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Barely
a week goes by without news of Sunni-Shia sectarian violence. Shia
are beheaded by Sunni extremists in Syria and the videos aired
online. Thousands continue to die in Iraq due to sectarian warfare in
the aftermath of the US occupation. Terms like the “Shia crescent”
are bandied about, while Sunni religious leaders call for a Jihad in
Syria. But is this Sunni-Shia sectarianism an ancient rivalry that
flares up now and again, as the mainstream narrative makes out? Or
are vested interests utilizing this apparent divide for geo-political
ends? Paul Cochrane reports from Beirut.
In
certain circles in the Washington beltway, policy makers and 'think
tankers' regular use the term “the Sushi war.” This does not
refer to disputes over tuna fish quotas in the Pacific Ocean or the
eponymous Japanese cuisine, but to the sectarian conflict within
Islam, between the Sunnis and the Shiites (or Shia). Such terminology
makes light of what is underway in countries with Sunni and Shia
populaces, of the mounting death toll, violence and animosity between
the two sects, especially in Iraq, Pakistan, Lebanon, Egypt and, more
recently, Syria.
But
this tongue-in-cheek reference belies a seriousness by trying to make
light of what is underway, as if the US does not have a hand in
stoking the fires of the so-called “sushi war.” Furthermore,
global powers and the establishment like mnemonics and abbreviations,
even if not appropriate, like “Af-Pak” for the
Afghanistan-Pakistan region - to call a Pakistani a “Paki” is
considered a racist slur, as former US President George W. Bush found
out when he made a related verbal faux pas in 2002 that soured
bilateral tensions.
The
US as the world's hegemonic power is involved in sectarianism at the
macro level, the regional level and the local level for its own
geopolitical ends. Yet it is not acting alone. In the Middle East,
there are regional players and intermediaries, such as the pro-West
Gulf states like Saudi Arabia and Qatar that are pushing a Sunni
agenda, and on the opposite side, the nemesis of the US and the Gulf
monarchies, Shia Iran. Then there are the local actors: the sheikhs
in the pay of regional powers, media outlets that stoke tensions
between sects, and militant groups that carry out attacks.
“Someone
is playing with this religion left, right and centre.
Sheikhs are on the payroll, like back in the 1960s when they wrote
anti-communist speeches until they came out of their turbans,” said
Mohammad, an Arab veteran of the Mujahideen against the Soviets in
Afghanistan in the 1980s that wanted to remain anonymous. “This
sectarianism crosses all the boundaries of logic. It doesn't have any
roots for a valid conflict, except for being a divide to provoke
people against each other. Most Muslims are standing by and watching
what is happening, and wondering what to do with each other.”
But
before getting into the situation today, a bit of background history
first.
A
bit of history
Factionalism
in Islam started in the wake of the death of the Prophet Muhammed in
632 AD, over who was to succeed as the caliph, the leader of this new
and ascendant monotheistic religion. The first four caliphs were all
companions of the prophet: Abu Bakr, Umar ibn Al Kattab, Uthman ibn
Affan and Ali ibn Abi Talib. The majority of Muslims – Sunnis at
around 90 percent of the 1.6 billion Muslims worldwide today –
consider that the prophet did not designate a successor, but
partisans (Shia) of Ali, believe that he was denied his rightful
succession as a member of the prophet's family, being the cousin of
Muhammed and his son-in-law, having married Fatima. Factionalism came
to a head in 680 AD when the son of Ali, Hussain, lead a rebellion in
what is now Iraq against the Ummayad caliph Yazid, which was crushed
with Hussain's “martyrdom” in Karbala. This event is commemorated
every year – Ashoura – and is a central historical narrative in
Shia Islam, that of the suffering and martyrdom of Hussain in
pursuing the rightful rule of the Prophet's family. Indeed, you
rarely find any Shiites named after the first three caliphs.
The
rift led to theological differences, the primary one that for the
Shia religious leadership is vested in an Imam (leader) that is a
descendant of Ali and Hussain. To the Sunnis, religious authority for
interpreting Islam is based on the collective judgment of the
community – the ulama, traditional religious scholars - and not
through the divinely inspired Imam.
While
there is clear historical continuity over the past 1,400 years in
theological differences, it is hard to find any parallels to the
sectarianism of today. “The Sunnism or Shi'ism of one age is quite
different from that of another. So we must avoid essentialism,”
said Professor Tarif Khalidi, Sheikh Zayed Chair in Islamic and
Arabic Studies at the American University of Beirut, and the
translator of the Penguin edition of the Qur'an into English. “In
origin my theory is that Sunnism was associated with groups who felt
that the unity of the community was the highest ethical-political
value while Shi`ism believed that the integrity of the ruler was the
best guarantee of good government. There are echoes of these two
foundational beliefs in today's Sunnism and Shi`ism but they're only
echoes.”
While
this is a brief summary – as there are many offshoots of Shia Islam
as well as theological schools within Sunni Islam – differences
within Islam cannot be simplistically compared to that of
Christianity, and the rivalry between the Catholic and Protestant
churches during the Reformation (which happened in Europe some 1,500
years after the death of Jesus Christ) and ensuing conflicts, such as
the 30 Years War. As Khalidi noted: “When approaching this subject
we need to rid ourselves of parallels with Protestant/Catholic
conflicts in Europe.”
Mainstream
accounts that the Sunni-Shia divide has raged since the time of the
Prophet Muhammad are also spurious, and labels attached to points in
history that were distinctly Shia or Sunni were imposed on the region
by Western scholars.
“Though
tensions between them were frequent, historically there was more bark
than bite, more polemic than pitched battle in their actual
relations. There were basically three periods when tensions were
high: the 10th century, often called the "Shi`ite interregnum"
by Western though not by Muslims historians. This was a century where
you had three major Shi`ite centers of power: Fatimid Egypt, Hamdanid
Syria and Buyid Iraq and Western Iran. You then have the 11-12
centuries, again called by Western historians the "Sunnite
revival" when Turkic Sunnite dynasties (Seljuqs, Zengids,
Ayyubids, Mamluks) spread their power over Egypt and Greater Syria.
Finally you have the great wars between Shia Safavid Iran versus
Sunnite Ottoman power in the 16-17th centuries,” said Khalidi. “In
none of these conflicts was the Sunni-Shia divide the decisive
factor. Rather it was a geo-political struggle over resources but
none of these conflicts involved massive ethnic cleansing or genocide
of one party by the other. In the present context of Shia-Sunni
tensions, we need to go beyond surface rhetoric and ask what are the
real strategic issues involved.”
A
Year of Seismic Change
Fast
forward to the 20th century, and the geopolitical issues at play were
securing access to the hydrocarbons and economic markets of the
oil-rich Middle East, the Gulf in particular, which were under
British tutelage before the US took over the mantle as the global
superpower. To understand what is happening in the 21st century, we
need to go back some 30 years to 1979.
It
was a year of seismic change in the Middle East. The Shah of Iran was
overthrown in major demonstrations, leading to the formation of the
Islamic Republic of Iran and the start of tensions between the US and
Tehran that rage to this day. Yet the US did not label Iran an enemy
because it was Shia, but because it was revolutionary and
Muslim. The worry was that in losing a pliable ally like the Shah and
access to Iran's hydrocarbon wealth, other Muslim majority countries
in the Middle East could do the same, and reject US power by going it
alone. This sent shivers down the spines of elites in Washington, but
also the ruling families in the monarchical Gulf states, which are
all Sunni and use religion to legitimise
their power base, particularly Saudi Arabia. Notably, Kuwait and
Saudi Arabia have Shia minorities, while Bahrain is majority Shia.
“The
real issue is ideological warfare and has three different angles.
One, Iranian-Arab divisions, and the second is conservative Arab
states, mostly monarchies, versus secular nationalists like Iraq and
Syria. Thirdly, it is about Islamists and monarchies, who are arguing
and fighting for two different forms of sovereignty: one from God,
and one from the monarchy, and they try and link (their legitimacy)
to God,” said Rami Khouri, Director of the Issam Fares Institute
for Public Policy and International Affairs in Beirut.
In
late November 1979, some of the Gulf monarchies' fears started to be
realized when the Great Mosque of Mecca in Saudi Arabia was seized by
hard-line Islamist gunmen bent on overthrowing the Saudi monarchy and
introducing a new redeemer – the mahdi – on the day
marking 1,400 years of Islam. The siege shook Saudi Arabia's
foundations for two weeks, challenged the kingdom's position as the
guardian of the two holy cities of Islam, triggered a Shiite uprising
in the east of the country, and unleashed forces that led to the rise
of Al Qaeda. Then, less than a month after the Saudis' disastrous
handling of the siege, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan on
December 24. This created the spark for a Machiavellian strategy hit
upon by the US and Saudi Arabia for the kingdom to export its “bad
boys” – the hard-line Sunni Islamists – to take on the Soviets
with the Afghan Mujahideen. And we all know where that led – the
rise of Sunni Islamic extremism in central Asia and the Middle East,
with those returning from Jihad in Afghanistan challenging the
regional order and, more recently, reflected in the so-called “Arab
Spring,” which some regard as having played into the hands of
Islamists, and can be called an “Islamic spring.” But on the
other side of the apparent Sunni-Shia divide, Iran in the wake of the
Arab uprisings called for an “Islamic awakening” but, note, not a
Shia Islamic awakening.
“It
was a crucial year, 1979, for Muslims. On the Shia front was Iran's
Ayatollah Khomeini, and on the Sunni side Abdullah Azzam, a
Jersulamite that went to Lebanon and then to Afghanistan, where he
decided the fight against the Soviets was a true Jihad, and that the
liberation of Jerusalem (from the Israelis went) through
Afghanistan,” said Mohammad. “Then the Sunni world embarked on a
project to recruit people in mosques to fight in Afghanistan, on the
periphery of the Muslim world. The Shia were also awoken, and given
the centre in the Iran-Iraq war and the Lebanese civil war. Later,
the two were brought together to meet in the Iraqi arena after the US
invasion. But for some reason the world's intelligentsia has not
given this any value.”
One
reason the mainstream narrative does not focus on these issues is
that they present uncomfortable truths. That to ensure oil and
capital flowed from the Gulf countries to the West, Britain and the
US were willing to work with authoritarian Islamic states like Saudi
Arabia, which has spent over $50 billion over the past half century
promoting its version of conservative Islam around the world,
according to Mark Curtis, author of “Secret Affairs: Britain's
Collusion with Radical Islam.”
Equally,
Britain and the US worked with radical Islamist groups when it suited
them, such as during the Cold War to counter communism, pan-Arabism
and nationalist sentiments in the Middle East, as Curtis shows in
his book. Furthermore, the West's political-economic alignment with
Sunni monarchies, and that collusion with radical Islamists were
primarily Sunni, gives rise to the idea that the West is more
pro-Sunni than pro-Shia despite the prevalence of Islamophobia in the
West today.
“This
is the thing about political Islam, especially Sunni political Islam,
that they are more than happy to take weapons, financial support and
logistical support from the US when it serves their ends, and when
they want to go to the next step, they have no ethical ties to that
alliance and dump the US,” said Stephen Sheehi, Associate Professor
of Arabic and Arab Culture at the University of South Carolina, and
author of “Islamophobia:
The Ideological Campaign Against Muslims.”
As
for the Iran-Iraq war, the first Gulf War, that raged between
1980-88, claimed over 1 million lives and caused economic losses of
over $500 billion, it was actively pushed by the US, Israel and the
Gulf states – the latter and the US being major financiers of
Saddam Hussein's regime – to counter the fledgling Islamic Republic
and thwart Iran from spreading its revolutionary Islamic message,
while at the same time weakening two of the most potentially powerful
states in the Middle East.
The
war, like the West and the Gulf backing the Mujahideen in
Afghanistan, was to have long-term ramifications. One in positioning
Iran as a major threat, reflected in ongoing concerns about Tehran's
alleged nuclear weapons programme, which has been warned about as far
back as 1984, and its support for “terrorist organizations” such
as the Shiite militia Hizbullah in Lebanon, which was established in
the early 1980s with Iranian assistance in response to the Israeli
invasion of Lebanon in 1982. Secondly, the First Gulf War laid the
groundwork for the eventual overthrow of Saddam Hussein when the US
invaded Iraq in 2003. And it was the invasion of Iraq that in many
ways sparked the violent sectarianism afoot today.
“People
never talked of such sectarianism before. In the 1960s, never did I
use the word Shiite,” said Khouri. “The reason why there is not a
real region wide Sunni-Shia war is because such sectarianism never
surfaced until seven to eight years ago, until after the Iraq
invasion.”
Opening
Pandora's Box
Iraq
was nominally secular under the ruling Baath party, but after the
invasion the US drew up a new constitution based along sectarian
lines, dividing the country up between the Shia in the south, the
Sunnis in the centre, and the Kurds in the autonomous north, while at
the same time the US funded a Shia police commando force that fuelled
a sectarian war in the country that at its height was causing 3,000
deaths a month. On the other side, Sunni fighters flowed into Iraq to
fight the Americans, with Saudi Arabia adopting a similar tactic as
during the 1980s in Afghanistan: allowing Islamist fighters to go to
Iraq instead of causing problems at home.
“It
was a situation that was partly instigated by the deliberate spread
of activities by Al Qaeda and the like in Iraq by targeting Shiites.
The other part of it was revenge by the Shia after the overthrow of
Saddam Hussein, as he was so brutal against his people, and this
created fears among Sunnis and exacerbated the divide,” said
Khouri.
Further
fuel was poured on the fire a year after the invasion when Jordan's
pro-Western King Abdullah made a controversial speech warning of a
"Shia crescent" that went from Damascus to Tehran via
Baghdad. Yet ironically, the government in Baghdad is close to the US
but also to Tehran, and in many ways, the invasion of Iraq played
into the Iranian's hands. As Khouri noted, “the talk of a Shiite
crescent is not about being worried about Shiites but about Iran.
They (the Gulf states) can't talk of a Shiite crescent when they have
Shia populaces of their own.”
This
fear of Iran has led Middle East states, primarily in the Gulf, to
buy $92 billion of arms from the US between 2008-2011. But it is not
just arms-for-oil at the crux of US-Gulf relations. The Gulf
countries are major players on the ground in “the Sushi war,”
such as backing Islamic rebels
during the Libyan conflict and currently in Syria – Qatar has
provided an estimated $3 billion to the rebels according to the
Financial Times.
“The Gulf countries have their own internal rivalries, but are
smart enough to put rivalries aside and channel common interests in
managing the “Arab Spring” and the “Arab Street.” The Gulf
countries are critical in negotiating between the top global layer,
the US, and the local layer. They are the intermediary,” said
Sheehi.
As for the conflict in Syria, it is now being increasingly portrayed
as a sectarian war, with Sunni Islamic rebels fighting the regime of
President Bashar Assad, who is an Alawite, an offshoot sect of
Shiism. In June, the now ousted Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi said
the Assad regime was a “Shia oppressor of Sunnis,” while Egyptian
preachers Mohamed Hassan and Mohamed Abd al-Maqsud called for a Jihad
in Syria and Shiites to be banned from Egypt.
However, Syria is a nominally secular state, and pro-government
support within the country derives not only from Alawites, but also
Christians and Sunnis. Furthermore, there is little basis for the
argument that the Alawites are Shiite and therefore siding with Iran
for religious reasons. As is the case with the US stance on Iran, it
is not about Iran being Shiite, or Syria Alawite, that the two
countries – and their support for Hizbullah – is being portrayed
as part of the “Sushi war.” Instead it is that Iran, Syria and
Hizbullah form an “axis of resistance” against the US-led world
order. Indeed, Russia and China's support for Syria and Iran is not
because Syria's government is headed by an Alawite and Iran is Shia,
but about geopolitics.
“Power is an important rubric we often ignore, for “great powers”
to maintain their influence. So if you can break this
Iran-Hizbullah-Syria axis, it enhances your power, although it might
not necessarily on the ground,” said Sheehi.
Utilizing sectarianism to achieve that old adage of “divide and
rule” is therefore one of the US' and it allies tools to achieve
geopolitical ends, turning what was not a major issue – certainly
in terms of violence – between Sunnis and Shia into a deadly issue
in many mixed Muslim counties.
“Deep
down it is not a war to death, but there is now mass fear and
hysteria, so (a sectarian conflict) is not completely
fantasized,” said Khouri.
