Executive magazine - Special Report
China's first aircraft carrier, the Liaoning, is not yet in active service
The consequences of China’s economic interests in the Middle East and
North Africa involve a layer of investments on political and security
levels. One such cost is in securing the safety of energy transports and
another is in the provision of defense forces around the region with
military hardware. An assessment of these investments reinforces the
view that China is not yet playing a large role in the Middle East as
either a naval policing force or supplier of arms, especially not when
compared to the United States.
There is a lot of talk as to whether this is an Asian century: that
China is destined to knock the US off its pedestal at the top of the
global order. When it comes to the Middle East and North Africa, will
Beijing’s involvement in the region move beyond ensuring energy
security?
Greater Chinese involvement in the region beyond economics is in MENA
interest, but politically it is more to Beijing’s advantage to have
stronger economic ties as a booster for political connections. With
political pundits suggesting the US is rolling back its MENA presence as
it “pivots toward Asia,” this, some opine, has cracked open the door
for China to get a foot in.
“Until recently the Chinese thought MENA was the Americans’ [turf], who
would use force and protect energy supplies; [the Chinese government
is] a practical government that could live with the US’ effective
leverage over oil supplies as long as it was getting the oil,” said
Derek Scissors, an Asia Economist at the Heritage Foundation. “But if
the US cannot ensure oil gets to the rest of the world, it is a problem
for China.”
Straits and horizons
Currently, MENA accounts for around 50 percent of China’s energy
imports, and the region is only set to become more crucial to Asian
economies, with the International Energy Agency predicting that
over the next decade more than 90 percent of the MENA region’s oil and
gas trade will be heading to Asia. This requires stability in MENA, and
that the Strait of Hormuz remains open for oil tankers. The US has been
the dominant player in ensuring that this oil continues to flow, and has
paid a lot to do so, with the costs of projecting military force in the
Gulf estimated at $6.8 trillion between 1976 and 2007, according to
research by Princeton University’s energy policy department.
“What if the US is only willing to spend $1 trillion
and not $2 trillion; is that enough? Who will step in? If there is
long-term partial US disengagement from the region, China needs to do
something to offset that risk, and they are not making decisions for
now, but for a world that will be radically different in 2020 than in
2013,” said Scissors.
China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) still has
only limited military capacity. China is not yet up to the task, with
two aircraft carriers yet to be seaworthy, and its long-range naval
capabilities limited.
More importantly, any attempt by China to assume a
greater role in policing the international sea lanes could be met with
suspicion and international resistance. Indeed, China has only recently
been involved navally in the region, with the PLAN over the last four
years deploying nearly 10,000 personnel on warships off the East African
coast as part of multinational anti-piracy operations. Unilateral moves
would likely not be so welcome, but if China were to seek expansion of
its naval presence, it would be a different story. “An increased PLAN
presence in MENA could be seen as a military intrusion in what is seen
as Western territory. I don’t think many Western countries would like
them roaming the Gulf, the Mediterranean and the Red Sea,” said Ghanem
Nuseibeh, founder of Cornerstone Global Associates.
In the regional defense markets, China is a minor
player and does not measure up to the arms-for-oil alliances that have
cemented ties between the West and MENA countries. In terms of arms
sales, China had a 4 percent stake between 2004-2007, dropping to 1
percent between 2008-2011, according to statistics released by the US
Congressional Research Service. The US on the other hand accounted for
78.9 percent of all arms agreements with the Middle East between
2008-2011, at almost $92 billion.
A changing world
Yet in a fluctuating global order, anything is
possible down the line. “If you asked people 15 years ago if China would
be building power plants around the world, people would’ve said no. In
10 years time China may be selling drones. So you don’t extrapolate from
the past. Maybe there will be a Chinese presence in MENA that is not
currently anticipated,” said Scissors.
The drop in Arab willingness to sign weapons contracts
with China shows that Beijing’s credibility is dwindling as a result of
attempts to stay neutral in MENA politics “It is hard for Beijing to
stay neutral. In Syria, they’re trying to do nothing, but in the MENA
region people feel China is pro-Assad, which is hurting China’s image
among the majority of Arabs that support the rebels. If Beijing doesn’t
veto US sanctions on Syria, then Iran and Russia are mad at China. This
is what happens when you become a global economic power — it is hard to
stay in the middle,” said Jacob Zenn, an analyst of African and Eurasian
affairs at the Jamestown Foundation.
This resonates with the view that China faces
fundamental limits with regard to ascending to top dog in the
geopolitical order. As US elder diplomat Henry Kissinger said in a
debate two years ago, “I have enormous difficulty imagining a world
dominated by China and I indeed believe that the concept that some
country will dominate the world is in itself a misunderstanding of the
world in which we now live.”
An indicator of the current state of play in how Arab
governments see the Chinese question was given in a recent speech by
Yahya bin Abdul-Kareem al-Zaid, Saudi Arabia’s ambassador to China: “To
understand China’s relations with Gulf states, one must understand
Sino-American relations.”
“I think that statement is important, as the US is
very cautious about remaining the number one power in the Gulf, and
there is a clear goal on Iran,” said Zenn. “If China starts to upset
that strategy or hegemony in the Gulf, then this will ultimately affect
US-Chinese relations.”
Scissors concurred. “I assume what the ambassador said
is that the Chinese will not do anything to upset the US when it comes
to Saudi Arabia, but we will see what happens, as maybe that is the old
world.”
The future of China’s involvement in the region may –
like in the past few decades – be decided in the halls of power in
Washington as part of a greater game, as the US and Beijing vie for
global supremacy.
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