary – Executive magazine

Unlike the heady summer of 2006, this year’s season is hardly a memorable one. It was back to business as usual, and as the summer winds down and tourists pack their bags to head home, the tourism sectors of Lebanon and Syria are no doubt pleased there actually was a summer season.
That Lebanon needed a calm summer far more than Syria is a given, particularly following the July war and the ensuing 18-month political debacle. But Syria has also benefited from greater stability in Lebanon, especially when it comes to attracting tourists from the West, who have a tendency to lump the Levantine countries together and avoid the region if there is a crisis.
Both countries were therefore lucky that the May clashes and the resulting Doha Agreement happened when it did, giving ample time for tourists to plan a summer visit.
The big difference between Lebanon and Syria’s tourism sectors however is that Syria is beating Lebanon hands down when it comes to attracting tourists.
Earlier this year Syria made the sound decision to advertise in the Gulf - bar Saudi Arabia -and the county is resultantly chockablock with Khaliji (Gulf) tourists, reflected in the joke circulating around Damascus that if you want to get a taxi outside any of the major hotels you have to wear a white jellaba or otherwise you’ll never get a ride.
The other noticeable difference is that Syria is getting tour groups by the busload, sweating their way around Damascus’ old city and the country’s numerous historical sites. Indeed, sitting in the lounge area of a hamam after a rigorous scrub one sultry August afternoon, I was taken aback by a dozen South American tourists that swarmed in and started snapping away at everything in sight. My fellow hamam clientele also seemed a little bewildered, with a chap opposite me rolling his eyes. But as soon as all the ajnabi (foreign) tourists left, he then thrust a camera in the hands of a hamam attendant to take a photo of himself bedecked in towels, and then asked me to join him. Ahmed, as he introduced himself, was from Libya and marvelled at what Syria had to offer, regaling me with his trip around the country.
Lebanon on the other hand doesn’t seem to be doing much to attract tourists other than appealing to expatriate Lebanese to come home for the summer. True enough expat Lebanese spend a bundle when they are over here, as a trip any night of the week to Sky Bar and downtown shows, but Lebanese returnees with foreign passports aren’t exactly tourists, particularly as most stay with friends or family. And while Khalijis are back on the streets of Beirut, the tour groups are conspicuously absent. It is quite clear Lebanon needs to develop a tourism plan and start marketing the country globally.
After all, if tiny Dubai with just shopping malls and flashy hotels can attract 6.4 million tourists a year, then Lebanon can surely boost figures from an estimated 1.5 million, especially if a modicum of stability prevails.
Lebanon has much to offer, and has a clear advantage over Syria when it comes to quality accommodation, restaurants and services. That isn’t to say that Syria doesn’t have the latter, but the country is desperately short of hotel rooms, reflected in a supply gap of 2 million nights per year in the four to five-star range.
But while Lebanon has few plans to boost tourism numbers, Syria aims to turn the country into a prime tourism destination, with 377 investment projects underway worth some $3.3 billion and international chains clamoring to get in. Damascus has also offered three huge locations for tourism development that are expected to attract up to $15 billion in investment.
How successful Syria’s tourism developments have been so far is reflected in the stats, with tourism numbers surging from 2 million in 2004 to some 4.6 million last year, spending $2.8 billion and accounting for 14.5% of the country’s GDP. Of the tourist numbers, 73% were Arabs, a figure that has increased 15% since 2005, and some 500,000 were from Iran, predominantly coming on pilgrimage. As Faisal Najair, director of Damascus’ Tourism Department was quoted as saying: “We hope to make Syria a resort for all Arab and Gulf tourists.”
With such developments underway, Syria could soon surpass – if it hasn’t already – Lebanon as the preferred destination in the Levant for higher-end tourism and even tourism of the more dubious kind. According to reports, the number of super nightclubs in Damascus has soared in the last three years from 15 to 40.
It’s time Lebanon, for once, took a leaf from Syria’s book if it wants to remain the region’s playground, as well as give the economy a much need boost.

Drug Financing, Money Laundering and Corruption Abound in Afghanistan

The Pakistani side of the climb up to the Khyber Pass.
Photo by James Molliso, Wikipedia Commons

Money Laundering Bulletin July/Aug 2008

After the US-led invasion in 2001 to overthrow the Taliban, Afghanistan took some important steps to curb money laundering and terrorist financing. The continued conflict, the profit that impoverished farmers can earn from poppy cultivation and entrenched corruption have, however, rendered these developments largely ineffectual, says Paul Cochrane.
In 2004, Afghanistan enacted anti-money laundering (AML) and counter terrorist financing (CTF) law, which also set the parameters for a Financial Investigation Unit (FIU). But instability, coupled with Afghanistan being the world’s top opium supplier, has stymied these measures. Corruption is wide spread, the government has minimal control over much of the country, and borders are porous despite attempts by NATO to better regulate entry points. In addition, there are concerns such as those aired by the International Crisis Group when it told the US House Foreign Affairs Committee last October that “Afghanistan is in danger of becoming a failed state, in part because it is in danger of becoming a narco-state.”
Following the installation of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan led by President Hamid Karzai, the state was reorganized under a new constitution, and by 2003 the Central Bank, Da Afghanistan Bank (DAB), was re-establishing relations with the international community. New licences were issued to commercial banks (currently 15 foreign and Afghan banks), and by late 2004 an AML and CTF legislative framework had been adopted designed to meet the recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF).
In 2006, Afghanistan became a member of the Asia Pacific Group (APG), and has observer status in the Eurasian Group. According to the APG Secretariat, the APG will carry out a country evaluation in late 2009. The Central Bank is also to establish a Financial Services Tribunal to review certain decisions and orders of the DAB.
The country’s AML law addresses criminalization of ML and TF, customer due diligence, international cooperation, extradition, and the freezing and confiscation of funds in addition to cross-border currency reporting. Transactions and cash transactions equal or exceeding 1,000,000 Afghani (US$19,890) have to be declared to the FIU, a semi-autonomous unit within DAB established in 2005, which has the legal authority to freeze assets for up to seven days.
According to the US State Department’s March 2008 International Narcotics Control Strategy (INCS) Report, the FIU receives approximately 10,000 large cash transaction reports from financial institutions each month, up from the 4,000 reports received and processed per month in 2006.
The FIU has over 140,000 large transaction reports currently stored in its database that can be searched using a number of criteria, while institutions have to keep records for at least 10 years.
AML examinations have been conducted at all commercial Afghan and foreign banks, up from half assessed last year.
There is reportedly growing awareness of AML requirements in banks, bolstered through DAB’s work with the recently created Afghan Bankers Association (ABA). The ABA has drawn up a “know your customer” (KYC) form that has been adopted by the sector and is providing seminars on identifying suspicious transactions. According to the INCS report, seven suspicious transaction reports were received in 2007 by the FIU, one of which was referred to law enforcement for investigation.
But despite such moves, commercial banks are confined to major cities, resulting in Afghanis relying on money dealers and the hawala system, an alternative remittance system (ARS) popular throughout Asia, Africa and the Middle East. There are over 300 hawaladars in Kabul, with some 100-300 additional dealers in each of the country’s 34 provinces. Hawaladars are supposed to be licensed by the DAB, and from September 2006, a new ARS regulation system was introduced to replace former regulations. The DAB has issued approximately 100 licences in Kabul, and this year embarked on a scheme to register hawaladars in other major cities.
But as the INCS report notes, “Given how widely used the hawala system is in Afghanistan, financial crimes undoubtedly occur through these entities.”
And therein lies the nub of the problem in curbing ML and TF in Afghanistan. Not just better regulating hawaladars, but enforcement of AML and CTF legislation in the face of corruption and the narcotics trade.
“The Afghan AML documents looks good, but it’s going to be really tough to make a dent on the endemic corruption and opium trade that permeates the economy in addition to border issues,” said John Solomon, a Central Asia specialist at World-Check, a British company that runs an intelligence database on financial risk.
According to the April 2008, UNODC Illicit Drug Trend Report, Afghanistan accounts for 93 percent of the global annual output of opium, utilizing 4 percent of the country’s farmland and involving 14 percent of the population. Warlords and the Taliban benefit directly and indirectly from the trade, said Solomon, issuing an usher tax on opium production of up to 20 percent, 15 percent on processing at laboratories, and 15 percent on transport. Furthermore, with such large amounts of money involved, there is suspicion that the opium trade is linked with the upper strata of the political establishment as well as law enforcement agencies.
“The Anti Narcotics chief, or police chief, gets an official salary of US$60 a month, and to land a job like that there are bidding wars reaching as high as US$100,000 for a six-month appointment, so clearly there must be bribes involved, and related to the opium trade,” said Solomon.
He added that there was anecdotal evidence that drug money is being laundered through purchasing real estate in Kabul, particularly in the upmarket and “surprisingly expensive” area of Sherpa.
But for more extensive ML related to opium, observers say the money and drugs flow out of the Central Asian countries to the North of Afghanistan, through neighbours Pakistan and Iran, and also via Dubai. Solomon added that there were reports that Ariana Afghan Airlines is being used to smuggle drugs and money.
To counter cross-border movements of people, weapons, money and cash, the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force in collaboration with the Afghan and Pakistan intelligence services embarked this year on the first of six joint intelligence centres to be built on either side of the Durand Line. But with borders of 3,435 miles, curbing illegal crossings will prove difficult.
“Most of the border is not policed or regulated in anyway, and there are loads of smuggling routes so this initiative will not solve the problem,” said Solomon.

Content Shift

Commentary – Executive magazine

A RECENT TRIP to London and Rome brought home how precarious the future of newspapers is in Europe, particularly in the capitals where commuters are inundated with free copies of tabloid newspapers.
Glancing around at fellow passengers on the London Underground, few were reading ‘normal’ newspapers while every other person was flicking through freebie Metro - which is to be found in most European capitals – or sister-paper London Lite.
Light these newspapers (if you can call them that) certainly are, all celebrity news orientated with a splash here and there of local news; it was as if Britain were in no way involved on the international stage, or in Iraq and Afghanistan.
The rise of these dailies have hit the national newspapers doubly hard, struggling as they are for advertising in the midst of an economic slowdown while trying to retain a readership in an era of immediate news. This has had a direct impact on the news the papers are producing, with newspapers jumping on the bandwagon of reduced hard news and foreign coverage in favor of the sensational and glamorous. All these factors thrown together have resulted in gloomy prospects for the industry.
Total sales of national newspapers in the UK are down 2% year on year, with broadsheets falling 3.4%, while the tabloid press has only dropped 1.2%. In the USA it is a similar story, with all newspapers reporting a drop in sales, bar a few exceptions, with total newspaper advertising, combining print and online revenues, falling 9.4% last year.
Less disheartening is the fact that there are still people around who want serious news, with The Financial Times’ circulation growing 2.1% while the Wall Street Journal’s circulation of 2.1 million copies has risen 0.4% over the past year.
Of concern however is that the increased commercialization and sensationalism of newspapers is leading to much larger papers, page wise, to give people supposed value for money – with some Sunday editions weighing in at nearly 2 kilos – but written by a near skeleton staff and almost devoid of original content. This has led to what Nick Davies, author of “Flat Earth News,” has called ‘churnalism’.
In a study Davies carried out with Cardiff University on the sources for articles in British newspapers over a two-week period, they found that 60% of stories in the more serious newspapers were wholly or mainly wire copy (i.e. Reuters, Associated Press or the UK’s Press Association) or from PR firms, 20% had clear elements of wire copy or PR, and 8% were from uncertain sources. That left only 12% of articles that were actually researched by journalists in person or over the phone - real journalism in other words.
But with Britain now having more PR people than journalists (47,800 vs. 45,000), it is perhaps no real surprise that PR is having an impact on a sector that is desperate for content while at the same time slashing their budgets for staff and expenses. Of further concern in our globalized world, and naturally for the Middle East, is that foreign coverage is on the decline. In 1970, for instance, CBS had three full-time correspondents in Rome alone, but by 2006, the entire US media, print and broadcast sector had only 141 foreign correspondents to cover the whole world.
While this is all bad news, particularly for newspaper journalists, it has meant that other media and entertainment outlets are picking up the slack.
For instance, a recent PricewaterhouseCoopers (PWC) survey of 15 global media markets, from online, TV, and newspaper advertising to theme park and cinema ticket sales, estimated that these markets were worth $1.6 trillion, and will be worth $2.2 trillion by 2012.
The ad battle between online publications and newspapers is where things will get the bloodiest though, with PWC predicting that by 2012, newspaper print ads will be worth $123 billion, only $3 billion more than online advertising, while newspaper ads and circulation is expected to rise from $186 billion last year to $208 billion. Notably, where newspaper circulation is dropping, in the US, UK and Europe, there is to be a rise in the emerging markets of China and India. So while new media will make inroads everywhere, old media may see an upturn in newer markets.
The question that plagues journalists and people that like to be kept well informed though is what kind of content these new publications will have as the battle between new and old media takes on epic proportions – heavy on quantity but not much quality appears to be the obvious conclusion.
Ultimately, what is likely to happen is that there will be an upswing in demand for specialized and niche publications catering to people’s specific business and personal interests, while general news becomes more marginalized, slotted in-between ‘churnalism’, saucy sex scandals and photo shoots of what celebs were wearing at some cocktail bash.

Lebanon 's Trade Unions

Published in DGB-Bildungswerk (Germany) - October 2006


THE LEBANESE TRADE UNION movement dates back to the 1920s during the French Mandate period, but it was not until 1958 that an organization collectively representing the country's workers and 18 trade unions was established, the Confédération Générale des Travailleurs au Liban (CGTL), or General Confederation of Lebanese Workers.
In the period that followed the creation of the CGTL urban centres mushroomed in size as the agricultural sector declined and the need for workers rose as Lebanon industrialized.
The late 1960s and 1970s were the movement's self-described 'golden era,' when there was a widespread call for change (reflecting global developments), frequent socio-political demonstrations, an expanding membership, and active Leftist and socialist movements.
With the advent of the civil war (1976-1990) the trade union (TU) movement was effectively paralyzed, labour conditions of secondary concern to the militias and the government. But despite the government's weakness in the war years, the state was able to increase membership to 22 TUs and the CGTL remained operational, representing the country's fractious confessional groups and political parties.
However, the TU movement never recovered its former role in society in the post-war years. With the country struggling to get back on its feet politically, socially and economically, and a laissez-faire government led by construction billionaire Rafik Hariri, the rights of workers were sidelined by the establishment to not hamper, in their opinion, the reconstruction process. Equally, Leftist political parties such as the Communist Party, which had had a strong political role prior to 1990, did not get a position in the post-war government, losing the workers' movement a much needed voice in parliament.
Along with being belittled by the government and industry, the TU's pre-war independence was usurped by the Syrian presence in Lebanon and came under pressure to become tools of political parties.
"Following the civil war the TUs became increasingly aligned with political parties as civil society gradually replaced the militias," said Ghassan Ghosn, President of the CGTL.
And with Syria interfering in Lebanese affairs, the Labour Ministry, which grants permission for an organization to be established, came under control of Damascus, according to Samir Farah, a Representative at the Friedrich Ebert Stiffung (FES) institute in Beirut. The Syrians also encouraged federations that had no TU representatives to exert influence in the CGTL.
The dispute within the TU movement and the CGTL over the direction of the movement, its structure and membership composition, came to a head in 1997 when the Labour Ministry authorized seven new unions, related to the Amal and Baath parties, to enter the CGTL. The CGTL's president Elias Abu Rizk (1993-1997) refused to admit the new unions saying it was an illegal action and they had no right to participate in elections.
Two elections were eventually held, one under the auspices of Abu Rizk and the other by the Labour Ministry. Abu Rizk lacked government support resulting in Chuman Zoghby to be voted in as the new leader of the CGTL. Zoghby only stayed one year in office, his attempts to unify the movement under one leadership continuously thwarted by bickering and governmental interference.
Abu Rizk returned as president until 2000 when Aviation Trade Union leader Ghassan Ghosn took office, re-elected in 2005.
"Under Ghosn's tenure there are many unions related to parties and Syria, given authority by the Labour Ministry and members of CGTL," said George Hajj, head of the Banking Federation.
Over 50 federations are now affiliated to the CGTL, according to Farah, along with 43 TUs.
The organization of the CGTL reflects Lebanon's constitution, divided along sectarian lines with the president Christian and the board dived 50:50 Christian-Muslim.
In the 1970s the CGTL had 200,000 members, but now has between 50,000 to 70,000 according to Ghosn. Hajj believes TU membership is around 10 percent of Lebanon's 750,000 workers but the Friedrich Ebert Stiffung institute thinks TU's are around six to seven percent of the working force. Walid Hamdan, Senior Workers' Specialist at the International Labour Organization (ILO) in Beirut, thinks these figures are exaggerated, considering 3 percent a more realistic figure.
"In Lebanon the whole TU movement is hibernating. This goes back to a structural problem, the desperate political situation, interference by government and parties, lack of freedom, and allegiance rather than alliance," said Hamdan.
Hamdan said that even though there are 600 unions, syndicates and federations in the country, "whenever you call for action, they are not able to muster more than 100 to 150 people. If they succeed its because political parties can really mobilize."
Not all political parties are involved in the workers movement. The pro-big business party Mustaqbal (Future), which has the premiership, is against the TUs, said Ghosn.
Lebanon's political system reflects the struggle underway throughout much of the world between neo-liberal elements and more populist movements, with the political parties opposing the likes of the Future party drawing their political base from the working population.
In Lebanon the split became more pronounced after the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri early last year. Following demonstrations on March 14, 2005 that resulted in the withdrawal of Syria from Lebanon, the pro-West, pro-big business "March 14 movement", which dominates much of the government, manifested in opposition to the March 8 movement, consisting of the Shia Muslim parties Amal and Hizbullah, and the secular Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) led by former Lebanese Army General Michel Aoun.
Ghosn said the CGTL is more aligned with the March 8 movement as their support base derives from workers. However, to critics the CGTL has become too aligned with parties that have their own political interests in mind.
"Trade unions are declining and don't exist anymore. They represent political parties in order not to collapse," said Farah.
"Movements can be used for political ends, not the interests of workers," said Hamdan. "Hizbullah is new to the TU movement but can mobilize the streets. In the future they could control more, and the FPM is also mobilizing," he added.
The CGTL's role, said Ghosn, is to apply ILO conventions and improve working conditions and social benefits. "In Lebanon this is difficult to fight for, especially when the economy is weak and with huge government debts," said Ghosn.
The CGTL's weakness is evident in what the organization has not been able to achieve in the past decade, said Hajj.
"From 1996 until now no adjustment on salaries, unemployment is up, the National Social Security Fund is in deficit, and the CGTL not doing anything, only trying to have a role in the political conflict in coordination with Hizbullah, Amal and the Baath," added Hajj.
The CGTL however has refused government reforms that wanted to raise taxes and minimize social security and education spending. The CGTL also opposes IMF and WTO stipulations that advise the government to minimize the government's role as a social provider ( Lebanon is awaiting WTO membership).
But the movement's attempts to counter the government's drive to implement neo-liberal economic reforms that would be detrimental to workers and demand better working conditions have been repeatedly thwarted by the state.
On 27 May 2004 a general strike was organized by the General Labour Confederation to protest hikes in fuel prices and the lack of social services alongside a demonstration by taxi and bus driver organizations held in Hay-e-Seloum, a poor area of Beirut's Southern Suburbs. The demonstration became violent and was put down by the Lebanese Army, killing five civilians and wounding dozens.
In May 2006 a small demonstration by state sector employees took place to oppose economic reforms the March 14 government wanted to implement. Although the opposition to the reforms were successful, largely due to Hizbullah's support, the TUs did not participate as state employees are not allowed to organize into TUs. If Lebanon had signed the 1987 ILO convention, this would have been allowed, according to Farah.
"Lebanon has not signed the conventions of the ILO in order for the government to keep control of the movement. It should have been signed decades ago, but seems now the TUs are now working to force the parliament to sign it," said Farah.
Lebanon's labour law, implemented in 1946 and briefly revised in 1975, is also outdated, say critics, with the Labour Ministry no plans to implement any changes.
"The labour law is outdated and not applicable to the current situation," said Hajj.
Ghosn claims the Labour Ministry "has no influence over TUs, but they have the labour law" and either cooperate or hinder the CGTL.
In the past several months the TU movement has taken yet another blow. Following the 34-day war between Israel and Hizbullah and a two-month sea and air blockade this summer, Lebanon's economy is in bad shape.
Critics say the CGTL did not mobilize during the war and are not doing enough to alleviate the aftermath of the war for Lebanon's workers.
"The CGTL has no role in the socio-political situation. Their only role during the war was calling for support for the resistance (Hizbullah)," said Hajj.
But the CGTL said their arms are tied by the socio-political situation.
"The Israeli war on Lebanon made things a lot more difficult. The priority is politics, people are talking less about the economic crisis," said Ghosn. "Employers are taking advantage of the war to diminish debts by laying off workers, we have less room for movement or negotiation, and a big burden in terms of unemployment."
Adding to complications is the government's inability to financially aid businesses or social services due to the country's inordinately high debt, equivalent to 180 percent of Lebanon's GDP.
Nonetheless, no demonstrations have been organized to address socio-economic concerns in the post war period, only political rallies. "The last demonstration (on September 22) was to celebrate Hizbullah's victory, not socio-economic issues," said Farah.
As for the future of the TU movement, observers are pessimistic. The FES and the ILO have made several attempts to create grass roots movements, made appeals to the government that have often resulted in rebukes, and urge a re-structuring of the movement.
FES suggests cutting the number of organizations the CGTL represents down to 18 organizations to better represent different sectors to be "more democratic and independent from the political parties." The CGTL also wants restructuring to take place.
But to Hamdan there will only be a solution if there is a stable political system and TUs are independent of political parties.
"To be realistic, I personally don't see a way out of this movement, because TUs are a phantom for different groups that want TUs under their control," said Hamdan. "There is no national consensus to lift their hands from the TU movement to restructure and have a free, independent representative movement. As long as the political situation is the same, there is no way out."

Days of Empire - Mansouriya Palace, Aleppo

Aishti magazine June/July

In the bygone era of the grand tour, when early 20th-century Europeans traveled luxuriously around the Mediterranean region marvelling at its wonders, there was one hotel in Aleppo where the discerning tourist would surely stay: Le Baron. One hundred years on Le Baron is scraping by on its faded glory while the well-heeled can now be found wandering down a narrow alleyway in the old city for a stay at the Mansouriya Palace.
Opened in 2002, after seven years of work overseen by two European interior designers, the Mansouriya has become the best boutique hotel in Syria, if not the region, gaining in popularity solely by word of mouth.
An unassuming door opens on the sun drenched courtyard of a 16th century house that has been painstakingly restored with the added addition of a pool, not big enough for laps, but deep enough for a refreshing dip.
Dotted around the courtyard are the hotel’s nine rooms, each themed to reflect Aleppo’s long, eventful history and catered to by some 20 staff.
Recent visitors have include the likes of Queen Sophia of Spain, who stayed in the Greco-Roman room, with its Roman-style fresco, wooden ceiling and bathroom naturally lit in purple hues from a domed cupola.

The Greco-Roman Room

In fact, each suite has a unique bathroom with a carved-in-place bathtub of solid marble. In the Bedouin room, decked out to resemble a tent with carpets and bamboo panelling, replica pillars from Palmyra hold up the fish-mouth faucet sinks. The bathroom of the Knight’s room, a play on the Crusader period with embroidered fleur-de-lils and other heraldry on the bedstead, is carved in stone in the style of a medieval chapel.

The Hittite Room

The Hittite suite's bathroom

The Hittite suite’s bathroom, in a converted basement, is watched over by two stone statues, while in the bedroom two large stone carved lions stand as sentinels near the foot of the bed.
The Mansouriya’s other suites, all decorated in keeping with their respective historical period, are the Ottoman, Iznik, Byzantine, Vizier, and the Favorite, as in the favorite concubine of the Vizier.
As if the private bathroom facilities were not ample enough, the hotel has its own spa with a jacuzzi and Turkish hamam inlaid with Iznik tiles. Other facilities include a lounge and library decorated in the Ottoman-era style with painted walls and mother-of-pearl encrusted furniture, and a 24-person dining room featuring a menu of Oriental cuisine and fine wines.


Mansouriya Palace, Bab Qennesrin, Aleppo, Syria: +963 21 3632000
All photos by Paul Cochrane

Enjoy it while it lasts

Commentary - Executive magazine

Fifty years ago, airplane travel was a luxury only the wealthy could afford. Indeed, my father recalls trips to the Belfast airport when he was a lad in the late 1950s, not to meet relatives or friends flying in, but to watch the planes come and go; it was an enjoyable family day out.
For a generation such as mine, on a plane at just six months old, we want to spend as little time as possible in an airport. Watching the planes is a mere diversion between security checks and whiling away the time at the boarding gate. But with oil prices that are going anywhere but down, the age of the cheap flight could be over and flying may again be a privilege confined to the well heeled.
This is a shame as over the last 30 years hundreds of millions of people have been able to fly more affordably, see the world, and contribute to one of the world’s economic staples, tourism.
Some 231 million people worldwide rely on tourism revenues, and although the benefits of tourism can be debated, particularly on the environmental and social level, peoples’ livelihoods and billions of dollars are nonetheless at stake. Furthermore, billions of people have not been able to step on a plane yet alone experience the cultural, natural and manmade wonders of this world.
With oil prices rising 42% in six months, airlines are in trouble. Fuel now represents 40% of airlines expenses, with the average airline spending $299 per passenger round trip on fuel alone, compared to $70 in 2000 and $151 last year.
Of further concern to the sector is that, according to analysts, a 3% rise in the price of oil over a day is enough to write off a year’s profits. Airlines are consequently bumping up prices (27 times in the US last year), charging for baggage, and cutting schedules and destinations.
Such price spikes and associated inflationary pressures have had an immediate impact on international tourism, which was pegged at 898 million international tourist arrivals in 2007 by the UNWTO World Tourism Barometer. The latest International Air Transport Association’s (IATA) figures show that global traffic growth in March 2008 was down to below 4%.
The IATA, which represents 93% of the global airline industry, found the biggest falls in passenger traffic were for airlines in the Asia-Pacific, the Middle East and Africa. Growth in the Asia-Pacific dropped to 4.3%, the Middle East’s growth slowed from last year's 20.4% to 15.4%, while African traffic contracted 4.3%.
The downturn could not have come at a worse time for the industry, which has just managed to claw back into the black for the first time since 9-11, with profits of $5.6 billion in 2007.
This year’s figures prompted IATA director general Giovanni Bisignani to say at a conference in Istanbul that the industry had taken “a major turn for the worse,” predicting growth for 2007 at 3.9%, down from 7.4% last year, and estimating losses for the sector at $6.1 billion if oil remained at $135 a barrel.
“Astronomical oil prices are hitting hard and the buffer of an expanding economy has disappeared,” Bisignani said.
The surging cost of oil is indeed worrisome, and especially, one presumes, for investors behind the billions of dollars in tourism developments and new airports; in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries alone, tourism and airport developments are worth an estimated $272 billion and $43 billion respectively.
Without affordable tickets, people will fly less and those that do may have fewer tourist dollars to spare. Such prospects should force governments to take a hard look in the mirror about the long-term viability of such tourist and air transport related projects, as well as basing economic strategies around what can be an unpredictable money earner.
If oil keeps rising, what we’re likely to see instead is a return to national and regional tourism as the medium- to long-haul flight dependent tourists disappear from view. The Middle East, bolstered by Gulf money, will be able to support a large local tourist industry, and arguably be able to subsidise national carriers with cheap fuel. Indeed, Virgin Galactic announced last month they plan to open a spaceport in the UAE for flights to space. Then again, at $200,000 a ticket to do some space tourism, that really is a luxury.
But just as the lucky few in the very near future will be gazing down at the earth while everyone else has to watch space shuttles taking off, so might that majority have to resort to watching planes at the airport, reminiscing about the golden age of cheap air travel. For now, it’s an opportune time to fly as much as possible before you need a bank loan for an airfare that used to cost less than a month’s rent.

Thorny Issues in the Horn

Bab Al Mandab in the Horn of Africa

Commentary - Executive magazine

One word sums up the Horn of Africa’s regional importance: geostrategic. Over the last two months, several developments have highlighted how intricately linked the Middle East is, and wants to be, with the countries on the other side of the Red Sea. They are the usual three suspects: business, politics and the “war on terror,” plus a wildcard, piracy.
The big business news is that Osama bin Laden’s brother, Tawfik, wants to build a $22 billion Africa-Arab bridge to link Djibouti with Yemen. The 28.5-kilometer project would span the narrowest point across the Red Sea, at the Bab al Mandab, the Gate of Tears - an appropriate name, especially given the situation in the vicinity and all the piracy off the Somali coast.
Indeed, piracy has dramatically increased since the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) was toppled by the US-backed Ethiopian invasion of Somalia in December 2006. Last year there were 31 attacks, and so far this year 23 attacks by Somali pirates on sea going vessels, including the 47-day hijacking of a Russia bound icebreaker, the Svitzer Korsakov. A $1.6 million ransom was allegedly paid out.
Bin Laden’s Bridge, as it could be dubbed, will potentially bring more stability to the region and its sea routes – after all, an estimated 3.3 million barrels of oil are shipped through the Bab al Mandab everyday. The bridge certainly intends to boost traffic between the two continents, and act as an entry point for pilgrims en route to Mecca. But the ongoing situation in Somalia presents concern for any parties involved in the troubled Horn, including Qatar.
This is the big international politics story: Ethiopia breaking diplomatic ties with Qatar over the Emirate’s alleged funding of the al-Shebab movement in Somalia, the military wing of the ICU and a recent addition to the US State Department’s list of terrorist organizations.
Doha-based Al Jazeera’s sympathetic coverage of the anti-Ethiopian rebel group, the Ogaden Liberation Front (ONLF), also rankled Addis Ababa, especially given Qatar’s diplomatic ties with Ethiopia’s other nemesis and ONLF supporter, Eritrea.
A week after the diplomatic spat – Doha denies any involvement with Al-Shebab – a US air strike killed the top leader of the movement, Aden Hashi Ayro.
Whether Qatar has involvement with these groups or not, Doha is not the only Middle Eastern player in the mix, with a UN arms embargo monitoring group reporting in late 2006 that Egypt, Iran, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Yemen and Lebanon’s Hizbullah were all supporting warring factions in Somalia. The US meanwhile has a military base in Djibouti, 100 military advisors in Ethiopia, recently donated $97 million to Ethiopia in recognition of its “strategic importance,” and Special Forces are reportedly operating within Somalia.
So this melee includes countries both on the side of the US-led “war on terror,” seemingly on the US’ side, and those that are completely against it. Somalia is Africa’s equivalent of Lebanon.
The irony of all this is that the activities of the US and its allies in the region have made the situation worse than before the ICU was overthrown. Ethiopia, for its own ends as well as Washington’s, has waged a brutal war on Somalia. Half the population of Mogadishu has fled, a humanitarian crisis is underway, and Amnesty International last month accused Ethiopian troops of widespread atrocities against Somalis, including slitting people's throats, gouging out eyes and gang-raping women. Somalia’s disintegration is also generating further support for Islamic movements.
Furthermore, Somalia’s return to warlord-run days under the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) is bad for regional business.
According to the Mombasa-based Seafarers' Assistance Programme, most of the Somali pirates are linked to the TFG, which has little control of the country and its territorial waters.
In the six-months the ICU were in power, piracy on the Somali high seas was reportedly down, but from 2007 the distance vessels were advised to keep away from the coast was increased from 50 nautical miles to 200. Although that is not even enough, with a Spanish luxury yacht hijacked in international waters in early April, the second European vessel to be overrun by pirates in a fortnight.
For such an important shipping route it would be to the advantage of most players involved, and certainly for the free flow of goods and energy, to better police the area around the Gate of Tears.
One solution is to put African Union troops on the ground in Somalia instead of the 8,000 Ethiopians currently there, as called for in UN Resolution 1725, and international monitoring off the coast to ward off illegal fishing as well as piracy.
Construction of Bin Laden’s Bridge will certainly need plenty of security, and a more stable Horn of Africa will help this other theater of the “war on terror” from becoming yet another disaster with far reaching geostrategic implications.
Photo of the Bab al Manbad courtesy NASA, Wikipedia Commons

High in Harar: On Khat

Nox magazine

In Karl Marx’s infamous words, religion is the opium of the people. In the self-proclaimed fourth holiest city of Islam, Harar in Eastern Ethiopia, the mild narcotic khat is as central to people’s everyday lives as the Qu’ran. It is the real drug of the people, with policemen, teachers, traders, bus drivers, beggars and the homeless all munching away from morning till night.
For just as a morning without a good dose of caffeine would bring on a bout of anxiety for much of the world’s populace, a day without khat in Harar would set the whole city on edge. As former soldier and now guide Tsegahur Admasu describes the locals: “All Harar people are people of the khat.”
Harar is a city truly in the grip of khat, with the local economy as dependent on the growing, packaging and transportation of theis psychotropic narcotic as people’s social life and psychological wellbeing is. Everywhere in Harar and its environs khat is in evidence, with people clutching bags of khat, women selling khat on the street, and men lolling on the pavements, on porches, under canopies and beneath trees slowly but deliberately picking off khat leaves to shove in their mouths.
Cheeks bulge with leaves as they grind it down, sucking on the juice that brings about the drug’s effect before the khat is swallowed. As people open their mouths, fragments of green leaf are in their teeth, the tongue is green, and green juice dribbles from the edges of the mouth. The smell of khat is everywhere too, from the bushels brought to market and the odour emanating from people, from breath (think a mix of zaatar (i) and mint), and even from calls of nature.
Khat is all consuming, with Hararis daily life scheduled around purchasing and consuming khat, which for your average Harari would be after breakfast, and for the more disciplined, or those that hold down semi-serious day jobs, mid-afternoon.
Clutching a fresh bag of khat, Hararis will head over to a friend’s house, a café, or a khat salon, where you can purchase directly from the patron, and start chewing away amid socialising and quaffing soft drinks. The session will end in the evening once the high wears off and introspection sets in. This happens every day of the year for Hararis and the 10 million others that chew khat in East Africa, Yemen and further afield, except during Ramadan when the narcotic is only consumed after iftar (ii).

Sampling a sprig of fresh khat in Awadday

Getting “Merkhana”

Within the first hour of chomping through several branches' worth of khat leaves, the khat starts to take hold, relaxing the user but also stimulating the mind. As people pick leaves off the stalks, approximately a centimetre under the stem, to be added to a personal pile and then rolled into a ball to insert in the right cheek, others are enjoying the effect of getting what the Ethiopians call in the Amharic language “merkhana” - high.
The user feels euphoric – not an ecstatic love-everyone feeling, or a damn-it-all-I-feel-great attitude common with other drugs – but a happiness and mental awareness that plunges people into relaying entertaining stories and embarking on animated discussions. Music becomes more engrossing, and worries slip away as the digestive system absorbs the khat.
As a mild psychotropic drug, the effects of khat chewing are similar to taking methamphetamine or cocoa (cocaine) leaves but much less intense, producing a high but also alleviating fatigue as well as appetite. So effective is khat in mental and physical stimulation that athletes use it, and students take up the habit.
“When students use khat they become geniuses, they can study hard,” says Admasu. Indeed, chewing khat one afternoon with a bunch of university students, all of them said they had started chewing at high school to help boost their concentration.
In essence that is what khat is, a stimulant. Khat was used to wake up the brain well before coffee was discovered in Ethiopia by an observant goat herder who noticed that after eating a particular berry his flock were a great deal more active than usual. Curiously, legend has it that Ethiopian goats also discovered khat, a food the wily animal still enjoys, roaming around the area’s main khat market town of Awedday, 10 kilometres from Harar, eating discarded khat leaves.
“You need khat to open your eyes in the morning,” as Ahmeddin Muktar put it, a burly, red-eyed khat exporter in Awedday.
And just as one cup of coffee opens just one eye for many people, requiring an encore or two to be wide awake, a good amount of khat needs to be chewed for the user to get stimulated, and certainly to get suitably “merkhana.”

Chewin' and sortin' at Awedday's khat market

The chemicals that bring on the high are primarily two controlled substances, cathinone and cathine. It is the cathinone that produces stimulatory effects, ten times more potent than cathine, and as a result listed by the USA's Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) as a Category I narcotic, the most restrictive category. Cathine on the other hand is less potent and listed as a Category IV narcotic.
As the cathinone is what provides the buzz, the user wants to get a bushel of khat as fresh as possible, for within 24 hours the leaves start to dry, converting the cathinone into the weaker cathine.
Because of such a short shelf life, khat has to be picked, packed and transported – needing some 15 workers from start to finish – fast. Really fast. The khat is picked in the first hours of sunlight, and once bound by a cord, or else pruned to stems, the khat bushels are bundled into white nylon sacks and then thrown in Isuzu flatbed trucks that tear off at speed to the nearby Dire Dawa airport for export to Kenya, Djibouti, Yemen, China, Israel and Britain. Some seven tonnes of khat are imported into Britain every week.
In the daily khat derby, the narcotic carrying truck can be spotted way before it careens into view, with dust kicked up from the compacted dirt roads and black fumes belching from the exhaust as other vehicles swerve out of the way and camel and goat herders give a wide berth to these wannabe Michael Schumachers. From Harar, if the khat trucks are not heading to the airport of the Ethiopian capital of Addis Ababa, they are already racing along the Jijiga road at 1030 in the morning to be on time for people’s afternoon fix in neighbouring Somalia, some 500 kilometres away.

Khat buying and selling in Harar

Cashing in on Khat

Like the drug trade elsewhere, a bundle of money can be made from dealing in khat, at least for the exporters. The major difference between a coke cartel in Colombia and a khat dealer in the Horn of Africa though is that khat is totally legal in Ethiopia and all the countries the narcotic is openly exported to. The Ethiopian government even lists khat among its top exports, at 10% of total exports in 2007, earning the country a much needed $26.6 million a year.
Registering 23.6% in export growth last year, growing khat is far more profitable than Ethiopia’s other stimulating export, coffee, which sells locally for $2.70 a kilo compared to khat at $4.10.

Bagging khat at the Awedday market

Harar fares well in the regional khat exporting stakes, being renowned for its quality due to the area’s high elevation at 2500-plus metres. As Admasu exclaims amid a mouthful of green mush: “The best khat in the world - no, the universe! - is from here!”
In neighbouring Djibouti the khat addled local bigwigs, which includes the president, are willing to shell out up to $100 for a kilo of large, juicy Harar khat leaves while in the US and Saudi Arabia, where khat is illegal, a kilo goes for $300.
Awadday khat exporter Muktar says that from two hectares of khat bushes you can net $20,000 in profit a year – not bad for a country where the average monthly salary is $35.
With 20% growth a year, Muktar says he is interested in new markets. “If you want to start exporting to wherever you are, let me know,” he adds, giving me his business card, a piece of cut cardboard with just his name printed at the bottom.
For the farmer, revenues are not as high, but growing khat comes with the added bonus of having an immediate personal source of narcotics.

Chilling with khat on the outskirts of Harar

Khat plantation outside Harar

At a farm outside of Harar, farmer Younis had toiled away on his land since daybreak and by 10am was lying inside a makeshift tent brewing coffee, listening to the radio and chomping away on fresh pickings brought to him by his wife. From two picking seasons a year, Younis can eke out a living from the Catha Edulis bushes. But as for most Hararis, home-grown produce is not enough for a year long habit, with people spending between thirty to fifty percent of their income on khat.
“I earn a dollar a day, from which I can buy some breakfast, spend 30 to 40 cents on khat, and have some money left for a bite later,” said Lagesse, a 20-year-old security guard in Harar.
This is a major downside of being a khat addict – as it is for most drug addicts, purchasing the daily fix. “If you have a few sprigs of khat today, you’ll want more tomorrow,” says Muktar, declining my offer of a few sprigs at 10am. “I only chew after lunch as I have to work in the morning,” he adds.
Khat addiction also means much of people’s money is not being spent elsewhere in the economy, and getting things done (unless he’s your overnight bus driver, whom you want to be chewing khat to stay alert) can be arduous with so much time given over to getting merkhana. But then with khat taken so openly in Harar, khat doesn’t get in the way of daily life, especially as business meetings and the like will probably take place over a bag of khat anyway.
Quality varies greatly, which is naturally reflected in the cost, ranging from 10 cents for a few sprigs to $6 for a bushel of thirty or forty branches bought at source. Ranging in length from 15 to 30 centimetres, quality can be told in the flexibility of the stems, and how soft and succulent the leaves are. White stemmed khat is particularly sought after, being considered an aphrodisiac.
For the hard up, drier khat can be bought and eaten with peanuts and sugar to mask the bitter taste, or else mashed up with a mortar and pestle to be eaten with a spoon – a technique popular with older men that have lost their inner chompers.

Mashing up khat on the streets of Harar

Khat-tastic

The additional benefits of taking khat are manifold, at least if you go by what khat users claim.
“When you compare a man that chews khat with a man who doesn’t, men that don’t chew get ill more often,” says Admasu. The fellow next to Admasu, stretched out on the floor and propped up by pillows, concurs. “My father has chewed for 70 years and he is still strong.”
The medical jury is still out on khat, although long term use can cause insomnia, anorexia, gastric disorders, depression and psychosis.
But when it comes to sex drive, khat is considered a potent aphrodisiac, acting not only as a stimulant on the mind but also the body. “You can perform well, but after a while, you’re down,” says Admasu’s friend, giving added emphasis with a hand gesture.
Indeed, a few years ago experiments run by King’s College London found that khat boosts the power of men’s sperm, making them fertile faster and for longer.
The most immediate side effect of khat is not a hard-on though, but insomnia. The narcotic is such a powerful stimulant that sleep is hard to come by, resulting in many khat chewers knocking back beers after the afternoon’s khat session is over. Alcohol serves two functions, picking people’s mood up after the merkhana has worn off, and secondly to bring about drowsiness for at least a few hours sleep.
As most of my fellow chewers were non-practicing Muslims, khat sessions would take up the better part of the day and then be concluded by a trip to a bar for a few bottles of the local brew, Harar Beer, or a St. George’s. Instead of encouragements of “chew, chew,” it would be “drink, drink to get to sleep.”
For the more pious Muslim however, with alcohol a no-go, drowsiness sets in conveniently after the first call to prayer. And herein lies the popularity of khat in the predominantly Muslim Red Sea region. With alcohol and other drugs banned, khat seems to have slipped through the blacklist, not considered by practitioners as in any way “haram” or “mamnou” (iii). In use for a thousand years, khat is viewed like coffee and cigarettes, legal stimulants and a social activity. But in the more hardcore Islamic countries khat is banned, although like a bottle of Scotch can be smuggled into say Saudi Arabia, so is khat.
As if to further snub its nose at more orthodox Islam, at one of Harar's 110 mosques – some as small as to hold only 10 people – men were sprawled out, at 9am, inside the mosque with bags of khat, cigarettes and bottles of soda.
At another institution of discipline and order, the local prison, khat was also being consumed.
“This is the only prison in Ethiopia where khat is sold; the guards use it the most,” points out Admasu. And in Ethiopia, no one is inside for dealing khat or getting “merkhana.”

Taking it easy: The guardian of a mosque on the outskirts of Harar

BOX: “Are you merkhana yet?”

In an area full of khat, it would be as strange to not have a chew as not knock back a few glasses of bubbly when visiting the Champagne region. Getting “merkhana”, high, on khat is certainly an experience, and one that requires preparation. A suitable lunch, preferably big on the liquids, is essential, as is plenty of liquid to wash down the khat, which is very bitter, particularly the first time.
In the khat market town of Awedday, a trader sought me out a good bushel of khat. “This is enough for you to get merkhana,” he said, thrusting a large bag of around 40 freshly cut sprigs of khat into my hands.
Reclining in the open-fronted hallway of a hotel in Harar later in the day, several of us chomped our way like ravenous goats through numerous bags of khat spread out amid cushions and carpets.
A quarter of the way through the bag rapid conversation ensued, ranging from why more tourists don’t visit Ethiopia to the dangers of globalization, to the arrest of Ethiopian pop singer Teddy Afro for homicide, and the state of the world’s media. A third of the way through I started to feel good, very good and at peace with the world. Noticing my increasingly upbeat mood, a fellow khat chewer asked: “Are you merkhana yet?” A nod resulted in smiles and another handful of picked khat leaves thrust in my direction: “chew, chew.”
It became glaringly evident how much of a stimulant khat is later that night when the introspection kicked in. What I took for reading for a short while was in fact three hours, and my brain was still buzzing at 3am. How addictive khat can be was clear the next day when I was feeling a bit grouchy, and by midday I could taste non-existent khat in my right cheek, a clear sign my body wanted to get merkhana again. And it did.

Chewing with Admasu, left, and Ali in a corridor at the Hotel Tewodoros

Clutching a bag of fresh khat at the Awadday market

Notes

i) Arabic: Zaatar is thyme.
ii) Iftar is the breaking of the fast at sunset.
iii) Arabic: Haram means "sin/sinful" and mamnou means "forbidden."

All photos by Paul Cochrane